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SUMMARY
How does language refer to objective reality and relate to speakers?
Davidson’s truth-conditions theory provides a method of interpretation and, 
notwithstanding difficulties in relating artificial languages to natural 
languages, articulates the true structure of all of natural language whilst 
simultaneously furnishing a theory of logical form.
But how does language refer to the world? Davidson’s scientific realism 
abandons any assumed foundational basis in extra-linguistic reality.; hence, 
reference to facts i3 otiose. Only via the truth-conditions structure of 
language can the true structure of reality be described.
From within language, reality is reconstructed as extensional reference to 
simultaneously-postulated entities. Yet reference to Davidson’s abstracta and 
the internal causal structure of such events is problematic. Nevertheless, in 
languages of normal expressive-power, we must refer- even if it proves possible 
to eliminate an unwanted ontology. Convention (t ), however, allows scope for 
alternative theories discriminating reality.
Reference to objective reality being a linguistic action, cognizance must be 
taken of background features of a speaker’s psychological reality guiding and 
constraining such use. Any foundational basis is again rejected:Davidson's 
analysis of *A believes that p ’ (etc.) abjures reference to Fregean propositions 
(or to sentences). Furthermore, extra-linguistic Gricean intentions are 
unacceptable. Only via true, structured, elements of language can the true, 
structured intensional and intentional elements be described.
Thus,beliefs (etc. ) are analyzed within the extensional metalanguage. But 
Davidson's extensional reconstruction of postulated attitudes, and also reference 
to 'reasons' as causes, are contentious. Still, it is argued, we must refer to 
such independent ’reasons' , despite shortcomings in Davidson's account.
Hence, reference to objective reality and the background attitudes of 
speakers are all reconstructed within the truth-conditions structure of language 
as theoretical postulations. Reality is immanent witnin language, but,crucially,
the disclosures of its structured network of interpretants must refer to the 
structured, true being of a reaiity beyond itself.
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PREFACE
How does language, whatever its nature may be, relate to the world and to
the speakers who use it? According to tne Myth of Orpheous, recounted in
Ovid's Metamorphes, only through the foundational ground of language does
the world take on a reality and become meaningful to man, a myth which indicates
the intimate unity which was held to exist between word and object, and between
word and thought, and of the power of language ‘to extend beyond the formation
of language itself to the 'creation' of a world, which was intrinsic to the
earliest Greek thought.'1’ Greek philosophy, however, more or less begins with
the insight that a word is only a name, and does not represent true' being: the
background to Plato's Cratylus, for instance, shows the movement away
from words as representing true being’, and from true knowledge as residing
in human speech; the movement against ancient Greek ideas was under way, and
the incommensurability of words with objects and thoughts began, with
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consequences for the philosophy of language down to recent times. Perhaps 
for the first time in almost three thousand years, there appears to have been
a profound shift occurring in philosophy this century wnich has begun to return
( .
us to something like a linguo-centrlo perspective, taking us almost full-circle 
to seeing language once more as the foundational ground for a new-found intimacy 
between such a language whose nature or structure is the source of true being 
and a realm of physical and 'mental' reality beyond itself- this 'modern' 
view transformed, of course, by the newly available tools and concepts of 
a scientific methodology. Arguably it is in Davidson's philosophy of 
language that this is most clearly seen: a philosophy in which the true structure 
of language becomes the foundational basis and the immanent source of the true
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structure and being of an external physical reality and psychological reality.
If, like all the best radical positions* Davidson's philosophy of language
is thoroughly traditionalist ( in trie real sense of this term), this thesis is
specifically concerned with Davidson's truth conditions theory and scientific
realism- since Davidson's aim is for a completely extensional account of
language and, as with Wittgenstein's Tractatus , there is a close relationship
between the methodology employed and the current ideas in science: in Davidson's
case, with the 'Bootstrap' theory in contemporary physics. ^ Not surprisingly,
therefore, Davidson's aim of achieving a totally unified theory of language
according to the tenets of scientific realism makes the notion of structure
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central in his theory of meaning. As Quine has pointed out, if we send a man 
into another room and have him come back and report on its contents, the selected 
traits of objects in that room which he is reporting upon encoded in language 
is a purely structural affair in the sense that there are no qualitative 
resemblances betweeen the objects reported upon and the language used to report 
them; furthermore, the man's internal 'psychological reality' in which his 
knowledge of the objects consists, also bears none but structural relations to 
those objects. Similarly with the knowledge which an interpreter secures from 
the man's linguistic testimony. Hence, if the nature of external physical reality 
and the psychological knowledge about that reality is in terms of structure 
which is encoded in language and which is sharable in the manner described, 
investigating the structure of language must surely be our paramount concern.
For tnis reason, this thesis makes Davidson's approach central rather than, say, 
the ideas of Dummett or Grice since, for reasons that will become clear, it is 
impossible to make the structure of language in terms of a truth conditions 
theory of foundational importance on the notions of these latter philosophers. 
Of course, in considering the relationship of the structure of language to 
the world and to language users, what must be in the foreground it the 
indicative sentence; since not all sentences are in the right mood to have 
truth conditions we must distinguish between imperatives and interrogatives and 
these indicatives, but the assumption here is that a theory of meaning compre­
hensive enough to ta^e into account the various moods will nevertheless still 
be essentially truth-theoretical. Again, as Quine has noted, Davidson's use 
of ‘Tarski's truth tneory should work as well for evaluative sentences
and for performatives as it does for statements of fact.
This general theme of the importance of structure,then, runs through the
whole of the study, but trie concentration by Davidson on this aspect leads to
the specific thesis with respect to the actual relationship of the truth
conditions structure of language,as Davidson construes it, to objective reality
and to the psychological reality of the speakers who use that language to
relate to the world. For the fundamental point which Davidson's truth conditions
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theory leads to is trie abandonment of the notion central to 'traditional' 
realism of the need for a foundational basis in an extra-linguistic objective 
reality, and also of the notion central to many 'traditional' theories of meaning 
of the need for a foundational basis in an extra-linguistic psychological 
reality ,notions which have in effect accorded to language a secondary status.
But this rejection of the concept of all dualisms between language and 
uninterpreted reality in many respects turns the traditional realist approaches 
inside out giving as it does primary importance to tne. structure of language . 
in terms of the truth conditions theory, and construing objective reality and 
psychological reality now as a relation to language. In so doing, it is argued 
by some philosophers, Davidson turns away from any 'full-blooded' concept of real 
ism, at best substituting . for it an anaemic form of realism, and at worst 
a kind of instumentalism which effectively ignores reality altogether. These, 
however , are not points of view which prove acceptable in the light of any 
serious study of Davidson's work.
Nevertheless, the fundamental change in perspective, with respect to 'tradit­
ional 'realism and 'traditional' tneories of meaning , which occurrs iu David­
son's move towards a unified truth conditions theory of meaning- does give
back to language a prominence whidh perhaps it has not enjoyed in our major
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Western tradition since before Plato.
In order to show how , despite the ensuing criticisms to be made, Davidson's 
ideas lead to the conclusion that for human beings language must once more be 
regarded as the foundational basis, the source, for the representation of true 
being in an extra-linguistic objective reality to which utterances refer, as 
well as representing tne true being of those features of the psychological 
reality of speakers behind the use of utterances so to refer, this thesis is 
divided into four main parts: PART 1 deals with the basic evidence of
linguistic behaviour confronting an interpreter, and the formulation of a 
suitable theory of truth for tne delineation of its structure; PART 11, the 
relationship of language to objective reality to which it is used to refer; 
PART 111, the relationship of such a referential use of language- construed as 
a linguistic action— to those features of the psychological reality of language 
users deemed to be behind such an action; PART IV concludes with a resume of 
the preceeding work, and a final assessment of Davidson's 'emergent' realism. 
Within this broad outline, the specific chapters are concerned with the follow­
ing topics:
CHAPTER ONE, following this brief PREFACE, continues with what must surely be
accepted as the only suitably concrete and scientifically objective evidential
basis for understanding human beings- that of uninterpreted linguistic behav -
iour, for what other evidence could possibly be relevant? Yet it is this
exclusive concern with language itself as the sole admissible evidence which
is later 'to have such a profound effect on Davidson's attitude towards realism,
and which sets his approach apart from other philosophers, even Quine. Thus,
intentional linguistic behaviour is taken to manifest what a complex organism
such as the human creature is must be attempting to meaningfully communicate
about the world, together with what that creature believes about the world, and
as accompanied by other complex attitudes. In this, the isolation of the central
core of 'sentences held true' plays a crucial role , and Davidson takes it
as given that language is , as it were, 'immersed' in the realities of the
world and of language users, and can be taken as manifesting relationships
to both these aspects of reality. The centrality of the indicative sentence, 
with its strict and literal truth conditions, with respect to how people
control and manipulate reality is obvious, together witn its syntactical and 
semantic completeness in tae light of tne other moods. Yet how are we to gain 
access to the structure of meaning and belief whica is deemed to be 'keyed-into' 
such sentences , and wi.ich will show how such linguistic behaviour is related to 
the realities of the world and of the speakers who use such utterances? We must 
have a theory to interpret such language, and the only suitable theory for such 
a purpose- the one which satisfies all four desiderata Davidson lays down - is 
Tarski's truth conditions theory.
CHAPTER TWO describes how Davidson construes his use of Tarski's theory of 
truth as providing what is centrally required: the means of revealing and
articulating;- the structure of the whole of natural language, commencing with 
a fragment and working outwards, togither with tne notion of satisfaction link­
ing sentences and non-sentential expressions to sequences of objects in the world 
Nevertheless, important difficulties lie in the way, since Tarski's Convention 
(T) was designed for an artificial language, and,relating such ideas to 
natural language is problematic. Davidson's eschewal of any ultimate dualism 
between the two, however, enables him to maintain that the only possible 
’entering-wedge' we have for exploring how the elements of a natural language 
are articulated is through his use of Tarski's truth conditions theory and the 
structure it describes. More than this, it provides us with a Theory of Logical 
Form.
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CHAPTER THREE elaborates on tne use of Davidson's truth conditions theory as 
tne foundational basis for the articulation of structure within the whole of 
natural language whilst simultaneously providing the required postulated 
logical form. Davidson's proposal to reflect the whole of the structure of 
natural language in terms of first-order logical form as the real structure of 
language is discussed in the light of the views of philosophers who hold that 
we canhot refer to this as the real logical form of language, and indeed that
natural language may not have any unique logical form at all. ‘The extreme 
difficulty of finding the kind of predicate structure Davidson envisages wi.thin 
many kinds of recalcitrant discourse would seem to provide evidence for the
truth of this criticism. Yet surely, it is argued, we must refer to such a 
uniform structure as really existing across the whole of language as required 
by a systematic and general theory of meaning such as Davidson's for there to be 
any consistent intelligibilty. Even so, Davidson's 'strong* notion of logical 
form in terms of ideal first-order logic though it may from certain methodo­
logical perspectives be the best means of capturing tne minimum outline of 
communicative intelligibilty needed, and building up the structure of all of 
natural language, is not the only option open to us ; if Davidson's notion of 
logical form needs to be augmented, we can do so whilst still remaining within 
the constraints of Convention (t ). Thus, whatever the outcome with respect to 
best kind of logical form, the fundamental point made in this chapter remains 
valid: that Davidson's use of Tarski's truth conditions theory provides at least 
one means of delineating the structure of the whole of natural language, and 
thus of enabling us to see natural language as a self-sustained, autonomous 
network of logical possibility . It also provides the foundational basis for 
how Davidson construes tne relationship of the structure of language to 
objective reality and to the psychological reality of the speakers of language 
discussed in PAST 11 and PAST 111.
CHAPTER FOUR thus opens with the question dealt with throughout PAST TWO,that
is, with the problem of how (from an interpreter's point of view) the sentences
and sentential components of that part of the language we are concerned with,
and with 'the kind of structure delineated in the previous chapter, can be
said to relate to objective reality. It is here that Davidson's departure from
the ideas of any kind of'traditional' realism (by wnich is meant the philosophy,
primarily, of the early Wittgenstein and Russell) or of any empiricism,(including
as Davidson sees it, Quine's philosophy of language) is most evident. Contrary
to such views, Davidson's truth conditions structure of language , where iruth
is defined in terms 01 satisfaction, does not require any foundational basis in an
objective reality to wnich language (whether in terms of sentences, words and
predicates or whole conceptual schemes) subserviently corresponds or which it
organizes or fit3, and hence all dualisms between language and uninterpreted 
objective reality is rejected. Although no total conceptual primacy
is given to language in the sense that its concepts need be taken as exhausting 
the concepts of physical reality- and indeed, on Davidson’s thesis , some degree 
of structural reciprocity between the two is demanded- nvertheless, for us, any 
structured view of objective reality can only occur via the 'entering-wedge1 
of a structured view of language, as provided by something like Davidson's w 
truth condtions theory. With certain reservations, it is argued that most of 
Davidson's{ ideas on these issues should be accepted; hence, in explaining how
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an interpreter construes how an (alien speaker's) utterances are used to refer 
to the world, since there is no access to any extra-linguistic objective 
reality, the truth conditions theory of the structure of language must provide 
the foundational basis for an intersubjective theory of reference, for captur­
ing those invariant structural features within the 1 over-lapping' reference 
schemes of speakers which are necessary to successful communication. The founda­
tional basis in an objective reality as required by traditional realism is thus 
abandoned. , and replaced by the intersubjectively shared truth conditions 
structure of language.
CHAPTER FIVE outlines how, from within the intersubjectively shared truth 
conditions structure of language, the direct description of a theoretically 
constructed objective reality is contemplated in terms of extensional reference 
and the simultaneous postulation of assumed entities such as events. From 
the point of view of the interpretative reconstruction of how a speaker's 
utterances meaningfully refer to objective reality, this aspect is best seen 
as dealing with the structural pattern and abstract entities which human 
beings project and impose upon objective reality — the 'operative' element and 
the fundamental category of language. Plainly, objective reality is immanent 
within language for Davidson, but is he right to hold that the structure he 
finds within ' language in terms of his abstract extensional events should 
also be taken to refer to tne real structure of objective reality? This is 
discussed in tne light of the negative views of many philosophers towards this.
Certainly, reference to extensional events with tne xind of internal structure 
Davidson requires is problematic, indicating perhaps tnat such an ontology
should be eliminated , ii tnis is feasible. The use of substitutional quantifi­
cation in this respect need not contravene Convention (t ) as Davidson thought; 
even so, it is argued that t...ough it may prove possible to avoid to the kind of 
abstract entities Davidson postulates, it seems certain that we must refer 
eventually. What is indicated by t;.is discussion on ontology, however, is that, 
despite the many advantages of Davidson's austere methodology, if we do need 
to augment his suggestions we can do so and still remain within the constraints 
of Convention (t ) : there appear, therefore, to be many more possibilities for 
other acceptable theories, and perhaps for other means of describing and 
descriminating objective reality form within a truth conditions theory. Since 
our first concern is with building the most unified theory of the structure of 
language, which must then be taken to refer to objective reality, (which of cour­
se can always refute our claims) , the exact nature of tne events internal to 
the theory is not the paramount concern. What still stands is that the truth 
conditions theory of tne structure of language remains our intersubjectively 
shared foundational basis from witnin which we must construe reference to 
objective reality together with the assumed entities which may be needed. It is, 
however, human beings who use utterances to refer to the world, and this aspect 
is discussed in PART 111.
CHAPTER SIX begins PART 111 ,therefore , with the premise that the use of
language to refer to objective reality is an action on the part of human speakers 
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an aspect of language emphasized in Anglo-Saxon philosophy by Austin, and in 
Continental philosophy by Merleau-Ponty. In the interpretation of intentional 
linguistic behaviour so used by speakers, essential reference must thus be made 
to certain intensional and intentional features of a speaker's psychological 
reality behind such language, a complex background of attitudes deemed to 
guide and constrain the use of a linguistic action to refer to objective reality. 
Essentially, wnat an interpreter would like to understand is how a speaker 
understands the use of ais words to refer to the world: what he(or she)believes 
his words mean, his desires, his intentions in using such words, and the decis 
ions involved in tne choice of actions. Not surprisingly, the construal of 
such intentional and intentional features turns out to be the h£te.
noire of scientific realism. Tnis chapter asks the question of now, on David­
son's view, such propositional attitudes as ones expressed by the intensional 
'A believes that.p' are to be analysed.Davidson's truth conditions theory 
abjures the need for any reference to tne kind of foundational, extra-linguist­
ic intensional abstract entities such as propositions ( required by Frege not 
only as the objects of attitudes but also to explain what it is a speaker 
'grasps' in understanding a sentence, aud the route to the reference of certain 
sentences) or of the reference to sentences. Furthermore, Davidson's theory 
rejects the possibility, from anotrier angle, of any reference to extra-linguistic 
Gricean intentions in any foundational sense. The claim is, then, that the truth 
conditions theory does not need any foundational basis in psychological reality 
of tne kind entertained by traditionally-orientated theories of meaning : hence 
all dualism between the trutn conditions theory of language and an extra-linguis­
tic psychological reality is eschewed. This does not, however, mean that total 
conceptual primacy is given to linguistic concepts in the sense that tney 
exhaust the concepts of beliefs, intentions and tne like; rather, there is some 
degree of reciprocity between tne 'two. But it does mean that our understanding 
of any true, structured, elements in these features of psychological reality is 
entirely dependent upon the true, structured, elements of language as provided 
by something like Davidson's use of Tarski's theory of truth,as an 'entering- 
wedge'. In this chapter, Davidson's claims about there being no access for a 
radical interpreter to extra-linguistic features of psychological reality seems 
largely vindicated. The trutn conditions theory of language must therefore be
w
considered as providing the foundational basis for capturing the invariant 
structural features of the over-lapping belief schemas (and other attitudes) 
which lie behind linguistic utterances, and which are necessary to successful 
communication. Any foundational basis in an extra-linguistic psychological 
reality as required bp traditional theories of meaning is thus abandoned and 
replaced the intersubjectively shared truth condions structure of language.
CHAPTER SEVEN tnus goes on to consider how, from within • the truth conditions 
theory of the structure of language, those features like beliefs, desires, 
intentions (and related decisions) which are part of the complex network of
the psychological reality of speakers behind their use of linguistic actions.
The attribution of any propositional attitude to an agent must be within the 
framework of a theory of such an agent’s beliefs, desires, intentions and 
decisions. Thus, for Davidson, the attribution of such intensional features as 
beliefs must receive an analysis from within the extensional truth conditions 
metalanguage, and tnus becomes a matter of the analysis of the logical relations 
of language together with the determination of an ontology. From the point of 
view of an interpreter, it is necessary to credit speakers with a pattern oh 
network of psychological attitudes behind their / language in order to satis­
factorily explicate such linguistic behaviour; variables to be solved for in 
constructing our overall theory. Clearly, the attribution of such features of 
psychological reality is from within language for Davidson. However,Davidson 
also requires that reference be made to real entities such as beliefs and 
desires , since such ’reasons’ are deemed to be the causes of linguistic 
actions. Both Davidson's extensional reconstruction of beliefs and other 
attitudes, and also the notion of reference to reasons as causes receive a great 
deal of criticism from various philosophers. Whether Davidson's truth conditions 
theory can offfer a satisfactory extensional account of sentences attributing 
propositional attitudes is so far unclear; the second issue of reference to 
reasons as causes is also problematic, though it does seem we must refer to 
independent antecedent reasons as causes. Nevertheless, shortcomings were 
revealed in Davidson's account of how agents arrive at their reasons for action,
but there are also difficulties with the alternatives suggested. What remains
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the case is that the truth conditions theory of the structure of language seems 
to be the only suitable foundational basis from within which to reconstruct 
those features of the psychological reality of speakers behind their linguist­
ic actions.
CHAPTER EIGHT , PART IV, summarizes the main issues of the previous chapters, 
and offers some conclusions. It also, in answering the original question- from 
the perspective of Davidson's truth conditions theory and the tenets of scientif­
ic realism- of what it is from an interpreter's point of view about the nature 
of the utterances of other speakers which allows them to be construed as
referring to an extra-linguistic objective reality, and how such utterances 
relate to the speakers who so use them, returns to the starting point of the 
enquiry. For, in CHAPTER OLE, linguistic behaviour was seen to be the only 
really scientifically objective and concrete evidence available to an interpreter 
and now the conclusion is that language itself is the very source from within 
which the objective reality being referred to by the utterances of a speaker, 
together with those features of the psychological reality of a speaker behind 
his linguistic action of referring, and which guide and constrain such an action, 
must be theoretically reconstructed. Since any foundational basis in an extra- 
linguistic objective reality.or psychological reality as required by traditional 
realism or traditional theories of meaning is untenable, Davidson's truth 
conditions theory .of language (or something like it) inevitably becomes the 
intersubjectively shared foundational basis from within which the invariant 
structural features of reference, belief, desire and intention (plus decision) 
must be reconstructed. An interpreter, in redescribing a speaker's utterances 
as meaningfully referring to objective reality has to construe such reference 
and simultaneous postulation of abstract entities from within the truth 
conditions theory of language; similarly, the attribution by an interpreter of 
the necessary background of tne complex network of psychological reality must 
also be in terms of the trutn conditions theory of language. Since the truth 
conditions structure of language determines both objective reality and 
psychological reality in tnis way, reality,for us, is linguistic reality, 
nevertheless,) though reality must be considered immanent within the structural 
network of language, it has also been shown that the disclosures of language 
also refer to a real external reality.
As mentioned at the beginning of this PREFACE, therefore, language once more 
becomes the foundational source of true being to be found in the realm of a 
physical and psychological reality beyond itself. Historically, perhaps it is 
not surprising that we have followed tnis cyclical path to once more accepting 
language as our foundational basis of reality; having rejected tne Divine as 
the source of transcendent meaning, closely followed by Nature, Progress, and 
Marxism, being ousted for failing to provide the fundamental human need for
some kind of foundational basis , man seems to be returning to the source 
closest at hand for a solution to our cultural crises of meaninglessness. Let 
us hope that language, as the last bastion of meaning, will not fail us.
i
PART ONE 
LANGUAGE AND INTERPRETATION
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
1*1 Language aa Evidence and a Theory of Truth
The goal of semantics, the central task of a theory of meaning is, for Davidson,
to show how it is possible for the speakers of a language to Effectively
determine the meaning or meanings of an arbitrary expression* ^ , as such an
expression occurs within a given context and as uttered by a particular speaker.
This immediately pinpoints the problem for the radical interpreter, since the
basic evidence, the sole evidence, with which he or she is confronted and upon
which a theory is to be formulated is that of hitherto uninterpreted intentional
linguistic behaviour, (as a part of behaviour in general ). It further reveals
the eminently scientific and objective nature of Davidson’s enterprize, following
as it does Quine’s dictum that the only acceptable evidence is to be utterances
of words ’out where we can see and hear them' and which are thus ’accessible to 
3
human science1. - surely a correct observation, since what other evidence can 
there be which would be more relevant ; as Davidson notes in another context, 
such a standpoint,as rooted in language, is 'as objective as can be.’ ^ And it 
is this exclusive concern with language itself which is to have such a profound 
effect on Davidson's attitude towards realism, an attitude which sets his 
approach apart from that of many other philosophers, including, ultimately, even
5
that of Quine.
It is this intentional linguistic behaviour, then, which is taken to manifest
simultaneously and- apart from the formal and empirical constraints which the
£
interpreter places upon it- indissolubly , what a complex organism such as the 
human creature is must be attempting to meaningfully communicate about the world, 
together with what that creature believes about the world,and accompanied by 
other complex attitudes and feelings.
In more general terms, what the radical interpreter is doing is observing 
the production of sounds(or inscriptions)in a given context by a particular 
speaker, behaviour which is obviously playing a strikingly important role for 
such a creature, and, as part of the theory which we wish to develop in order 
to explain this expression of complex behaviour we must assume the observed 
sounds(or inscriptions)to meaningfully refer to the world, while as part of our 
attribution to such a speaker of a human mind we must also attribute to him or 
her a complicated structure of beliefs, desires, intentions and the like. In 
Davidson's terminology, a theory of interpretation allows us to re-describe the
7
utterance of sounds as acts of saying. Without such basic concessions it is 
hard to see how any start towards intelligently interpreting linguistic behav­
iour can be made. How this is to be achieved by Davidson, and to what extent it 
can be considered successful is a matter for later consideration; here it is 
necessary only to establish that the sole ground for such theorizing according 
to Davidson's programme is the observed linguistic behaviour said to manifest 
a certain structure of meaning about the world, together with a complex struct­
ure of psychological attitudes towards the world.
However, it is not just language in general which can be taken to provide 
the specifically semantical evidential base which Davidson demands and which is 
taken to^manifest such a meaning and attitudes; not only is the focus of David­
son's project exclusively on linguistic behaviour, but he ear-marks as crucial
8
in this respect the central core of sentences held true - although m  very
' 9 murecent work, Davidson has altered his position somewhat on this issue. Thus,
in most of his papers to date Davidson has maintained that 'In order to interp­
ret verbal behaviour, we must be able to tell when a speaker holds a sentence 
he speaks to be true.'^ and that such sentences are 'held to be true partly 
because of what is believed, and partly because of what the speakere means by 
his words. ' 11 (other attitudes also being involved, as Davidson makes clear 
elsewhere. 1^). In Davidson's view, the basis for a theory of meaning would 
begin with plausible guesses about what sentences a speaker holds true: without 
any detailed knowledge about what such sentences mean, or about what the speaker 
believes about tne world, we can nevertheless, says Davidson, find it plausible
that ’X holds S to be true’1? Tne idea being, then, that the interpreter makes
as many good guesses as he can about the conditions under which speakers hold
sentences to be true, and proceed on this basis to construct a theory of meaning.
It is the isolation of this group of sentences which is to enable us to get our
translation manual under way, and it is plain that here, too, Davidson, in
depending on the notion of ’sentences held true’ is following Quine who, in
developing his own theory of radical translation, also depended on the idea of 
• . 14simple assent. Certainly, it would seem that the most secure linguistic 
data upon which to build a thory of meaning - because it is the least theoretic­
ally loaded- is assent-dissent behaviour, the means by which we isolate the 
sentences held true; nevertheless, whether this particular group of sentences is 
in fact so readily isolatable as Davidson and Quine appear to assume is not 
clear, and has been questioned by some philosophers. ^  (See also CHAPTER SIX).
1*2 Abstraction of Linguistic behaviour Prom Context and Speaker
Assuming that the isolation of sentences held true is feasible, Davidson, like 
any good scientist has isolated the basic evidence in conjunction with which 
he is to develop his theory. Such objectivity is of course commendable since 
such a starting point seems to provide the most scientifically objective means of 
cutting through the plethora of detail from the jungle of data which confronts 
the would-be radical interpreter. For example, the sheer complexity of elements
I
at work in the observed structure of sound itself : the various degrees of intona 
tion, inflexion and tone; the battery of perceptual and physical detail emanat­
ing from the extra-linguistic context in which the utterance is produced; the 
immense richness of the psychological factors within individual speakers deemed 
to issue in the utterance. All these features are apparently variable in countless
ways, and could be construed as interacting in various configurations to produce
16
the linguistic behaviour with wnich the interpreter is concerned. Taking 
such extra-linguistic features as essential factors in a theory of meaning, as 
some traditionally-orientated approaches have done, and some contemporary 
philosophers still wisn to do, leads, as will be seen, only to frustration. Apart 
from all the difficulties which Davidson perhaps skates over too
readily with respect to isolating tne sentences held true, it will be assumed 
that this approach is indeed the most scientific and objective starting point 
possible. In fact, though Davidson's perspective may seem, in the process it 
adopts of abstracting from the extra-linguistic contextual and psychological 
factors and concentating on the central core of language as the only admissible 
evidence, to be ignoring such features and placing an unwarranted conceptual 
primacy on language, this is not so. Of course, there is a radical change of 
perspective involved if one compares Davidson's approach with traditional 
theories of meaning: it is taken as given that the linguistic behaviour under 
consideration is the resultant of the interaction of all these various extra- 
linguistic contextual and psychological forces ; certainly the mystery of how 
they interact to produce true sentences is left unexplained ( perhaps because 
ultimately it is inexplicable, or at least not the concern of the semantic 
theorist). Rather, we go straight to the 'resultant* of these forces- the 
language produced- and, in particular , to that core of sentences held true, 
immersed, as it were, in tne contextual and psychological features which 
surround and have produced it. (see CHAPTER TWO,section 2*2). And, in so doing, 
we are going immediately to the heart of the most concrete evidence available. 
Naturally, it also puts Davidson in conflict with the more traditional theories 
of meaning which take it for granted in many cases that the extra-semantic 
features have a much more basic foundational role to play, and that an 
explanation of how language ties-up with such features musr be forthcoming. 
Indeed, one of the major criticisms levelled against Davidson is that his 
concentration on the structure of the sentences of language fails to explicate 
adequately certain needed connections between language and extra-linguistic 
reality; needless to say at this stage, Davidson holds that his approach which 
places sentences held true as the centre 'reality' need not fall prey to such 
criticisms.
1*5 The Centrality of the Indicative
The central core of sentences'held true , which Davidson believes to be easily 
isolatable, is thus taken to be tne central fragment for investigation by
our theory: even thouji of course 'most sentences are not true, 1 nevertheless
17
’the pattern of sentences held true is central.1 For Davidson’Communication
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by language is communicatio by way of literal meaning;1 hence the importance
of sentences with strict and literal truth conditions. But why should we take
tnis category of sentences as basic? Although Davidson does not go into any
detail about this, it is plainly because it seems difficult to comprehend a
plausible account of a language - of tne sounds and inscriptions produced-
which does not see many of tnem, a central core, as having a truth value.Perhaps
from the position of a radical interpreter, some kind of rationalization could
proceed as follows. In certain cases it is tne non-human reality which concerns
19
speakers, and about wnich they wish to communicate to others. To do so, certain
sentences are uttered by by a speaker- and are treated by the hearer - as a
guide to that reality; furthermore, the speaker is taken to have beliefs and
other attitudes about reality behind the use of such sentences. The point about
the utterances in tuis special case being tnat the speaker has information
about the reality, and attitudes towards that reality, which he wishes to
(literally) . communicate. The (radical ) interpreter seeks to explain the
behaviour of the speaker with wnom he is confronted, and does so by tentatively
20assigning truth values to these utterances, and beliefs about their truth-values;
in other words, the radical interpreter starts by observing the production of
sounds (for example), and semantic theorizing begins when some of these are
are taken as true or false, meaningfully referring to the world, as well as
20
reflecting the thoughts , beliefs and other attitudes of the speaker. We 
thus have a great practical interest in establishing wnich or our neighbours 
sentences are held true, not least perhaps because the more we are able to 
interpret and understand such sentences about the world, the better our chances 
of acting and surviving in the world: people have an interest in controlling 
and manipulating the reality outside tnemselves, and , insofar as this is 
feasible , and in order to satisfy their various beliefs, needs and aims, 
language— and especially the sentences held true — have a significant role to 
play. It seems a plausible assumption, therefore, that in attempting to render 
linguistic communication intelligible, a central and uneliminable role should 
be accorded to the notion of the strict and literal truth conditions
meaning of sentences. Thus, if , with Davidson , we are to base our semantics 
on truth conditions, we are bound to accord a central position in 3uch a 
semantics to tne indicative mood. (Relativized to time and speaker-see CHAPTER 
TWO. )
Clearly, of course, as Davidson recognizes, not all utterances are assertions 
an indeed, most sentences are not even in the indicative mood: yet there are, 
independent of the reasons given above, plenty of good motivations for treating 
the indicative as primary- an emphasis prevalent in the majority of theories 
of meaning. The indicative does seem to have a syntactic, semantic and communica­
tive completeness which the other moods lack, and which therefore invites the
21thought that the common element in a semantic theory will be these indicatives.
And, though by the usual standards, neither questions, nor optatives, nor
imperatives have truth values, Davidson does offer an analysis of how the
non-indicative utterances in the different moods can be accomodated by a theory
of meaning which takes the literal, truth conditions meaning as central: such
an accomodation being accomplished, for Davidson,by extending his proposals
22
for tackling indirect quotation and other propositional attitudes. Whether this 
proposal is in itself adequate is open to question, and is considered in 
CHAPTER SEVEN.
Notwithstanding this latter problem, however, it nevertheless seems justif­
iable, for the reasons given above concerning matters of cutting through the 
plethora of detail awaiting the radical interpreter,and the importance to
I
speakers of communicating literal meaning, that a primary importance should be
( ^
given to the central core of sentences held true, and to indicative sentences.
It will thus be assumed here tnat Davidson's starting point is the most scientif­
ically objective and precise one possible, and that Davidson's project is in 
essence viable- though tne use of truth conditions as a central concept for the 
theory of meaning will later be questioned. For the present, however, it is 
necessary only to establish that tne focus of Davidson's programme is exclusively 
on linguistic behaviour, and crucial to this is his concentration on the central 
fragment of sentences held true and wnich are taken to manifest a structure of 
a speaker's meaning and belief (plus other attitudes)and which, with their strict 
and literal truth conditions is the basis for the truth conditions theory itself.
1*4 Sentences Held True and a Suitable Theory of Truth: Four Desiderata
Davidson’s procedure is thus to construct a theory of truth, according to cert­
ain constraints to be specified, solely on the basis of- or in conjunction with- 
the linguistic data, tne sentences held true; a theory of truth which will 
enable us to simultaneously reconstruct the joint manifestation of meaning and 
belief (and other attitudes) within tnis central core of sentences.^ The 
problem of interpretation is therefore, given that we have isolated the 
sentences held true within a certain context and by a particular speaker, to
work out what that speaker’s words mean, together with what that speaker
2 A 2 R
believes, together with other related attitudes. Furthermore, the
interpretation of even a single arbitrary utterance with which we are assuming
we are confronted (l«l) is deemed to require the ability to interpret the whole
of a language: 'tne evidence for the interpretation of a particular utterance
will have to be evidence for the interpretation of all the utterances of a
26
speaker or community.' The construction of such a theory will thereby
provide a rational and coherent explanation of the pattern of the linguistic
behaviour with which we are confronted, since ’We interpret a creature as
rational insofar as we are able to view his actions as part of this overall
27
rational pattern comprizing his meaning' and belief.' (and other attitudes.) 
Thus,, our problem may be summarized as concerned with constructing a suitable
theory of truth which will enable us simultaneously to abstract form the
1
total evidence of linguistic behaviour available, a theory of meaning, plus a
h
theory of belief and other relevant attitudes.
But what kind of a theory of truth would be suitable for such a task? One 
of the chief merits of Davidson's approach, and one which again indicates his 
.adherence to the tenets of objectivity and scientific realism, is the precision-
with which he lays down FOUR DESIDERATA as methodological criteria for a 
truth conditions theory of meaning. Before constructing a semantic theory, we 
must say what it is we want it to do ; the criteria which Davidson lays down 
lead him eventually to equate his own requirements with a Tarski-style truth 
theory- though, as will be seen, Davidson's approach is not tied directly to
the Tarskian model, Davidson's desiderata should be considered in the light of 
the aim of his overall programme, the task of a theory of meaning being, as he
sees it, not to reform , but to describe and to understand natural language. 28
The four desiderata wnich Davidson lays down are:
(1) Recursion: The primary demand on a theory of meaning is that it be
29
recursive. It must show how the sentences of a language L
are semantically compounded from the finite stock of L's words
by means of L's rules for combining these words.
(2) Holism; . A theory of meaning must enable us to 'give the meaning ' of
each and every sentence of the natural language L we are 
studying.
(3) Same Concepts: It must ensure that the statements of how the sentences of L
mean is based on the same stock of concepts as L's 
sentences themselves.^
32(4) Empirical Testability: The theory of meaning must be empirically testable.
The most important of these desiderata is that of recursion; next in importance
is that of holism. The remaining two are explicated in a somewhat more vague
manner by'Davidson, (at least in his early papers). All four are dealt with ,
as they relate to Tarski's theory of truth, in the next chapter, which shows G
how these requirements lead Davidson to accept sucn a truth conditions theory.
For the present it will be noted tnat none of these criteria is particulary
controversial; what is more open to dispute, as will be seen, is whether Tarki's
theory of truth will satisfy them with respect to natural language. But perhaps
it is pertinent at tnis stage to mention the kind of truth theory which is
required for his descriptive enterprize. Plainly, the specific interest is not
33
in any metaphysical definition of truth; Davidson's starting point is the 
claim that our basic data is tue uninterpreted (intentional) linguistic 
behaviour in the form of sentences held true. The interpretation ...of these
is to proceed by stating' tneir truth conditions; what is required, therefore,
of a theory of truth is a descriptive account of the notion of truth: wnat it
means to say t,:at the various conditions are jointly necessary and sufficient
34for the truth of sentences.
Plausible candidates for this role include- initially, at least- Ramsay’s 
35
Redundancy Theory . Many variants of Ramsay's theory have also been proposed,
36
such as Grover’s Prosentential Theory. ' Kripke, too, has sketched an Outline
37
of a Theory of Truth. All, however, appear to encounter crucial difficulties.
Ramsay's theory itself comes down to saying that 'true1 and 'false' are in fact 
predicates which can be dropped without semantic loss, since they have only a 
stylistic or pragmatic role to play. Beneath this, on the surface, simple notion, 
however, lay profound difficulties. Specifically, Ramsay’s account demands a 
suitable handling of second-order quantification for cases where propositions 
are described: in cases wnere what is asserted is not explicitly given but is
~Z Q
introduced obliquely. Ramsay’s proposal here was that, for example, 'What
he says is always true' is to be explained as 'For all p, if he asserts p, 
then p.' - which contains no use of 'true'. However, now the question arises
as to whether the universal quantifier 'for all...' is to be understood 
objectually or substitutionally. (see CHAPTER FIVE. ) If it is understood 
objectually, then it looks as though propositions may have to be retained as the 
objects quantified over- and tnis is explicitly rejected by Davidson.(See 
CHAPTER SEVER) And also, if the bound variables, the 'p's' , are syntactically 
like singular terms (See CHAPTER FOUR), then the final 'p' in 'for all p, if 
he asserts p, then p ’ will have to be regarded as an ellipsis"of 'p is true' , 
as implicitly containing a predicate, in order for it to be sufficiently like 
a sentence to stand on the right—hand—side of 'then': for all propositions p,
if he asserts p, then p is true». Yet if this analysis contains the predicate 
'is true' after all, then truth has not in fact been eliminated, and thus is 
not redundant. Furthermore, if the quantifier is interpreted substitutionally, 
then''for all p, if ne asserts p, tnen p' turns into 'all substitution instances
of '^if he asserts p, then p" are true * Again, 'true' remains in the analysis,
and thus has not been eliminated.
The Ramsay Redundancy Theory of truth therefore seems less than plausible,
with its suggestion that truth is eliminable; neither, however, do the various
alternatives mentioned earlier seem to suffice. Grover, for example, readily
39admitts that there is also a residue of truth in his analysis. As for Kripke, 
Katz criticizes his theory of truth on the grounds that though it offers an 
account of groundedness for an artificial language, there seems to he no obvious 
way in which the account can be applied to natural languages. ^
If this is so, and iftruth refuses to be redundant, Ramsay’s theory and the\ 
variants of this theory only pointing the way to a more satisfactory theory of 
truth, then we must look elswhere for a solution. The one which turns out to 
satisfactorily meet Davidson’s requirements is in fact Tarski's Convention (T). 
And it is to such a truth conditions theory, one meeting the four desiderata 
Davidson laid down as the methodological criteria for a suitable theory of 
meaning, to which we now turn in the next chapter.
i
CHAPTER TWO 
TRUTH CONDITIONS STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE
2*1 The Role of the Truth Conditions Theory
For Davidson, a truth conditions theory along the lines advocated by Tarski, 
suffices to delineate the structure of natural language. ^
CHAPTER ONE showed, in fact, that such a truth conditions theory, one meeting 
the four desiderata Davidson laid down as the methodological criteria for a 
suitable theory of meaning,was the best and possibly the only viable theory of 
the truth structure of sentences. But Tarski's theory of truth was designed for 
a formalized language, and, as will be seen, though there are similarities 
between an artificial language and natural language, plainly,there are also 
important differences. Such differences make the idea of any simple notion of 
correspondence between an artificial language and natural language problematic ; 
for some philosophers, there is a kind of dualism between any artificial langu­
age and natural language , an unbridgeable gulf between the two which , because 
of the recalcitrance of natural language, makes them seek to replace it entirely 
by its formal counterpart. Such a conceptual predominance cannot be accorded to 
artificial languages on Davidson's approach, for whom the task is to understand 
natural language itself and the reality of its impervious features, and even 
though ultimately Davidson rejects the notion of any dualism between the two. 
There is, indeed, a kind of reciprocity between the demands of a formal and a 
natural language on Davidson’s thesis, but what is insisted upon is that for us 
the only possible 'entering-wedge ’ that we have for exploring how the elements 
of natural language are articulated is via something like Tarski’s truth condit­
ions structure. In this way, the truth conditions theory becomes Davidson's
foundational basis for delineating the structure of the whole of natural langu-
2
age, and provides an intersubjectively available theory of logical form .
m e  arenetype lor naviason's tneory oi meaning is Tarski's theory of truth, 
though, as will be seen, Davidson does not, and cannot, follow Tarski in every­
thing. Ultimately, the value of Tarski's theory lies, for Davidson, in the fact 
that it enables him to reveal and articulate structure within the whole of 
natural language , beginning with a fragment of that language and working out­
wards. 3 Tarski provides Davidson with a paradigm in terms of an analysis of 
the formal semantical treatment of quantificational language which, Davidson 
hopes, with amendments, will be applicable to ordinary language. The initial 
task in this chapter is therefore to examine the means by which Tarski delin­
eates structure in a formal language, and then to see how this links up with the 
requirements given by Davidson's four desiderata considered in the last chapter.
Tarski's purpose is to provide a satisfactory theory of truth for a formal­
ized language. He begins his account with the objective of finding a definition 
of truth which is both materially adequate and formally correct , and which 
would do justice to the 'classical Aristotelian conception of truth . ' ^
In order to prohibit self-reference of sentences which can occur in semantically 
closed languages, and wnich can lead to paradox , Tarski drew an object language- 
meta language distinction. Ascriptions of truth to sentences is meta­
linguistic: truth is construed as a predicate of a metalanguage applicable to 
sentences of its object language. Furthermore, sentences can only be true or 
false as they are part of a certain language , for there could be a language in 
which, say, 'snow is black1 means tne same as 'snow is white1 does in English.
i
Thus Tarski wisnes to give a definition of 'true sentence' for a certain
W
language L, in a metalanguage M of L. It will entail all sentences of M of the 
form 'S is a true sentence of L if and only if p' - where 'S' is a 9trpctu^&l 
description of a sentence of L, and 'p' is the translation of that sentence 
into M.^ And, since M can include L as a part of itself, sentences of L 
are their own translation into M. Tarski's definition entailing sentences of 
this form is his criterion of material adequacy for any satisfactory definition 
of truth, and is called 'Convention (t) 'Hence, any acceptable definition of 
truth should have as its consequence according to Tarski all instances of tne
schema
an example being 'Snow is white'is true in English if and only if snow is white.
But, in order to give such a definition of truth, something more needs to be 
added to the material adequacy condition: proof of formal correctness , both in 
respect to the structure of the language in which truth is defined, and also 
the concepts employed in the definition. Definitions of truth, as noted, are 
given in L's metalanguage M, thus L must be included in or translated into M; 
but not only must M contain translations into itself of all L-sentences, but 
also the machinery to refer to L-sentences. Finally, and very importantly for 
our later discussion, Tarski required tnat both M and L should be 'formally 
specifiable' : the well-formea-formulae ('wffs') of L must be so specified in 
order to define truth-in-L, since these are the very items which the predicate 
'true-in-L' qualifies. However, since no natural language is formally specif­
iable, ‘Tarski concluded tnat a formally correct definition of truth should be 
expressed in a language which is not semantically closed- that i3, for an 
artificial language only, and that trie possibility of defining 'true' for a 
natural language was virtually impossible: 'The problem of the definition of
truth obtains a precise meaning and can be solved in a_rigorous way only for
7 . . .
those la/iguages whose structure has been exactly specified.' In his original
paper, Tarski's 'object' language was the calculus of classes and he used a
8
version of the axioms of Principia Mathematica j Quine's account, wnich foil—
i
ow'Tarski in all essentials, has been more generally followed by various 
philosophers, with a definition of truth for an object language with first-order 
calculus. ^ Furthermore, Tarski's actual defining, of truth is by means of the 
recursive characterization of the infinity of sentences by means of satisfaction, 
thus he must first define 'satisfies' :
The possiblity suggests itself, however, of introducing a more general
concept wnich is applicable to any sentential function, can be recursively
defined, and, when applied to sentences, leads us directly to the concept
of truth. These requirements are met by the notion of the satisfaction of_._a
10
given sentential function by given ob.iects.
The procedure is therefore that we axiomatically define satisfaction, which 
stands to open sentences (sentential functions, or predicates) as truth stands 
to closed sentences, and then use that axiomatization to define the truth- 
predicate itself.
Specifying the syntax of the object language L , and then that of the 
meta language M is thus the first step:
Syntax
The syntactic structure of the language L , for which truth is to be defined 
includes the expressions:
variables: x.,,x0 ,xT ... 
predicate letters: F,G.•• 
sentence connectives: — & 
quantifier: (E...) 
brackets: ( )
In terms of this primitive vocabulary, the other truth-functions and the univers­
al quantifier can be defined. The atomic sentences are strings consisting of 
n-place predicates followed by n variables:
(I) All a,tomic sentences are well-formed formulae(wffs)
(II) If A is a wff, ^  is a wff
(ill) If A, B are wffs, (A & B ) is a wff
I
(17) If A is a wff, (Ex)A is a wff
(V) Nothing else is a wff
The syntactic structure of the meta language M  is similarly defined.
The recursive characterization of sentences by means of satisfaction, on which 
basis truth is defined,
Satisfaction and Truth
A full discussion of this will prove vital when Davidson's position on realism
a-nu one rexa,uuuBiup ui .Language iu trie worra is considered ^rAKT ±±;:at present, 
an outline of Tarski’s formulation is given. The definition of satisfaction is 
recursive : definitions being given first for the simplest open sentences, and 
then the conditions are stated in which compound open sentences are satisfied; 
this procedure will then provide the necessary definition of truth applicable 
to all sentences of L.
Satisfaction
Let A and B range over sentences of our first-order language, and let the 
expressions X and Y range over sequences of objects, letting the expression 
X^ denote the i. th member of any sequence X .Satisfaction is then defined 
for atomic sentences thus:
(I) For 1-place predicates,
for all i and X: X satisfies'Fxn iff X^ is F 
For 2-place predicates,
for all i and X: X satisfies Gx.x. iff X. and X- stand in the
-  -  -  — i - j  - i  - j
relation JS
And so on for all predicates . Negation, conjunction, and quantification are 
dealt with similarly:
(II) For all X and A: X satisfies ’— A ’ iff X does not satisfy ’A ’
(III) For all X, A, and B: X satisfies fA & B * iff X satisfies A and X satis -
fies B
n For all X, A, and i: X satisfies ’ (Ex. )A iff there is a sequence Y (IV; — “■ .. “ — u
such that X.** Y . for all jj£i, and Y satisfies A.
— i--- 0 “
Each clause in the definition of satisfaction thus corresponds to a clause in 
the definition of a wff. A closed sentence (a wff with no free variables) will 
be satisfied by all sequences or by none. Kence, 1 true1 can now be defined
thus: a closed sentence of the first-order object language is true if and only
if it is satisfied by all sequences. Tarski has therefore shown that his 
definition of'true' is both materially adequate and formally correct . Some care 
has been taken in elaborating the details since they are central to all the 
ideas in Davidson with wnich tnis tnesis will be concerned.
xndixxcj. in  o ru iriiiiit uimjsi wtia s ta o e a  tna i; D a v id s o n 1s two p r im a ry  d e s id e r a ta
for a theory of meaning were those of recursion and holism . It is now possible
to see how Tarski's Convention (t ) as a criteria for suitable theories of truth
meets Davidson’s requirements in this direction.^
The primary demand on a theory of meaning, one which Davidson emphasizes
continually, is to give a recursive characterization of sentence-hood: ’Above
all, I would say, such an account must lead us to see tne semantic character of
the sentence- its truth or falsity- as owed to how it is composed, by a finite
number of applications of some of a finite number of devices that suffice for
the language as a whole, out of elements drawn from a finite stock(the vocabu-
12
lary) that suffices for the language as a whole. ’ And, Davidson makes clear,
’A way to provide such a theory is by recursively characterizing a truth predi-
13cate along the lines suggested by Tarski’ ' - a way which we have just seen 
demonstrated. One of the crucial reasons,Davidson jsays,for this requirement that 
the meaning of each sentence of L depends on a finite number of constitutive 
features of the sentence , is that a language which lacks such a feature would 
be unlearnable.^  Also, the claim that , as shown by Tarski’s theory of truth, 
that the meaning of each sentence depends on the meaning of the constitutive 
words , is deemed to be an essential element in explicating the ability to 
construct and to understand sentences never before encountered: from L ’s finite 
stock of words, (and tne rules governing their combination) an infinite number 
of sentences can be generated and understood by L ’s speakers. (See PART 111, 
CHAPTER Spc, section 2.) Thus, it can be seen that the desideratum of recursion
is important from a number of angles for Davidson’s thesis. The question of the 
finiteness of a theory is important since, if the number of non-logical axioms 
were not finite-if we took as axioms 6f the theory every instance of ’S is true 
iff p 1 , - then desideratum 1 would be violated. A finite, basic, vocabulary 
must be discoverable in the verbal phenomena to be interpreted for a. theory tobe 
useful to a human being with finite powers. And the finite, recursive characteri-
- zation of sentence-hood is crucial from the perspectives of learnability and 
Understanding. Though these aspects recieve detailed discussion in PART 111,
it is pertinent to mention here that this is not a point of view which is shared 
by all philosophers: for example, it has been questioned whether the learning
process aoes m  iact require a recursive theory oi' the kind demanded by Davidson 
and his theory of truth. ^
Closely related to these issues are tne criticisms of Davidson’s (and Quine’s)! 
contention that though Tarski’s recursive, compositional account relies heavily 
on the fact that words contribute in a systematic way to the truth conditions 
of sentences, in terms of meaning and semantic structure, it is sentences which 
take priority in communication. Quine, for example, has said:
The unit of communication is the sentence and not the word. This point of 
semantical theory was long obscured by the undeniable primacy,in one 
respect, of words. Sentences being limitless in number and words limited, 
we necessarily understand most sentences by construction from antecedently 
familiar words. Actually there is no conflict here. We can allow the 
sentences a full monopoly of 'meaning' in some sense, without denying that 
the meaning must be worked out. Then we can say that knowing words is 
knowing how to work out the meanings of sentences containing them. Dict­
ionary definiitions are mere clauses in a recursive definition of the 
meanings of sentences. 16
Similarly, Davidson regards it as the task of a theory of meaning to analyse 
the structure of sentences, and not to supply an account of the meaning of 
individual words:
I
...we have recognized tnat a theory of the kind proposed leaves the w:hole 
matter of wnat individual words mean exactly where it was. Even when the 
metalanguage is different from the object language, tne theory exerts no
17
pressure for improvement, clarification, or analysis of individual words.**
In fact, as will be seen in P A R T 11, words become for Davidson, controversially, 
mere posits of tne truth conditions theory.
Yet again, the matter has been disputed by other philosophers. For instance 
Putnam has argued tnat naming is tne most fundamental function of natural 
language, and that Davidson's and Quine’s method runs counter both to
xiiou-j. o x u ii cuiu uo w it' d t u u  a x  u i  ctii o i ix u p u x u g is  o s : ' i o  i s  n o x e w o r x n y  x n a x
the procedure tnat Quine ana Davidson claim is tne only possible one..going from
whole sentences to individual words is the opposite of the procedure upon which
18
every success ever attained in the study of natural language has been based.'
Active learning, Putnam also stresses, starts from the meanings of individual
words. (See PART 11).
Dummett, too, has disputed tne primacy of sentences over words, though he
seems more recently to have qualified his earlier position. Initially he says
'Though it is certainly true of some words that (l) we can learn their sense only
by learning the use of representative sentences containing them, conversely (11)
there are some sentences ...which we understand only by already knowing the
19meanings of the constituent words. ' Yet more recently he admitts ' m  a
certain sense...sentences have a primacy within language over other linguistic
expressions. ' and Dummett alludes to Frege's 'insight that sentences play a
unique role and that tne role of almost every other linguistic expression...
20
consists in its part in forming sentences. '
Another area where mucn has been made of the primacy of words over sentences
is in psychology: for many psychologists, the fundamental linguistic act seems
21to be that of naming, rather than the communication of meaning And, as for 
Putnam, mentioned above, learning itself is linked in a basic way to this 
fundamental linguistic act of naming. This, of course, brings into focus the 
whole issue of traditional views on language learning. Although it is not necess­
ary nor ppssible to go into all the issues here, it is clear that both Quine 
and Davidson, with tneir claims that sentences are primary in semantics, stand 
opposed to such traditional views on how language is learned. (Even though there 
are remants of empiricism,on which traditional tneories of language learning 
are based, still present in Quine's own philosopny of language, and which prove
unacceptable to Davidson- see CHAPTER FOUR. )
As far as these trauitional theories of language learning are concerned, 
and wnich focus on the primacy of words and how they are linked to the world,as 
the basis of the first stages of language learning, building up bit by bit from 
such a position, this approacn is castigated by Davidson as the 'building-block 
theory of language learning1 w.-.icn echos empiricist epistemology. ^2
empiricism has no place in Davidson’s philosophy of language. Learning a few 
names and predicates applying to physical objects through a process involving 
ostension, followed by tne learning of complex predicates and singular terms for 
objects not necessarily observed, followed in turn by the learning of theoretic­
al terms, together with the enormous jump from individual terms to sentences, is 
rejected by Davidson.
On these matters, there are both similarities and differences between 
Davidson and Quinev. Certainly, the recognition that sentences are primary 'in 
language learning rather than words, is central to Quine's thesis. In publications 
such as Word and Object2^ and The Roots of Reference2 -^ Quine adumbrates his 
position. Simply, language, for Quine, is learned by conditioning: the teacher 
conditions the child to respond in appropriate observable situations. First, 
the learning of short sentences takes place, and tnen access to various words 
is gained through their use in those sentences. On such a basis, comes the 
grasp of longer sentences in which those same words recur. The development which 
leads from sensory stimulation to objective reference is thus seen as beginning 
with the conditioning of simple 'occasion' sentences to stimulatory events,and 
then advancing through various stages to objective reference itself, the attain­
ment of the latter Quine regards as having occurred when the learner has mast-
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ered pred'ication by way of quantification. It is not tne purpose here to 
considerable opposition to Quine's views - for instance, Strawson's criticism
of Quine's dictum that the whole category of singular terms is theoretically 
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superfluous, or Davidson's disagreement with whatphe sees as Quine's misplaced 
empiricism2^ ,since these aspects receive substantial attention later: the only 
point to be made at present is that, despite some contrary opinions, the require­
ment that in matters of communication and learning sentences are,semantically, 
of prior importance to words, is endorsed by a great many philosophers. Dot only 
as might be expected by Quine as indicated above, but also by those of very 
diverse persuasions . Vygotsky, for example, echoes Quine : 'Semantically, a
child starts from wholes , from a meaningful complex, and only later begins to
28
master the separate semantic units, the meanings of words...' ; Austin also 
mounted a lively attack on the idea that word meaning is basic, regarding the
concept 'tne meaning oi a word' as 'in general...a dangerous nonesense—phrase •' '
Grice, too, hardly Davidson'3 bedfellow, gives predominance to sentences over 
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words. Enough has been said, therefore to indicate that over the matter of the 
primacy of sentences over words and the associated issue of the need for a 
recursive theory , there is a substantial body of philosophical opinion in 
support of Davidson ; just how these two ideas stand up to testing will be
revealed in PABT3 11 and 111.
Davidson’s second desideratum requires that a theory of meaning should be
holistic , a requirement again met by Tarski’s Convention (T). A theory of
meaning for a natural language should, for Davidson, yield all sentences of the
form ’s means m ’ , where ’s ’ is a description of a sentence w. ich specifies
its structure, and 'm' is an expression wnich denotes that sentence's meaning.
31However, an appeal to the notion of ’meaning1 is, Davidson contends, problema­
tic, and so Davidson comes to reformulate his original equation, and its amended 
substitution ’s means that p 1 by replacing 'means that' by an arbitrary 
predicate ’T' , giving 's is T iff p' : 'The theory will have done its work if it 
provides, for every sentence s in the language under study, a matching sentence 
(to replace"p" ) that, in some way yet to be made clear, "gives the meaning" 
of s. ’ If the object language is contained in the metalanguage, then one 
candidate* for a matching sentence is obviously 's' itself; if not, a translation 
of 's' in the metalanguage. But it is Davidson's 'final bold step' which is the 
most radical: 'let us try treating the position occupied by "p" extensionally: 
to implement this, sweep away the obscure "means that" , provide the sentence
that replaces "p" with a proper sentential connective , and supply the descrip-
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tion that replaces "s" with its own predicate. ' y If this is done, maintains 
Davidson,'the plausible result is
34
(T) s is T if and only if p
Thus, what is neede for a theory of meaning for a natural language L is that.it
places restrictions on the predicate'is T' sufficient to entail that all the
sentences of the above form (t ) can be derived . But we have now, thinks 
Davidson, reached 'the point of discovery' since 'the condition we have placed
on satisfactory theories of meaning is in essence Tarski's Convention T that
tests the adequacy of a formal semantical definition of t r u t h T h u s ,  the
predicate 'is T 1 mentioned by Davidson in tne constraint on a theory of meaning
will be co-extensive with the truth predicate proposed by Tarski; it will apply
to all ,and only, the true sentences of tne language L. As Davidson indicates
elsewhere, 'since there is a T-sentence corresponding to each sentence of the
language for which truth is in question, tne totality of T-sentences exactly
fixes the extension, among the sentences, of any predicate that plays the role of
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the words"is true" ' J Of course, Davidson thesis comes down to saying what is 
not exacly new: namely that tne meaning of a sentence is to be given by stating 
its truth conditions. But the major difference is the one indicated above, that 
is , with the added muscle of Tarski-style constraints, the truth conditions of 
all sentences are given. We would tnen know not only the T-sentence for any 
particular sentence to be interpreted, but the T-sentences for all other senten­
ces; such a theory is non-trivial, and would enable us to see the place of any
37particular sentence in the language as a whole . The consequences which this 
holistic standpoint nas for delineating the whole of tne structure of a natural 
language is discussed in CHAPTER THREE : for the present, it is enough to see 
that Tarski's theory of truth enables Davidson to fulfill the requirement laid 
down by his second desideratum. And certainly, it does not seem controversial 
that whatever else a suitable theory of meaning needs to delineate, it must 
include an account of the truth conditions of all the sentences of the language 
under consideration.^
The task of the semantic analysis of natural language is therefore seen by 
Davidson as involving the reconstruction of its structure of truth according to 
the primary desiderata of recursion and holism outlined above, both of which 
seem to be essential features of a suitable theory of meaning, and wnich have 
substantial pnilosophical support from various directions.
However, it will be recalled tnat there were also two less determinate 
desiderata laid down by Davidson. (CHAPTER OHE) Th© third desideratum for an 
adequate theory of meaning states tnat the statements of the truth conditions 
for individual sentences entailed by the theory should draw upon the same
concepts as the sentences whose truth conditio^s tuey state ; tne fourth desidera 
turn states that the theory must be empirically testable.
Again, with respect to the third criteria, Davidson maintains that theories 
conforming to TarsKi’s Convention (t) indeed have this desirable characteristic^ 
In a theory couched in a metalanguage which contains its object language,for 
example, this condition is apparently fully satisfied since , for in the schemas 
*s is true iff p 1 the truth conditions of's1 are given by the sentence replac­
ing ’P ’- and this is 's' itself- and so no use of any concepts not directly 
called upon in understanding 's’ are invoked. However, as already hinted at, 
there are other difficulties which seem to make the possibility of making 
desideratum three a precise condition. For one thing, if the metalanguage does 
not contain the object language, it is not obvious when this criterion is satis­
fied. Furthermore, as Davidson notes ’It seems natural to interpret the third 
condition as prohibiting the appearance of a semantic term in the statement of 
the truth conditions of a sentence unless that sentence already contains the 
semantic term (or a translation of it ) . * ^  Davidson, however holds(at least 
when such desiderata were formulated he did) that it is unclear whether this 
constraint would rule out explicit appeal to semantic concepts in the statement 
of truth conditions for modal sentences, even though it seems to threaten theor­
ies which make truth in a model the fundamental notion. Such issues have proved 
contentious, with some recantation on Davidson’s part, as will be seen in
41
PART 11, CHAPTER FIVE.
Finally, in this brief outline of how Davidson sees theories meeting the 
constraints of Tarski’s Convention (t ) as satisfying his own desiderata for 
suitable theories of meaning for natural language, there is the requirement of 
empirical testability. The issues here are even more fraught with difficulty, 
as will be seen in PART 111 (CHAPTERS SIX and SEVEN) . What about the more
limited purpose at present: how does ^avidson see Tarski’s (adapted) theory as 
providing what Davidson sees as crucial to a theory of meaning- that it must be 
testable? Sinee we are seeking an empirical theory, we must know what empirical 
data might constitute evidence for or against such a theory; we want some specif­
ication of wnat evidence will indicate when a theory is correct. 42 f0r ,
’like any theory, it may be tested by comparing some of its consequences with
the facts. rTy And, even though, as we shall see, we must use relativized
surrogates, the verification of instances of T-sentences will remain'respectably 
• • 44empirical.' Thus, to test tne theory, '...we only need to ask, in sample cases
whether what the theory avers to be tne truth conditions for a sentence really 
.45are.' The proposal is thus starkly simple: a truth theory is to be viewed as 
the formalized empirical theory whose testable consequences are the infinite 
collection of T-sentences which the tneory entails; and, all that is needed to 
test any given consequent is an ability to recognize that the biconditional is 
true. When the metalanguage contains the object language, the test is trivial:
'it is no harder to test tne empirical adequacy of a theory of truth than it is 
for a competent speaker of English to decide whether sentences like "'Snow is 
white" is true if and only if snow is white' are true.'^; and Davidson draws an 
analogy between the testing of a truth theory and the testing of a theory of 
generative grammar against the linguistic intuitions of speakers.
However, when the object language and the metalanguage do not overlap , the 
testing of the truth theory is more complex. In such cases, the relation between 
the sentence named on the left of the T-sentence and the one occurring on the 
right is not one of identity. Indeed, these are, with respect to empirical 
testability,'the cases that count'^. Davidson's proposed method here is that of 
radical interpretation, the theorist determining , in order to test the theory, 
when the object language sentence named is identical in truth value with the 
metalanguage sentence with wnich it is paired:
I
We will notice conditions under which tne alien speaker assents to or
dissents from, a variety of his sentences . The relevant conditions will be
what we take to be tne truth conditions of his sentences. We will have to
assume that in simple or obvious cases most of his assents are to true, and
his dissents from false, sentences- an inevitable assumption since the
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alternative is unintelligible.
It would indeed, initially at any rate, seem plausible to think that an empiric­
ally testable tneory of meaning is best grounded on an appeal to assent and 
dissent patterns, since these appear to carry relatively little theoretical
load; yet as the arguments in CHAPTER SIX make clear, the difficulties in
49such an enterprize are formidable.
To close this aspect of how Davidson sees a Tarski-style truth theory as 
meeting his condition of empirical testability, it should be mentioned that there 
is another strategy Davidson mentions for testing truth theories, involving the 
fact that truth tneories provide an account of logical truth and entailment for 
their object language (see CHAPTER THREE). A truth theory will entail, for every 
logical truth in the object language, a sentence in the metalanguage which 
asserts that it is true; Tarski-style truth theories can be taken as providing 
a theory of logical form, and it is this consequence which Davidson would exploit 
to give an additional empirical check on the theory. The test consists in 
comparing the trutn theory's pronouncements about logical truths(plus entailment 
and logical equivalence) with tne intuitions, which speaker's offer :
...the theory that entails not only that these sentences are true but that
they will remain true under all significant rewritings of their logical
parts...It is hard to imagine how a theory of meaning could fail to read
into its object language to this degree; and to the extent that it does ,
our intuitions of logical truth, equivalence, and entailment may be called
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upon in constructing and testing the theory.
But there are difficulties even here, for in the end it would seem from the above 
passage that the speaker's intuitions turn out to be the only empirical test 
on the theory. Is Davrdson's tneory then a theory about speaker's intuitions? 
Certainly, it is clear that Davidson's theory could not offer itself as a 
satisfactory theory in this respect: its form is too idiosyncratic and restricted
51for such purposes.
The suggestion already is , then, and without yet having encountered the 
arguments which will be placed in its way in future chapters, that Davidson's 
hopes of construing a Tarski-style trutn theory as satisfactorily accomodating 
his fourth desideratum of an empirical tneory of meaning, is not without diffic­
ulty. The same applies, too, with respect to the other desiderata.
Davidson's dejection- or Any Dualism Between Artii'icial and Natural Language
So far, the technical details of Tarski's truth conditions theory have been 
considered, and how Davidson sees Tarski’s Convention (t )~ as a criteria for 
suitable theories of truth-as meeting his four desiderata for a theory of 
meaning of natural language. But Tarski’s theory of truth was designed specific­
ally for a formal, artificial language; whether this theory can have any applic­
ation to the problem of truth for a natural language is something wnich Davidson 
in his enthusiasm seems already to have assumed, and which must now be considered 
more seriously.
Tarski himself was in fact deeply pessimistic about the relevance of his 
truth theory to natural language. In his view, natural language is semantically 
open and formally unspecifiabie which, Tarski thought, virtually ruled out the 
possibility of defining 'true1 for a natural language:
...The very possibility of a consistent use of the expression "true sentence”
which is in harmony with the laws of logic and the spirit of evervdav
language seems to be very questionable, and consequently the same doubt
attaches to tne possibility of constructing a correct definition of this 
52expression.
Furthermore, Tarski also maintained that
I
../die concept of trutn(as well as other semantical concepts) when applied 
to colloquial language in conjunction with the normal laws of logic leads
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inevitably to confusions and contradictions.
Taking these points in reverse order, Davidson never fully answers- Tarski's
criticism that since natural languages contain their own metalanguage, their
truth cannot be defined without the problem of paradox arising (the issue of
self-reference mentioned at the beginning of 2*l). Davidson's only published
comment on this indicates a rather cavalier attitude to the matter: the point
54'deserves a serious answer', he maintains, and 'I wish I had one. ' But he
does not have any proposals to make in mitigation of Tarski's contention that 
the semantic closedness of natural language leads to paradoxes. ^  Though the 
issue of semantic paradoxes has since received more attention from other philoso 
phers, Davidson's early attitude is dismissive: 'I tnink we are justified in 
carrying on without having disinfected tnis particular source of conceptual
. . , 56
anxiety1 the reason being that such paradoxes arise because of the over- 
generous scope of the quantifiers in natural language. iYtore importantly perhaps, 
and closely related to the next part of our discussion, is Davidson's contention 
that this problem need not exclude our being able to give an explicit definition 
of true-in-L for any natural language since work can proceed on the semantically 
open fragment of natural language where the danger of paradox is minimal.
The first point mentioned above with respect to the seemingly impossible
task of the formal specifiability of the whole of natural language is the more
crucial to Davidson's project, since if it were true, as Tarski thought, that it
would necessitate refining natural language out of all recognition , this
57would be fatal to Davidson’s proposals. Again, Davidson, it will be seen, 
approaches the problem of formally specifying all of a natural language in a way 
which is orthogonal to more 'traditional' perspectives on the relationship 
between artificial and natural languages and tne direct application of formal 
methods to a supposedly amorphous natural language - an approach which envisages 
entry to natural language as a whole by first considering a fragment of such 
languages, and by regarding the notion .of any 'dualism' between an artificial 
language and such a fragment as unacceptable.
The difficulty as,Tarski saw it , wnich prevented any direct application of or 
'correspondence' between an artificial language and natural language was that
Whoever wishes, in spite of all difficulties, to pursue the semantics of 
colloquial language with the help of exact methods will be driven first to 
undertake the tnankless task of a reform of this language. He will find it 
necessary to define its structure, to overcome the ambiguity of the terms 
which occur in it, and finally to split the language into a series of 
languages of greater and greater extent, each of which stands in the same
relation to tne next m  wnicn a lormaiizea language stands to its meta­
language. It may, however, be doubted wnetner the language of everyday life, 
after being "rationalized" in this way, would still preserve its naturalness 
and whether it would not rather take on the characteristic features of the 
formalized languages. ^
The issue of tne formal specifiability of natural language seems , then , to 
raise a whole range of problems. Natural language is indeed a living, growing, 
organic thing, and is, furthermore, riddled with such features as indexicality, 
ambiguity, and vagueness. Such features have led not only Tarski, but also many 
other philosophers to despair over the possibility of formalizing natural langu­
age , and indeed, on this account , to advocate the replacement of natural 
language altogether. (See the following section, 2*5)• Frege, for example , 
complained that ordinary language is inherently vague and imprecise, features 
he saw as rendering it impossible to devise a coherent semantics for natural 
language as it stands. ^  More recently , the later Wittgenstein and also Dummett
would deem natural language as a whole to be impervious to the application of
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any overall systematic theory. (See CHAPTER THREE, section Then, again,
there are a wide variety of problems which arise when we try to equate in any
direct correspondence, the operations and sentence patterns of a formal calculus
witg the'propositions and arguments of ordinary language, as Strawson has shown
6l
m  various papers. Finally, there is the fact of alternative philosphical
tradition^ to take into account for whom the resources of natural language are 
wholly beyond the capacities of scientific uethodology or formalized languages: 
one thinks immediately in this respect of philosophers such as Heidegger,
Gadamer, or the Deconstructionalism of Jacques Derrida, wnich holds that the 
ultimate truth about language is to be found in its infinite instability and
fragility, and thus in the very play of its deconstructed differences and displace­
ments. ^2
At least some of these views, as evidenced by tne above quotation, seem 
based on the notion that tnere is an enormous and , perhaps, an ultimately 
unbridgeable gap between an artificial formalized language and natural language- 
a kind of 'dualism* between tne two which can never be breached.The raison
d 1 etre behind Davidson's project is the dismissal of tais very idea that there 
is, ultimately, any kind of'dualism' between an artificial and a natural 
language, any difference of quality which ultimately separates the two. The 
absolutely fundamental element of this aspect of Davidson's work, and one on 
which the success or otherwise of his ideas to be discussed in PARTS 11 and 111 
depends, is that for Davidson
It- would be misleading , however, to conclude that there are two kinds of 
language, natural and artificial. The contrast is better drawn in terms of 
guiding interests. ^
It is on this fact, as Davidson sees it, that'we can ask for a description of
the structure of a natural language.' ^ In other papers, too, Davidson makes
it clear that a natural language- or at least the 'core' of a natural language-
can -be seen as a formal system, that we can treat natural language as a more
complex formal language: '...standard formal languages are intermediate devices
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to assist us in treating natural languages as more complex formal languages.'
And the basis for this is tne fact that, at least for a fragment of a natural 
language, it can be considered the case that such a portion of a natural language 
is indistinguishable from a formal language. ^  If an artificial language is 
picked which can be considered rich enough to 'correspond1 to a part of natural 
language, then the canonical truth structure can be considered to be reflected 
within this natural language. An analogous role for the artificial language 
truth schema formulated by Tarski can tnen be seen to exist within a natural 
language such as English. ^  We tnus pick an artificial language as much like 
English as possible, and, by virtue of being able to consider tnis as co—exten­
sive with a fragment of natural language, we can proceed to extend outwards, 
bit-by-bit, from this tractable fragment:
Tarski has shown the way to giving a tneory for interpreted formal langu­
ages of various kinds;, pick one as much like English as possible. oince
this new language has oeen explained in English and contains much English 
we not only may, but I think must, view it as part of English for tnose
wno understand it. J?’or t m s  iragment or English we have, ex hypo the si,
68a tneory of tne required sort.
It is in this sense, as described above, that Davidson rejects the notion of 
there being any inherent ’dualism' between an artificial and a natural language. 
Of course, this is not to equate Tarski's truth schema as it stands as a suitable
theory for natural language ; is it obvious evidence , as will be seen in
the following section, for supposing that natural language is a well-defined
system in the sense demanded by Tarski(see 2»l).
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As Davidson makes clear in many papers, Tarski's Schema 's is true(in' L) if
and only if p* cannot be applied as it stands to natural language because of the 
presence in the latter of such elements as indexical features like tense. Tarski 
was interested in formalized languages containing no such indexical or demonstra­
tive aspects, and could tnus treat sentences as vehicles of truth; however, in 
natural language, sentences may vary in truth value according to time and 
speaker : 'I am tired', for example, may be true uttered by one speaker on a
particular occasion, say, time t^ , and false when uttered by another speaker 
on a different occasion, say, time t^ • Thus, when indexical or demonstrative 
elements are present, it cannot be sentences which are true or false, but only 
such sentences as they are relativized to a time and a speaker. Thus, the 
extended T-schema will require tne tneory to entail such sentences as ' "I am 
tired" (s,t) is true iff s is tired at t' ; for demonstratives like 'this1 or 
'that', the extended account is given as ' "tnis is X is true iff the object 
picked out by the speaker's use of "this" satisfies "...is X" at the time of 
utterance' And so on, for line cases. (S®e CHAPTER THREE). The notion of 
'absolute' truth is tnus relativized to time and speaker when applied to a 
natural language. This relativization by Davidson is of great importance 
since what it meaus in effect is , by making explicit appeal to circumstances 
and speakers in giving a Tarski-style formal theory of truth for natural language 
Davidson is— as mentioned in CHAPTER ONE, looking at language as already
'immersed',as it were, in a context of objective reality-arid a speaker's psycho-
no
logical reality. Such a relativized theory remains, for Davidson, strictly
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empirical.
m a t  a trutn conditions tneory Tor natural language has to be so relativized 
does not in any way effect what has been said regarding the relationship, as 
Davidson construes it, oetween.an artificial language and ordinary discourse, 
and of the rejection of tne idea tnat there is any ultimate dualism between the 
two. But is Davidson right in maintaining that we can treat natural language as 
a more complex artificial language? Certainly, Davidson is at one with such 
philosophers as Montague, who has also argued that there is no important differ­
ence between formal and natural languages. Rather, Montague holds that there is 
sufficient of a formal structure to the whole of a natural language like English 
to make it possible to apjjly formal theories of semantics to them. ^  As with 
-havidson, formalized languages are seen as having much in common with ordinary 
languages— enough to ensure tnat they can be made to successively approximate 
to ordinary language in expressive power. It is as it were as if the structure of 
an artificial language can be construed as already being 'embedded' within, or 
'keyed-into' natural language. As mentioned with Davidson, the notion of there 
being any ultimate ‘dualism1 between the' two kinds of languages is destroyed to 
the extent that an artificial language can be envisaged as a kind of 'outgrowth' 
of natural language.
There is much indirect evidence on this score from many different philosoph­
ers. Tyler, for instance, maintains tnat tne very source of all logics lies in
75natural language itself. Hocket shows that mathematics- the paradigm -of an
artificial language - developed by and through the same mechanisms responsible
for the openess of natural language itself: even though natural language is an
ill-defined system, it nevertheless is still cnaracterized, according to Hocket,
by various levels of stability by moans of wnich the well-defined systems of
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mathematics and logic emerged Benaceralf stresses that 'the semantical appara­
tus of mathematics (must) be seen as part and parcel of that of the natural 
language in which it is done. ' ^  Popper, in opposition to Brouwer's sharp 
distinction between mathematics and its linguistic expression , espouses Lakato's 
notion that the growth of mathematics and natural science presupposes their 
linguistic formulation, and indeed holds that scientific knowledge itself is a
branch of literature. There is thus a very good pedigree for Davidson's view
that ’it is misleading to thirnc of an artificial and a natural language as 
fundamentally different.
2*3 Truth Conditions 'structure as 'Entering Wedge* to Natural Language
Even though the absolutely crucial point has been made that for Davidson there is
no essential difference in kind between at least part of a natural language and
an articial language which would preclude discussion of the former in terms of
the latter, this is not necessarily to identify the two-even for a limited
fragment of a natural language. Davidson is undoubtably aware of equating the
well-defined system of an artificial language with the ill-defined system which
is a natural language or a part of such a language . Davidson specifically says,
notwithstanding what has already been said, that it would be foolish not to
recognize the differences wnich undoubtably do exist between an artificial and a 
79natural language. And, as will be seen, it is not open to Davidson to side­
step the difficulties involved in delineating the recalcitrant features of nat­
ural language as it is for some other philosophers, since Davidson’s purpose is 
different from theirs.
It is not Davidson’s intention. , for example, to give .the kind of conceptual 
priority to a regimented language over a natural language that is behind the 
views expressed by say Erege or Quine. For instance, even though Frege suggested 
ways in which an account of his kind could be applied to regions of natural 
language, he did not think in terms of general truth tneory for natural language; 
indeed, he took natural languages to be defective and recalcitrant and according­
ly better replaced by the construction ofan improved formal language, a language 
he believed had tne same expressive power as important tracts of natural langu-
Q Q
age. But as Davidson maxes clear, Frege did not have a theory of truth such
as Tarski's in mind, and his work cannot be applied directly to the matter of
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investigating meaning in natural language in the manner Davidson requires. 
Neither is Davidson's concern with an artificial language notationally superior
to ordinary language as it was for Frege.
Similarly with Quine. Though there are essential ingredients in Davidson's
theory provided by Quine— for example Quines holistic approach— as witn Frege,
Quine views a satisfactorily regimented language as an improvement of natural
language, rather than, as with Davidson, part of a truou conditions theory about 
02
natural language. Quine'a aim is not in any way to at tempo to capture the
complexities of natural language, but rather to construct an alternative 
artificial or regimented language wnich will supplant natural language . Again, 
this kind ofconceptual primacy wnich is accorded to artificial language at the 
expense of natural language, and which leads to the replacement or elimination 
of the latter by the former, is -unacceptable to Davidson. The reality of the 
undoubted recalcitrance and complexity of natural language, rather than being 
reasons for its elimination, are seen by Davidson as features to be described 
and understood: 1 for tne task of a theory of meaning as I conceive it is not to 
change, improve, or reform a language, but to describe and understand it.* 
Consequently, Davidson eschews the aim of a programme such as Quine’s and takes 
it that the task of his use of Tarski's truth conditions theory is to investigate 
all the recalcitrant features behind the reality of natural language discourse. 
Thus*?Davidson requires ’a canonical notation rich enough to capture, in its dull 
and explicit way, every difference and connection legitimately considered the
Q A
business of a theory of meaning’ , and, as indicated above, ’The point of
canonical notation so conceived is not to improve on something left vague and
defective in natural language, but to help elicit in a perspicuous and general
form the understanding of logical grammar we all have that constitutes ( part of)
85our grasp of our native tongue. ’
On Davidson's thesis, then, tnere is a kind of 'reciprocity* between the 
concept o*f an artificial formal language and the concept of a natural language 
for which the former is a tool of investigation. For, as seen in the last section 
(2*2), there is no holding-, on Davidson's view, that natural language is complete 
ly different in at least some crucial aspects from an artificial language: the 
fact that there is some kind of structure present in natural language which can 
be directly described by a theory of truth (even if such a theory of the struct­
ure is not , in the terms Davidson construes it, the best or even the only
solution available to us— see CHAPTER THREE) indicates this fact that natural
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language should not be given the final word, as some philosophers thought.
On the other hand, neither is it appropriate, in view of the nature of Davidson's 
programme, to jettison or eliminate natural language and give conceptual domin­
ance to the idea of an artificial language simply because of its amorphous and 
recalcitrant nature. The only point of view from which a formalized language can
be regarded as of primary importance is that it is the means whereby we gain 
access to the analogous structure in natural language: The point is not that 
canonical notation is better than the rough original idiom, but rather that if 
we know what idiom the cononical notation is canonical for , we have as good a 
theory for the idiom as for its kept companion.’8^ In other words, the only 
access, for us to any structured view of a natural language can only be via the 
fenteriiig wedge of something like the kind of truth conditions structure provided 
by Davidson'S use of Tarski’s theory of truth:
What a theory of truth does for a natural language is reveal structure.
In treating each sentence as composed in accountable ways out of a finite
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number of truth -relevant words, it articulates this structure.
In this way , an artificial language is considered by Davidson as a device for 
exploring the structure of the whole of a natural language. The fact that a 
theory of truth reveals such structure by describing each sentence as composed, 
out of a finite number of truth-relevant words takes us back to the beginning 
of this chapter, and the way that Davidson saw Tarski’s constraints on suitable 
theories of truth as satisfying his required desiderata such as recursion and 
holism. (2«l)
Yet there are, in the outline given above, and again as mentioned at the
beginning of this chapter, indications that Davidson’s approach is in some ways
very different from Tarski's; in fact, it is no exaggeration to say that in his
use of a truth conditions theory to delineate structure or meaning in larfguage,
Davidson is in effect actually reversing Tarski's proposals: whereas Tarski
with Convention (t ) wanted to define truth by an appeal to meaning(or synonymy,
or translation), Davidson aims for the opposite- by delineating the structure of
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truth, his aim is to try to define meaning. Thus, since Tarski was interested
in defining truth, and furthermore, was only working with an artificial language,
he could take the concept of translation or meaning for granted. This comes out
clearly when we begin to compare Tarski's aims with Davidson's. ’Meaning’ for
Tarski is , in the formal context of his theory, taken for granted: ’Instead of
90
"meaningful sentence", we could say "well-formed-sentence." ' In other words.
a sentence with meaning is, for Tarsxi, a well-formed-formuls in a formal
system: 'The function and meaning of an expression should depend exclusively on 
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its form. ’ Tarski assumes the concept of meaning in order to examine truth. 
Davidson, however, wishes to illuminate meaning by assuming at least a partial 
understanding of the concept ot truth, as the following shows.
For Davidson, it will be recalled, the point of the T—schema is that it fixes 
not the intension or meaning of sentences, but the extension of the predicate 
'true': any predicate satisfying Convention (t ) was , Davidson thought, just what 
was required since if the predicate ‘is true’ replaces 'means that' in the 
formulation 's means that p ‘ for each sentence of the language we would be left 
with *s is true(in L)iff p ‘ and an explicit truth-condtional form. A theory of 
meaning should supply pairings between sentences of the object language with 
senteices of the metalanguage in a way which will ‘give the meaning' of the 
object language sentences. Davidson argues that it is more fruitful to’sweep- 
away* the intensional 'means that' and make the context completely truth function 
al and that tis comes down to seeing 'means that ' as co-extensive with the 
Tarski truth predicate, and that this was apparently just what was needed for a 
theory of meaning. Tarski's proposed criteria of adequacy for a formal truth 
definition could take over from the 'means that' of natural language: Davidson 
argues, for the abandonment or elimination of the tradtional and obscure idiom of 
meaning and its replacement by the formally more tractable idiom of truth
- structure- a kind of 'semantic ascent1 from ordinary discourse to the more
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exact idiom of logic of the kind proposed by Quine. y Davidson is saying that 
leaving 'means that' behind and looking to truth for a solution to semantical 
problems constitutes an ascent of sorts also?
Making a systematic account of truth central in empirical semantics is in 
a way merely a matter of stating old goals more sharply.Still, the line 
between clarification an innovation in science is blurred, and it seems 
likely that tne change would shift priorities in linguistic research. Some 
problems that have dominated recent work on semantics would face in import­
ance: the attempt to give "the meaning" of sentences, and to account for 
synonymy, analytioity, and ambiguity. For the first of these, the theory of
truth provides a kind of substitute; the second and third become unnecessary 
appendages; the fourth reappears in a special form. 93
However, Davidson's early claims that truth could replace meaning were mistaken. 
Whereas translation is a notion which Tarski could justifiably employ in defin­
ing the truth predicate (it being a condition on 's is true iff p 1 that p be a 
translation of s, with homophonic translation as the simplest case) , it cannot 
do for a theory of meaning, since, if we are setting out to construct a theory 
of meaning, translation must be the result of , and not an intergral part of, 
the theory of meaning itself. Thus, it is a mistake to think that the use of the 
Tarski truth predicate can do the work required of a theory of meaning as 
Davidson originally thought. In fact, this is what leads Davidson to formulate 
additional empirical constraints on a theory of truth- these additional criteria 
being fully discussed in PART 111.
Nevertheless, though Davidson must now accept that 'the notion of translat - 
ion, which can be made precise for artificial languages on which interpretations
are imposed by fiat, has no precise or even clear application to natural langu- 
94.ages', the change in perspective wnich Davidson's aims entail does not, m  
his view , mean that we must give up Convention (t ) - only that we must read it 
in a new way."^ Thus, if Davidson is right, we can still use a Tarski-style 
theory of truth to reveal structure in natural language in the manner described 
previously. It still remains hhe case that our only suitable means at present 
for use as a kind of 'entering- -wedge' into the structure of the sentences of 
natural language must be via the structure which is provided by sometning like 
Davidson's use of Tarski's theory of truth; indeed, Davidson would say that 
we have no choice in the matter. ^ Even if it is not a theory of meaning for 
natural language, as later discussion will show ( PART 111), there are still 
substantial inclining, if not fully compelling,reasons for Davidson's use of 
Tarski's theory of truth as satisfying scientific and objective criteria for 
the primary objective of revealing the structure for the whole of natural 
language•
2*4 Truth Conditions Structure of Language and a Theory of Logical Form
As seen in trie last section, Davidson still holds that his use of Tarski's theory
of truth gives what is centrally required: a means to reveal and to articulate
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the structure of the whole of natural language. Tarski's theory, consisting 
as it does in an enumeration of the semantical properties of the items in a 
finite vocabulary together with a recursive definition of the infinity of 
sentences shows precisely how the truth-conditions of complex sentences are 
determined by the truth import of their components , and tnus makes for an 
exact delineation of the structure of a language- plus the subtle and powerful 
concept of satisfaction linking sentences and non-sentential expressions to 
sequences of objects in the world (see PART 11). It thus provides a paradigm of 
analysis for the quantificational structure Davidson takes to be embedded 
withing natural language itself. By invoking Tarski's programme in the manner 
Davidson suggests, we thus gain scientific precision into delineating the struct­
ure of a natural language containing an infinity of sentences, if not its meaning 
Y/e have a systematic, structured account of the natural language as a wnole.
But- and this aspect is what is going to lead us into the subject matter of 
CHAPTER THREE - the direct description by a theory of truth of the structure of 
the sentences of a natural language is not all that is provided. For, as Davidson 
explains in another context, the formation of the skeleton of what we call a 
language is the pattern of inference and structure which is created by the 
logical constants (sentential connective, quantifiers, and devices for cross- 
reference). And, if we can apply a theory of truth as a method* of interpre­
tation to a speaker at all by assuming his language is like ours, it can only be 
because we as interpreters can treat that speaker's structure-forming devices 
very much as we treat those of our language, this fixing 'the logical form of his 
sentences and determining the parts of speech. In effect, this is to suggest 
that a theory of truth, based on an account of the sentential elements and 
structures, also provides us with a kind of 'intersubjectively shared' theory 
of logic , as well as directly describing structure.and giving us a basis for an 
'entering wedge' into the structure of natural language. This aspect of a Theory 
of Logical Form is, however, is a matter for CHAPTER THREE.
CHAPTER THREE 
LOGICAL FORM AND NATURAL LANGUAGE
3*1 Direct Description of Structure of Language and Postulation of Logical Form
As seen in the last chapter, Davidson takes his use of Tarski's theory of truth 
as the only suitable means we have for directly describing the structure of 
natural language whilst at the same time providing the required postulated 
logical form. Davidson’s truth conditions theory becomes the foundational basis 
for such attributions since he would not accept any ultimate ’dualism’ between 
a fragment of natural language and an artificial language, nor was it open to 
him to replace a recalcitrant natural language by any formal counterpart; but, 
though a degree of reciprocity between the demands of a formal and a natural 
language were recognized , the only means we could nave, according to Davidson, 
for exploring- how tae elements of a natural language are articulated is by means 
of an 1entering-wedge' of something like that provided by his truth conditions 
structure, such an account of the structured sentential elements also providing 
us with a theory of logical form. For, by being able to determine the conditions 
under which any two sentences are true, we are able to determine if the one 
sentence entails the other sentence. ^ Thus, from within his Tarski-style 
truth condtions tneory, Davidson proposed to reflect the whole of the structure 
of xnatural language in terms of first-order logical and quantification form, 
such predicate structure being taken by Davidson to be really there within 
the various forms of discourse of natural language. Davidson's holism and txie 
demand for semantic monism wuich leads to this standpoint that first-order 
logical for.ii is the real form of all of natural language is, however, rejected 
by many pnilosphero. Indeed, for some, it is mythical to suppose txiat, as 
Davidson suggests, his existentionally quantified structures give the real 
structure of natural language at all, since natural language has no real logical
AVJLiu cio cij.a • xeo, eta w i n  ue stjen, otiuugax, m e r e  are inaeea airncuities m  
finding the kind of logical structure Davidson demands in certain kinds of 
ordinary language, a fact which might seem to suggest the previously mentioned 
philosophers are correct, it nevertheless transpires that we must refer to a 
real structure existing behind language if any intelligible interpretation is to 
be forthcoming. Even so, Davidson's delineation of structure in terms of 
'ideal' first-order logical form , though it may suffice as the best approach in 
some respects, is certainly not the only option open to us in describing the 
structure of natural language; it is possible to accept some augmentation of 
Davidson* proposals in this area and still remain within the constraintsO
of Convention (T). Still, this does not prejudice Davidson's basic contention 
that his truth condtions theory is the foundational basis for the reconstruction 
of the structure of the whole of natural language in terms of an autonomous 
network of logical possibility , and that this in turn is the foundational 
basis for the theoretical reconstruction of how speakers refer to the world, 
and of how the speaker's psychological attitudes constrain such a reference to 
the world.
The essential point made in CHAPTER W O  was that Tarski's truth conditions 
theory enabled Davidson to achieve the aim central to his project: to reveal
and articulate the true structure embedded within the whole of natural 
language, beginning with that fragment of language Davidson took to be co- 
exstensivs with an artificial language and working outwards. As was also 
suggested, such a theory of truth, being based on an account of the sentential 
elements and structures , provides, Davidson would hold, a theory of logical 
form as well. The merit of Tarskian truth theories being that they entail 
generalizations, based on the notion of sentence structure about true sentences, 
and that it is this which enables them to be considered as plausible candid - 
ates for theories of logical form : the true structure revealed within sentences 
by a truth theory for that language, and which is directly described by such a 
theory, is synonymous with its postulated logical form. A theory of truth 
will, according to Davidson, give us an account of entailment and logical truth 
in the object language, tnus sufficing as a theory of logical form.
Thus it is that from within the 'umbrella' of a Tarski-style truth condit -
ions theory that Davidson proposes to reflect the whole of the structure of
natural language in terms of first-order logic and quantificational form.
Firstly, and most importantly, it must be emphasized that - for reasons given in
the last chapter- Davidson takes it as a possibility that we can directly
describe the one true structure ( relative to a theory of logical form) of
natural language in terms of first-order predicate logic or quantificational
form because for him it really is there within natural language . Sentences in
the predicate calculus or quantificational logic are, as shown in the section
on Tarski, (2«l) , built-up from predicate structures and sentential components,
and these are taken to be genuine parts of the sentences of natural language
by Davidson. The discernment of predicate structure within English, for example,
is thus not regarded as an arbitrary matter: there really is such a genuine
predicate structure within English; the delineation of such structures, on
Davidson's view, cannot , therefore, be regarded as just a convenient tool -
even though , of course, one of the functions of logical form is as an intrument
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to probe the logical structure already taken to be within natural language.
To state this may appear to be stating the obvious; yet it is far from an
obvious fact for many philosophers (and from differing philosophical traditions) 
The seriousness with wnich Davidson takes tnis structure to be really present 
in natural language, and his idea that we are able to directly describe this 
structure from within a theory of logical form- a theory which will reveal not 
only the 6ne perspicuous form across the whole of natural language in terms of 
first order logic, but in the process will ^ enhance the delineation •,* in terms 
of the same quantificational structure, of a unified network of entailments - 
must now receive consideration.
The attribution of logical form within a Tarski-style truth conditions 
theory by Davidson has an importance which is hard to overemphasize in relation 
to the standpoint taken by traditional realism and many contemporary voices for
3
whom such attributions have often been undertaken on a very piecemeal basis. 
However, for Davidson,'To give the logical form of a sentence is, then, for me, 
to describe it in terms that bring it within the scope of a semantic theory that
meets ciear requirements. ' ' it is to Know, rrom witnin a Tarski-style theory
of truth, its significat features, its semantically relevant features. ^ Hence, 
only as much- or as little - logical form is attributed to sentences as is
necessary to enable Davidson to make the formulation of an adequate truth theory
possible, and it is in this sense that there is something of the spirit of 
instrumentalism in Davidson’s notion of logical form. Selection is made of 
all, and only , those iterative devices necessary for the construction of the 
needed truth definition, and assignment made to them of all, and only, those 
truth-bearing properties required for such a definition;
To say a second sentence is a logical consequence of a first is to say,
roughly, that the second is true if the first is, no matter how the non-
logical constants are interpreted. Since what we count as a logical 
constant can vary independently of the set of truths, it is clear that the 
two versions oflogical form, though related, need not be identical . The 
relation, in brief, seems this. Any tneory of truth that satisfies Tarski’s c 
criteria must take account of all truth-affecting iterative devices in the 
language. In the familiar languages for which we know how to define truth 
the basic iterative devices are reducible to the sentential connectives, 
the apparatus of quantification,and the description operator if it is 
primitive • Where one sentence is a logical consequence of another on the 
basis of quantificational structure alone, a theory of truth will therefore 
entail that if the first sentence is true, the second is. There is no point, 
then, in not including the expressions that determine quantificational 
structure among the logical constants, for when we have characterised truth, 
on which any account of logical consequence depends , we have already 
committed ourselves to all that calling such expressions logical constants 
could commit us. Adding to this list of logical constants will increase 
the inventory of logical truths and consequence-relations beyond anything 
a truth definition demands, and will therefore yield richer versions of 
logical form. ^
Davidson’s view therefore seems to be that logical form is_ truth which i3
ueoej.-mj.xxeu uy one aema.iioxus iur one primitive operators, ui course, there may­
be other iterative devices which carry inferential consequences- there could 
be an adequate truth theory which does not reveal as valid all the inferences 
held to be valid, but such an additional structure may be unnecessary from the 
standpoint of Davidson's truth conditions theory. It certainly seems to be the 
case that a complete semantics for a language L- that is, a complete assignment
of the truth conditions of all its sentences as described in CHAPTER TWO- will 
contain enough information to determine the logical fomr for that language
7
in the manner indicated by Davidson.
However, there are other crucial aspects to Davidson's notion of logical 
form which are more controversial. As was also seen in CHAPTER W O ,  a primary 
desideratum for Davidson's theory of meaning was that of holism; that we can 
give the meaning of any sentence or word only by giving the meaning of every 
sentence and word in the language L. Closely connected with this requirement is 
Davidson's condition of semantic monism- that the rules that determine the 
meaning of each and every sentence in the language L should all be of the same 
general kind. The close connection of semantic monism with holism is indicated 
in many places in Davidson's papers. Hence, he says that above all, the logical 
form of a sentence must be seen in the light of a theory that gives the logical 
form of every sentence in the language- such a theory being, of course,one 
like TarSki's truth conditions theory; 'to give the logical form of a sentence 
is to give its logical location in the totality of sentences, to describe it in 
a way tha,t explicitly determines what sentences it entails and what sentences
Q
it is entailed by.’ and such a location 'must be given relative to a
a
specific deductive theory.' Davidson can thus conclude; 'By my lights, we 
have given the logical form of a sentence when we have given the truth- 
conditions of the sentence in the context of a theory of truth that applies 
to the language as a whole.' (emphasis added). This makes it clear that 
Davidson's holism demands that the attribution of logical form must be 
accomplished 'all-of-a-piece', the reason for this being that, for example,
We cannot decide how to interpret a speaker's "There'3 a whale" independ­
ently of how we interpret his "There's a mammal", and words connected with
uiese, witnout ena. we must interpret tne wriole pattern.
Clearly, the requirement of semantic monism must then follow from the logical
connection of the totality of sentences; there must be some key concept in the
theory of meaning , a central notion figuring in the explanation of the meaning
of every sentence whatever the surface characterization of tne type of discourse.
Without such a key concept, running through all the different kinds of sentence
in the language, and which figures in the explantior of the meaning of any
sentence ,whether that sentence be an indicative sentence, or a sentence of
oratio obliqua, or what have you, there could be no unification of meanings
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across these sentences or the words they contain.
Suffice it to say at this present stage that Davidson's condition of semantic
monism is extremely controversial; if such a constraint were adopted, it would
run counter to the views of many philosophers , from various traditions, as to
the nature of language ; particularly pertinent in this respect are , of course,
the ideas of the later Wittgenstein, in the Philosophical Investigations* ^  
for whom there could be no unique logic applicable to natural language as a whole 
In fact, Davidson's project is much more reminiscent of the early Wittgenstein 
of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus or of Russell’s logical atomism. ^
Such philosophers then aspired to devise a unique, ideally perspicuous language 
in which logical form would be perfectly exhibited, and in which each informal 
argument has a unique logical form.which is perhaps not immediately recognizable, 
though naturally there was nothing like Davidson's truth conditions theory 
involved. Wittgenstein, for example, saw all complex significant propositions 
in a language as so-called truth-functions of simpler propositions from which 
they could be constructed by various logical operations; the 'ultimate' proposi- 
tional elements- the 'atoms' of language- being the elementary propositions 
wnich were not furtner analyzable because they themselves consist of simple 
signs. (See also PART 11, CHAPTER POUR. )
And, in both the early Wittgenstein and Russell there is the fundamental 
notion of ordinary language as concealing its real logical structure, and that 
it is possible to represent this real structure in its purer form as a kind of 
ideal language- Russell, for instance, holding that the grammatical or surface
form of a sentence is misleading as to its real logical form. *"J
Similarly, Davidson- at least until very recently, when there is perhaps a
l6
hint of second thoughts about the matter- accepts ideas made apparent in some 
of Chomsky's earlier work where Chomsky says:
The meaning of a sentence is based on the meaning of its elementary parts 
and the manner of tneir combination...the manner of combination provided by 
the surface structure is in general almost totally irrelevant to semantic 
interpretation, whereas the grammatical relations expressed in the abstract 
deep structure are, in many cases, just those that determine the meaning of 
the sentence. ^
Thus, too, Davidson, in his early papers accepts that the deep structures of
syntax were the vehicle for semantic interpretation, and that the deep structure
of a sentence should correspond to the logical form of a sentence as given by
18
his truth conditions theory. However, Chomsky's earlier views have not
always found full acceptance amongst philosophers, and the source of Davidson's
present (1985) caution on the issue may lie in an alternative view which
Chomsky himself has defended, in which deep structure trees are not full-
19semantic representations of a sentence . Hence, we have the expression of
0
such opinions as 'It is a matter of controversy whether the deep structure of
20
a sentence completely determines its logical form 1 and MeCawley indicating
that deep structures need not stand in any systematic relation to the meanings
of sentences , and that 'Chomsky briefly held, but has repudiated, a conception
21
of deep structure which determines meaning 1 Similarly, Sampson declares 
'Chomsky has outlined wnat seems to be the true situation : semantic representa­
tions of actual sentences are identical neither to deep structures nor to
22
surface structures, but are some simpler function of the two.' On the
other hand, Harman, for example, recognizing that Chomsky defends a view in
which deep structure trees are not full-semantic representations, neverthless
defends a position in wiiicn 'It will be assumed here that tne deep structure-
2 5
tree is a full-semantic representation of the sentences ' . J and cites many 
philosophers still holding to tnis position. And Bennett states ' the fundamental
structural facts about a language are those which constitute its semantic
strcutred, and syntactic structure is an abstraction, a selection of certain
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aspects from this larger whole.* Thus, though some caution over the matter
seems in order, as Davidson now recognizes, there seems no concrete reason at
present why we should not accept the earlier view of the distinction between
surface structure and deep structure in our language , and that the deep
structure trees are a full semantic representation of the sentence meaning in
line with Davidson's comments to the effect that *The true coin, the deep
structure* is opposed to the 'deceit of the conventions of the market place
25
engendered by the surface forms of natural language.* If we still can accept 
such a position, then, it will mean that in utterances like the following:
1 Jill is certain that Mary will leave
2 Jill is certain to leave
sentences (l) and (2) can be shown to be similar in surface structure, but 
very different in deep structure which is said to underlie them:
Surface Structures:
1' (S (NP Jill) (yp isifj certain(g that(Np M a r y ) ^  will leave)))))
2' (s(Np 'Jill) (yp i s ^  certain) to leave )))
both of which are similar in surface structure.
Deep Structures:
1M ^ N P  Jil1  ^ V^P is A^P certain(s that(Np wil1 leave)))))
-and which has the same structure as (l1) but where
2 "  ^ s W s ^ N P  J111^VP t0 leave))) (yp ^ A P  oertain)))
and which shows that both are very different in deep structure.
Ahalogious arguments hold for sentences which are very different in surface 
structure and yet similar in deep structure.
Hence it seems reasonable to accept, if the philosphers mentioned are right, 
that transformations applied in sequence to deep structures in accordance with , 
certain principles will ultimately generate the surface structures of the 
sentences in a language , and that furthermore, any sentence's meaning can be 
expressed in something like the language of quantification theory and that, as 
some transformational grammarians claim, that the deepest structure is its 
semantic interpretation or meaning. Despite the controversy mentioned over 
whether.the deep structure of a sentence completely determines its logical form 
or meaning, there does still seem substantial agreement- that an ideal transform­
ational grammar would in one way or another specify the logical form of every 
interpretation of every sentence. ^
To bring together the threads of this section, what we have seen is that for 
Davidson,, his truth conditions theory is taken as the foundation for directly 
describing the real structure of natural language whilst simultaneously providing 
the required postulated logical form: the account of the structured sentential
t
elements gives us a theory of logical form since being- able to determine the 
conditions under which any two sentences are true, we are able to determine if 
one sentence entails the other sentence. Hence a theory of truth will, according 
to Davidson, give us an account of entailment and logical truth in the object 
language, thus sufficing for a theory of logical form. Such a theory of logical 
form from within a theory of truth is of course holistic, and closely linked 
to the condition of semantic monism, Davidson holding that tne postulated first 
order logical form is the real logical form behind the whole of natural language 
(together with the notion tnat such a logical form as given by the truth condit­
ions theory is to be identified with tne deep structures of the language. )But is 
this latter thesis of Davidson's correct? We must now at.temp.t to., find out.
5*2 Davidson!s Myth?
For many philosophers, Davidson's proposal to describe the whole of the structure
of natural language in terms of first-order logic, and to delineate a unified
network oi entailment in terms 01 such a quantified structure , is little more
than a myth. Certainly for Davidson, such a structure behind all of our language
must exist for his programme to be feasible, but in that case how are we to
account for the scepticism hinted at earlier amongst many philosophers who would
deny that natural language can be so described?
For example, the ideas oi the later Wittgenstein , in the Philosophical
Investigations have already been mentioned, and which suggest that there can
be no unique logic applicable to natural language as a whole. Rejecting his own * ,
earlier 'ideal* philosophy, Wittgenstein now saw natural language as providing
us with the resources for playing a variety of language games with divergent
structures- so that different formal languages may be required to represent
these different formal roles, and different logical systems may specify the
valid rules of inferences within the different language games; if this were so
there would be no unique, correct logic - or even any logic at all- which is
applicable to natural language as a whole.
For Dummett, too, we nave no grounds ’to assume in advance that our language
27
is in every way perfectly in orcier1 and he calls Davidson’s project into
doubt , indicating that tne attempt to delineate the whole of natural language
in terms of one logical structure is misplaced, language not conforming to any
( 28
one systematic theory,being ratner a 'mult-storied* phenomenon... ^  Many otner
philosophers in the western tradition have expressed similar reservations
concerning the description of the logical structure of language in the terms
29
Davidson does envisage it.
Not only that, but philosophers from alternative philosophical traditions 
would regard the project as untenable. Heidegger, for instance, for whom ’one­
ness’ is ’the distinctive property of language’ conceived of as a web of relat­
ions, nevertheless would see it as exhiDiting a ’great diversity of elements 
and relations ' which would undoubtably for him place language beyond the kind 
of analysis Davidson would undertake. ^  For Gadamer,also, it is questionable
whether tne idea of natural language in terms of symbolic form is appropriate 
More recently, we have the ideas of Jacques Derrida, for whom there is some­
thing in writing- or in any process of language- which finally evades all 
systems and logics, all language displaying a 'surplus' over exact meaning; hence 
for Derrida the infinite instability and fragility of language which can only 
be 'deconstructed. ' 52
There is thus considerable opposition from many diverse directions, as this
brief survey indicates, to anything like Davidson's programme of adopting his
criteria of semantic monism and his attempt at describing significant structure
in terms of first-order logic across the whole of natural language, for if the
above philosphers are correct, such a predicate structure is either just not
there, or is wholly inadequate to deal with the complexities of language. And, if
it is merely a 'myth' that extensional first-order logic can be applied across
the board as Davidson envisages, is it desirable, or even possible to augment
Davidson's proposed logical form by invoking the use of other logics? Presumable
Davidson's response to the issue whould be to say that tne proof of the pudding
is in the eating, and certainly many philosophers who have been attempting to
apply Davidson's programme to the differing types of language have so far
33claimed some success. Certainly, however the appearance of a sometimes facile 
calm that seems to surround the Davidsonian notion of logical form is somewhat 
removed by seeing the complications that arise in handling apparently straight­
forward constructions, let alone the more recalcitrant forms of discourse such 
as action1 sentences, oratio nbliqua , and the like; perhaps Davidson may be too 
quick to ignore the recalcitrant datLc* in order to squeeze everything into his 
one favoured theory.
Davidson's logical form proposal, it will be recalled, is ralative to Tarski's
theory of truth, and is designed to be applied first to the central core of
indicative sentences, from where it is proposed to work outward to all other
forms of more recalcitrant discourse. For this central fragment, the indicatives,
the backbone of Davidson's theory, ( see CHAPTER ONE), there seems no great
obstacle in the way of equating the structure of such sentences with the kind 
of predicate structure advocated by Davidson. Thus, an atomic sentence such as
'there is a cat' can be easily symbolized according to the normal existentially 
quantified form (Ex) (x is a cat) ; or the molecular sentence 'There is a black 
cat' as (Ex) (x is a cat & x is black) . Similarly, a simple declarative 
sentence like 'The girl ran home' can be adequately expressed by the logical 
form (Ex) (Gx .(y)(Gy-=>x=y ). Rx) . So, relative to one theory of logical form, 
such sentences seem unproblematic, though as Davidson notes, many people, includ­
ing Tarski, think it impossible to give a truth definition even for the indica-
34tive sentences of a natural language.
Ambiguous sentences, too, can probably be accomodated on Davidson's terms,
though there are a few dessenting voices as to the efficacy of his proposals in 
35this area, where Davidson's point of view is given by 'As long as ambiguity
does not affect grammatical form, and can be translated, ambiguity for ambiguity,
36
into the metalanguage, a truth definition will not tell us any lies.'
We have also seen that indexicals can be dealt with, in Davidson's view, by 
taking truth to be a property, not of sentences, but of sentences relativized to 
a time and to a speaker. The concern with indexicals being extended to the 
problems involving demonstratives ( 'This/That') , the account to be given is 
that ' "This is x" is true iff the object picked out by the speaker's use of 
"This"(or"That" ) satisfies "...is x" at the time of utterance' . Davidson
37early endorsed the work on the logical form of sucn utterances by Weinstein ,
and thought that 'The fact that demonstratives are amenable to formal treatment
38
ought greatly to improve hopes for a serious semantics of natural language* 
and saw sucn an analysis as also being directed towards problems of quotation 
and verbs of propositional attitude; however, very recently, Davidson has
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admitted that such a hope has 'turned out to be naively optimistic' - as 
indeed is indicated -by some of the criticisms of this kind of discourse which 
are dealt with in PART 111 of this thesis.
Much more serious challenges also await Davidson'3 attempt to attribute the 
kind of predicate structure he envisages to other types of natural language as 
well. One of the most serious of these is tne case of action sentences, and the 
related problem of adverbial modification, (some of the consequences of David­
son's analysis in this area are discussed in PART 11, CHAPTER FIVE. ) As a way 
into examining what Davidson's theory of logical form is up against.
here, consider the following simple sentence: 'Something moves slowly' . As a
first attempt at delineating the structure of this sentence, we could try 
representing such a sentence as having the logical form of (Ex)(Sx) - where (Sx) 
takes the place of 'x moves slowly'. Clearly, however, this would be wrong: it 
would fail completely to assign structure to 'moves slowly' , and in consequence 
would block any further attempts to account for the truth structure of related 
sentences such as 'If a man moves slowly and another man moves quickly then at 
least two men move. ' ^ Another attempt might be to represent the sentence as 
(Ex)(Sx. (z ) (Sz = M z )) , where 'Sx* stands in place of *x moves slowly' , and 
'Mz* stands in place of 'z moves'. But again, this would mean that the sent­
ence 'Something moves slowly' would be assigned the same structure as 'Some - 
thing moves slowly M B  if anything moves slowly then it moves. ' - and surely 
it is hardly credible that the semantic structure of these two very different 
English sentences is identical. So long as 'Sx' stands for 'x moves slowly', 
the logical structure of the sentence appears to be simply (Ex)(Sx); any 
supplementary clauses would then have to serve to express an inference based on 
the analysis of the predicate 'Sx*.
The problem posed by the sentence 'Something moves slowly* is a general 
problem occasioned by the fact that quantificational logic or predicate 
structure does not seem equipped to cope with adverbs in any simple way. The basic 
form of quantificational logic being- that of predication, if one is to cope with 
the problem posed by adverbs, the only device available is to construe adverbial 
modification as an instance of such predication: one must somehow recast 'slowly' 
in the"guise of 'slow'; but in so doing, one is forced-:, as Davidson is, to 
conjure up special entities to fill the bill of 'x is slow*. (See CHAPTER FI\/E).
Somethinlike the problem just considered, then, is what Davidsonfaces in
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trying to delineate the predicate structure of action sentences, including
the issue raised by the nessity of postulating entities such as events in order 
to enhance the explanation of entailment in terms of quantificational logic.
And, as will be seen, the ensuing difficultes have led some philosophers to deny
that the structure of sucn sentences is explicable in terms of the predicate
structure Davidson conceives , and either giving up reference to it altogether as 
the real structure of language,or urging augmentation of Davidson's proposal.
In The Logical Form of Action Sentences, Davidson suggests that the 
logical form of 'Shem kicked Shaun' is the existentailly quantified form of 
(Ex)(Kicked(Shem,Shaun, x)) and that the traditional Subject-PredicAte analy­
sis which would normally have been given for this sentence, and where the
structure of 'Shem kicked Shaun1 is seen as consisting of two names and a two-
43place predicate, goes by the board. It is crucial to note, in view of what 
has been said previously, (3 *1 ), that relative to a theory of logical form given 
by a Tarski-style truth conditions theory, there is no way for Davidson that 
this sentence could have a different logical form. ^  The existentially quan­
tified structure directly describes or refers to the real logical form of 'Shem 
kicked Shaun’ as given by the truth theory: it is not just that this is a more 
perspicuous or more convenient rephrasal. This, despite the fact that this 
existentially quantified form ( A propos the recent discussion) also reads, as 
the closest English sentence directly reflecting this given form, 'There is an 
event x such that x is a kicking of Shem by Shaun'.. However, this requires the 
postulation of events as entities, and Davidson's proposed logical form is in 
fact nothing like 'Shem kicked Shaun.1 Nevertheless, even though the original 
sentence of 'Shem kicked Shaun' and the English equivalent of the existentially 
quantified form have such very different surface structures, it is their basic
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( deep structure ) logical form wnich is, for Davidson the same. Hence, for 
Davidson,* it is possible to hold that this existentially quantified structure 
directly refersto- fee real structure of the English original, since this real 
structure' is equivalent to its deep structure or logical form - which ties in 
exactly with what was said previously (3*l) about Davidson's views on the nature
of predicate structure in English. But how can we be really sure that the origin
al sentence does have such a structure as Davidson maintains, in view of the
discrepancy noted above? Davidson states that part of the justification- but it
is the only justification he does offer- is that seeing the real structure of
English in these terms wi.ich he suggests enhances our prospects of delineating
the entailment between sentences on the holistic basis which his theory of truth 
4^requires.
All three points mentioned above, and wiiicn spring from Davidson's major
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English sentences concerned, have been denied by Cargile. For Cargile, the
Davidsonian notion of quantified structure should not be confused with the real
structure of English at all. Indeed, he regards it as nothing less than a
'myth1 , a pretence on Davidson*s part that he should so regard the existen -
tially quantified structure as giving the logical form of the relevant English 
48
sentence. Gargile maintains that 'there is no reason for denying that David­
sons 's rephrasals are just that- rephrasals with very different forms from the 
49originals' and suggests that to say, as Davidson does , that such rephrasals
reveal the logical form of the originals, is instead to 'say something very 
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obscure.1 For Cargile, Davidson’s existentially quantified structure does not
refer to real structure in the English sentences at all, and suggests adding
51extra rules to quantification logic or else giving it up altogether.
As an ally to his cause, Cargile cites Reichenbach. Certainly, Davidson's
attitude to logical form is very clearly seen in Davidson's own discussion of 
Reichenbach's that, for example, the logical form of an action sentence like
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(4) Amundsen flew to the North Pole 
is not given by
(5) (Ex)(x consists in the fact that Amundsen flew to the North Pole).
I
but that the two forms, though equivalent, are different. Davidson puts it this
way: 'Reichenbach does not think of (5) as showing or revealing the logical
53
form of (4 ), for he thinks (4 ) is unproblematic.1 Similarly, for Reichenbach, 
the real logical form of other such sentences is not given by their quantified
54
form, as it is for Davidson.
Thus, for Reichenbach, as for Cargile, Davidson's quantified structure does 
not reveal the logical form of English sentences, whereas for Davidson, it 
plainly does refer to the real structure of the sentences concerned. And the 
basic reason for this appears to be the differing attitudes of these philosoph­
ers to deep and surface structures- whether there is such a distinction to be
Dade, and whether deep structure in te.ms of a quantified structure, refers to 
the 'real1 structure behind the surface of the original English. This comes out 
clearly when Cargile, like Davidson, mentions that Reichenbach thinks of the 
original English sentences as 'unproblematic', whereas for Davidson, it is the 
other way around: it is because such English sentences are regarded as problema­
tic that we should represss our natural assumptions about their Subject-
Predicate structure and give them the kind of Predicate structure which
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Davidson wishes to accord them. We seem to be back to to the original quest­
ion of whether we should conceptual primacy to original English (see 2*3) or
whether a formal structure, in terms of the predicate structure Davidson advoca-
5 6tes better reveals the true logical form of an original English sentence.
(see also 3*1) For Cargile, even if a sentence like 'Shem kicked Shaun' is
dirivable form a 'deeper' structure, it does not show that they necessarily have
the same form, whereas for Davidson, the fact that two "very different 'surface'
forms are involved, does not mean that he should not resist Cargile's and
Reichenbach's point of view, and maintain that they do share , at the level of
57deep structure, a real existentially quantified form. Cargile and Davidson
at first seem to be locked in mutually incompatible sets of ideas ; yet there is 
in fact a hint of a way to resolve the issue, and it is a theme which will 
be taken up later (3*3)- For Cargile indicates that though for him Davidson's 
proposalVn predicate structure does not show that this is the (only real) 
logical form that the original English sentence must have, he is willing to 
concede that it can perhaps at best be considered the'ideal1 form it should have.
CQ
And Davidson seems willing to accept that this is so. The notion of quantift-
icational form may indeed by an arbitrary ideal, but it is a laudable ideal :
for Davidson,presumably, we must refer to first-order logic or predicate 
structure as the real logical form behind the whole of natural language , such
a logical form being identified with the deep structure of the language, because•
as Davidson's arguments for holism and semantic monism show, his aim is to 
maximize the notion of structure across the whole of natural language from 
within his truth conditions theory. The justification for Davidson'' claims 
about his notion of first-order logical form as the logical form must be seen in 
this light-that for nim it provided tne best way of fitting the sentences
concerned into an overall theory. But although the ultimate need to find
an overall intelligibility in this area undoubtably justifies Davidson's attempt 
to a certain degree, his notion of logical form is still, as Cargile notes, 
an arbitrary ideal: Davidson has not shown that his required logical form is the 
only one which the sentences concerned can have, or that his austere constraints 
in this respect are the only ones we can accept. As will be seen later (3*3), 
it now seems that there are other options available to us, within the constraints 
of Convention(T) for suitable theories of truth which would allow richer propo­
sals in this direction.
Similarly with the other issues which Cargile criticizes: if, as Davidson
maintains, it is the idea of his truth theory which gives a point to his ideal
notion of logical form,' the same can be said of his 'strong' notion of entailment.
It is only from within such a truth conditions theory as he envisages that
entailment can be suitabley delineated. Cargile again takes Davidson to task,
stating that his version of entailment in terms of quantificational form does
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no better than Reichenbach's. For Davidson, if a sentence like 'Jones 
buttered the toast' were analysed according to the traditional manner advoca­
ted by Reichenbach and Cargile as containing a two-place predicate it would,
says Davidson, obliterate the logical relations or entailments within other
6l
related sentences. Whereas for Cargile 'the standard symbolism of quantifica
tion theory is not good at keeping track of entailments between relations forms
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in English' , for Davidson quantificational form is the best means of explicat­
ing such entailments: as mentioned above, it is the 'best' theory in the seqse
that for Davidson 'It explains more in the obvious sense of bringing more data
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under fewer rules. 1 Cargile-’s idea seems to be that we should just accept 
that English naturally 'works that way' ; this places a primacy on natural 
language, but no unifying theory is forthcoming from Cargile. What is primary 
from Davidson's point of view, however, is to place the account within the scope 
of an overall truth condtions theory. Davidson's reasons , for instance, for 
maintaining that 'Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom'entails 'Jones 
buttered the toast' is that'it follows from the rules of quantificational 
theory' and these rules endorse such an inference by capturing the common
conceptual roie m  tne two sentences represented by tne repeated syntactic 
feature of the word 'buttered'In the analysis I have proposed, the word 
'buttered' is discovered to have a common role in the two sentences: in both 
cases it is a predicate satisfied by a certain ordered triples of agents, things 
buttered, and events.' ^  Thus, by describing what this role is (and the role 
of the other significant features of the sentences) Davidson hopes for 'a
6s
deep explanation of wr:y one sentence entails the other' - and such an explana­
tion being from within a theory of truth which satisfies Tarski's criteria. 
Exhibiting entailment as quantificational form from within such a theory 
means that we do not have to take such rules of quantificational logic on trust, 
since , from within the theory of truth it can be seen that if some sentences 
axe true, then others must also be true. Cargile, however, thinks Davidson, has 
no such theory of logical form, and hence his notion of adding extra rules to
quantificational theory in order to systematize the inferences. But, as David-
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son notes 'rules not backed by a theory of logical form are irrelevant
And, although Davidson does not say so /presumably the same kind of criticism
would apply to Reichenbach, since, although this latter philosopher was greatly
concerned with the formal analysis of sentences of ordinary language, again,
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none of it appears to be incorporated within a theory of logical form.
Plainly, as mentioned, this key factor of having a unified theory at hand is 
obviously of crucial importance, and largely justifies Davidaon'g ideas, as 
against those of Cargile and Reichenbach. And certainly , too, the perspicuous 
semantics • for first-order quantificational languages at , our disposal means 
that if we can paraphrase the sentences of natural language which have been 
mentioned into such q uantif ica.it onal form, we can extend the theory of truth to 
cover these sentences. Then, as stated earlier , the proof of the pudding is 
in the eating for
Since the entailments that depend on quantification form can be completely
formalized, it is an easy test of our success in capturing logical form
within a theory of truth to see whether our paraphreases articulate the
68
entailments we independently recognize as due to form.
But yet again, though Davidson’s use of first-order quantificational struct­
ure in this respect may indeed by regarded by Davidson as the 'best' or ideal 
way of delineating tne needed entailments, he is nevertheless forced to admitt
that ’this does not show that a theory based on first-order quantificational
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structure is all we need or can have.’ It may be, for example, that there 
are difficulties here which Davidson’s austere constraints cannot deal with: 
cut , as will be seen in tne following section (3 *3)> there are options available 
to us which will enable us to.augment Davidson’s constraints as he initially 
envisaged them, and still remain within the decided advantages of a truth 
conditions theory.
3*3 Degrees of Discriminability
The suggestion already, then, is that perhaps the austere constraints as David­
son initially construeu them may have to be augmented, or possibly even abandoned 
if it transpires that , as some philosophers think, they are not able to cope
with such problems involving modal sentences, sentences about propositional
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attitudes , and so on. For , in view of Davidson's stated aim of understand­
ing all of natural language (CHAPTER TWO) , it is not open to him to by-pass 
descibing the structure of such locutions. In any case, it now seems certain 
that the severe constraints which Davidson assumed in his early work were necess­
ary to satisfy Convention (t ) are in fact not needed, and that therefore if a
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richer semantics is required, it can be provided. (See also 5*3J* Within the
constraints of Convention (t ), therefore, we are not compelled to go along
with Davidson's original contention that we must refer to first-order structure
as the real logical form of natural language, even if , for vairious other
reasons, it is tne ’best’ solution to adopt. Cargile was right to the extent
that the predicate structure or first-order qunatificational form required by
Davidson, even considered from within a theory of truth, must be construed at
best as an 'ideal', a fact which Davidson now seems to admitt : ’to call the
paraphrase of a sentence into some standard first-order quantificational form
72
the ..logical form of the sentence seems arbitrary indeed.'
uerxaimy, 11 as Davidson maintains, 'the only way to justify particular 
claims about logical form is by showing that tney fit sentences into a good 
theory, at least a tneory better than known alternatives.'^ then quantificat­
ional logic has some claims to be our best bet at present: it is our best 
understood of logical languages, and has tne merits of simplicity, consistency,
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and completeness. Another point is this. Though the application of fuzzy-logics 
and many—valued or modal logics may seem to offer some hope of being able to 
solve some of the difficulties arising from the more recalcitrant types of natur­
al language, would altering logic to suit natural language be a good thing, 
even accepting that Tarski’s Convention (t ) allows this? Davidson is surely 
correct in holding fast if he can do so to the virtues of quantificational logic, 
as against those like Cargile who would urge altering quantificational form
in order to automatically suit natural language. If it were supposed, as it
75sometimes has been, that ordinary discourse is of primary importance, and 
that the only object of constructing formal systems is to systematize the 
valid inferences of informal argument, the discrepancy between the language of 
the propositional calculus and tue vagueness of ordinary language would be a 
good reason to resort to a non-bivalent logic; but surely ordinary language 
whould not always be considered the final arbiter in such matters. To take a 
simple example, the ordinary English expressions ’and’ / ’not’ are generally 
agreed not to- at least not in all cases- conform to their truth functional 
’equivalents’. To the extent that this is the case, the propositional calculus 
fails to coincide exactly with the ordinary language expressions. Yet this does 
not , by itself, show that the truth functional connectives do not capture a 
central use of 'and'/ 'not' , or that the propositional calculus should therefore 
be replaced by a non-truth-functional system. If formal logic faithfully follwed 
ordinary language in all its complexity and vagueness in a kind of one-to-one 
correlation, there would be little point In formalization in the first place.
One’s aim in formalizing is to generalize , simplify and to increase precision 
and rigour: in other words to maximize structure. This means that one should not' 
expect nor desire to capture in direct formal representations all tne complexity 
and amorphousness of informal discourse; indeed, considerations of simplicity, 
precision and rigour - the virtues of quantificational logic as Davidson sees it-
may be expected to lead to discrepancies between the constructed formal language 
and informal discoures- even, perhaps, in some cases, to suggest a reassessment 
of our intuitive judgements in favour of the quantified form. So it seems that 
tne best approach is not always to require that we modify our logi to cope with 
the difficulties in natural language, but rather to regard predicate structure 
as an ideal to wnich the arguments of our ordinary discourse inevitably fall 
short, but towards wnich they can be approximated. In a sense, it is a case 
of ’swings and roundabouts' : some failure on the part of a formal system to
represent all the'knobs and bumps'of ordinary language is not necessarily 
objectionablej on the other hand, we must be wary of assuming that all such 
adjustments of natural language to theoretical demands are acceptable,especially 
since in Davidson's case it may be important to understand some of these 'knobs 
and bumps ’ Davidson indicates, though, that the attempt is not to capture all 
of the richness of natural language, but rather to give a minimum schematic
77outline in terms of first-order form. The price of sticking to an austere 
symbolism in terms of a theory of first-order logic is bound, then , to result 
in some loss of tne naturalness of ordinary language, the crucial point being 
at what stage t^is becomes unacceptable: if one attaches greater significance 
to austerity- as in Davidson's wholly extensional programme - one will inevitably 
have to accept a divergence form natural language; if one wishes to attach 
greater significance to conforming with natural language (perhaps as in Cargile’s 
or Reichenbach's account) , one will have to adopt a richer formulism. In a 
Theory of'Logic, as with science, it seems a case of competing desiderata.
Clearly, tnen, the precision of first-order theory is too central and
important to be lightly surrendered unless we are forced to do so, and Davidson
is right at least to begin theory of the logica. form of natural language from
this perspective . On this score, at least, Davidson is at one with Grice, who
also would defined his semantics according to first-order logical form, and
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then, by means of his Gricean maxims of 'Conversational Implicatures' acc­
ounts for the 'excrescences’ of natural language— that is, wnat is conveyed by 
a speaker in addition to the semantic or logical core of language. (See 1-ART 111) 
There are also further reasons wny Davidson should stay with first-order logical 
form if it i3 possible, reasons wnich are , as will be seen in DART 11> crucial
in his attitude towards realism, and tne way language is seen as relating to the
world. By remaining; within the sphere of extensional first-order logic, Davidson 
hopes to keep, for example, ontological committments to a minimum. So there are 
substantial inclining reasons for Davidson wanting to acheive his aim of 
delineating the whole of tne structure of natural language in terms of first- 
order extensional logic if he can. But it must be admitted here and now that 
in view of some of tne difficulties which will be seen to arise later in the 
account given in this thesis, not only with respect to how Davidson construes 
the relationship of language to the world, but more particularly with regard to 
how speakers use language in this way, the difficulties facing such a completely 
extensional account make the prospect of its success, in the terms Davidson 
originally envisaged it, very uncertain. Nevertheless, Davidson still seems
optimistic about tne chances of an extensional account in terms of first-order 
logical form not only for indicative sentences , but for propositional attitudes 
and other such areas of discourse- dispite tne fact that, for instance, some 
philosophers have given up tne attempt to find predicate structure in such kinds 
of language : it is not possible on Quine’s proposal to characterize a truth
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predicate that applies to all the sentences of indirect discourse ; similarly,
for both Quine and Tarski, tne result of quantifying into quotation marks is 
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meaningless . For Davidson, however, even metaphorical discourse has a meaning
wnieh can be characterized in terms of a truth conditions structure, with its
81
attendent first order logic.
t
But the important point to bear in mind is , as suggested at the beginning 
of this section, that- if Davidson’s constraints prove too severe, and his fully 
extensional account cannot be carried through, there are other options open to 
us for discriminating structures of natural language from within a truth condtion 
theory. On some readings of Davidson’s early papers, Davidson seems to be
adamant that a theory of truth that satisfies Convention(T) cannot allow an
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intensional semantics. However, in slightly later publications, Davidson
becomes less sure about tnisj and , in very recent work, he appears to
acknowledge what recent research indicates is surely the correct standpoint:
that if tne ’ideal' of a first-order logic does prove insufficient for our 
purposes, then a richer semantics, aided , for example, by a modal logic, would
be advantageous, and would not violate either Daviason's original desiderata or
Tarski’s Convention (T)^Davidson originally rejects modal logic (as does ^uine^J
as apparently being unacceptable within Tarski's Convention (t ): there seemed to
be a question of whether a Model Theoretic definition satisfied the constraints
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given by Tarski in his 1931 paper, and this seemed to Davidson an important 
reason to prefer an absolute definition, Davidson's use of a theory of truth thus 
remained stubbornly bivalent. Yet other philosophers have since shown that this
is not the inevitable consequence of a truth conditions theory satisfying 
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Convention (T). Another reason Davidson gives is that intensional, modal
logics (Heterophonic truth theories) make for a large gap in the expressive
resources of the object-language and the metalanguage: the metalanguage in
heterophonic truth theories is substantially richer than the objects language, „
and this violates one of the four desiderata Davidson laid down for semantics: 
that since Tarski's work show it is not possible to give a semantic theory for
a natural language within itself, the next best thing is to keep the difference
between the object and metalanguage to a minimum, and this extensional first-
order logics do best (nomophonic theories; see CHAPTER TWO).Though Davidson's
criticisms in this respect seem accurate, it does not seem a decisive reason
for many philosophers for rejecting, other things being considered, the needed
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benefits of a non-extensional logic. Finally, another reason for rejecting 
Modal logic is given by Davidson as being that heterophonic theories show 
intensionality to be a feature of the lack of expressive power :
t
The real contribution of exterj3ional possible world semantics to the 
understanding of natural language may be to encourage us to see talk 
of necessity and the rest as intensional only wnen placed in a restricted 
setting; in the context of a fuller scheme intensionality is revealed as a
89surface phenomenon. The underlying structure is extensional.
Intensionality is thus taken by Davidson to be a mark of expressive incomplete­
ness, and natural languages are expressively complete; it follows, therefore, 
for Davidson, that modal logics do not reveal the logical forms of natural 
language. However, tiiis,too, has been disputed by at least one philosopher*
uupxa, ior example, maintains m a t  m  rsressanian moaai logics we can aerine
analogues of worlds, and that,consequently, these are expressively complete,
90and this shows that Davidson's arguments here fail.
Summing up wnat has been said on this issue, it seems that though Davidson 
was right to begin his theorizing with the most scientifically precise and 
austere first-order extensional logic , the consensus amongst philosophers now 
seems to be that there is no fundamental reason why we should be forced to 
aocept that such constraints are mandatory, as Davidson originally assumed, in 
order to remain witnin a satisfactiory truth conditions theory as defined by 
Convention (t ). It is not a matter for despair, therefore, if the undoubted 
merits of a theory of truth in terms of an 'ideal' first-order logic as a means 
of revealing predicate structure 'across the whole of natural language may 
have to be augmented or abandoned, though it is too early at present to be 
decisive about the fate of such a project. Nevertheless, as Davidson now seems to 
recognize, even though it may be the 'best' theory of logical form from certain 
points of view, it is untenable to hold that first-order quantificational form 
is the one real structure of natural language, even if it can be taxen as
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adequately reflecting in some respects the true structure of natural language.
And surely this is consistent with acknowledging what is accepted as the case
by many philosophers, that natural language is itself the source, not only of
first-order logical structures, but also of all known categories of logic which
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can also be found reflected there. Certainly the goal of the semantic
I
theorist is for a theory of logical form which will discern maximum structure 
in natural language, but whether Davidson's criteria are tne best means of
93
acheiving such a unified theory at present remains unclear.
3*4 Truth Conditions Theory as a Unified Theory of the Structure of Language
The last section ended with the suggestion that the goal of the semantic theor -
ist is for a theory of logical form which will maximize structure in natural
language; whatever the eventual outcome of the issure over suitable logics, the
central virtues of Davidson's truth conditions theory as an enterprize remain
untouched. Though there are substantial arguments over whether Davidson's
original constraints are needed, the attempt to reflect, from within a Tarski-
style theory of truth, the whole of the structure of natural language in terms
of a network of logical possibility has not been vitiated by any substantial
philosophical argument so far considered. (But, as will be seen later, there are
other arguments against Davidson's project. )
Accepting for the present that Davidson's extensional programme is not yet
discredited, it can be seen that such a theory of logical form within the
'umbrealla' of a Tarski-style truth conditions theory would enable Davidson to
delineate in holistic terms tne web or network of logical possibility acrosss
the whole of natural language in terras of first-order logic, this network of
quantificational structure said to lie behind language being the unifying
element in what Davidson takes to be the crucial feature in natural language:
94the autonomy of meaning. Natural language, insofar as it reflects this
quantificational structure, can also be seen as a self-sustained, autonomous
network of logical possibility. Tne theoretical reconstruction of this total 
i 95network of the 'meaning' of natural language, beginning with the fragment
of indicative sentences and working outwards, being of course the Durden of
Davidson's project. Such an autonomous structure of 'meaning' is an essential-
perhaps the essential- feature of natural language for Davidson, since it is
the foundational basis in enabling us not only to put to use the sentences of
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language within any context whatsoever, , but it is also, as will be seen 
in PARTS 11 and 111, the foundational basis for how Davidson construes the 
relationship of the structure of language to objective reality, and how he 
envisages such a use of language as being constrained by features of tne 
psychological reality of tne speakers concerned.
If, however, there are great difficulties in tne way of accepting-, witnin 
the constraint of semantic monism, that the logical form of all of natural 
language is given only by the kind of structure Davidson envisages- even granted 
that such a predicate structure is really 'keyed-into' natural., language as 
Davidson construes it- it may mean that such an 'ideal 1 outline of the struct­
ure inherent within natural language is no more than one of the many possible 
structures inherent within such language , structures wnich for various 
reasons may often be better delineated by,say, modal logic. It may be, as 
indicated, that from a certain methodological perspective a theory of 'meaning' 
(structure) in the terms Davidson describes it is the 'best'' solution , but 
this does not mean that language itself is limited to such definitions. Perhaps,
for example, as a philosopher such as Eco would maintain, the network of
97language as a whole is best construed as a kind of rhizomatic maze , a 
system of infinite possibility, in which case Davidson’s truth conditions theory 
of its structure is but the first step on a very long journey.
Davidson makes it clear, of course, tnat his is just a theory of the struc­
ture of language, and plainly it is a theory concerned with discriminating only
the fine differences witnin language, and whereby, as will shortly be seen in
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PARTS 11 and 111, reality itself is thus discriminated. But, if the suggestions 
in the last section are correct, language may not only be the foundational basis 
for such an objectively precise and scientifically valid mode . of discrimination, 
but the source, too, of perhaps a multiplicity of ways of differentiating reality 
amenable 'to very different means of formalization. ^9 However, the degree
to which Davidson's truth conditions theory succeeds in describing reality 
from within language must now be considered.
To summarize this chapter, we began by seeing that Davidson construed his 
use of Tarski's theory of truth as tne only suitable means of directly describ­
ing the structure of natural language, whilst simultaneously providing us with 
a theory of logical form. Davidson's proposal was then to reflect the v/hole of ' 
the structure of natural language in terms of first-order; logic- the require­
ments of holism and semantic monism leading to this standpoint that the
real structure of all of natural language must be in terms of first-order logic.
.For some philosophers t^is is nothing less tnan a myth, since natural language
does not have one real logical form. Certainly,there are substantial difficulties
in describing many kinds of discourse as having the kind of structure Davidson
holds that it should have. Intelligibility demands that we have some theory of
logical form by which we can refer to an overall structure in language; even so,
Davidson’s ’ideal’ delineation of this structure in terms of first-order logic ,
though it may from certain perspectives be considered the ’best1 theory we have
is not the only option at our disposal for describing the structure of natural
language and yet still remaining witnin the constraints demanded by Convention (t) 
It may be that there is no final answer to what we should take to be the
structure of natural language. Though Davidson’s basic contention that his 
truth conditions theory is the foundational basis for tne reconstruction of 
the structure of natural language in terms of an autonomous network of logical 
possibility is not rejected, it does suggest that the theory he chooses for 
finely discriminating such a structure (and thus reality itself) is only one
option open to us, and that natural language may indeed by the source which
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can support many other means of differentiating and describing reality.
I
PART TWO 
LANGUAGE AND THE WORLD
CHAPTER FOUR 
REFERENCE AND OBJECTIVE REALITY
4*1 The Role of the Truth Conditions Theory
For Davidson, . the theery of truth suffices fer a theery ef reference. 1 
Behind the simplicity ef this statement lie ideas crucial in establishing 
the radical change in eutleek frem traditienal realism which Davidsen's truth 
cenditiens theery invelves.
PART 1 ef this thesis clesed with the injunction that Bavidsen's use ef 
Tarski’s truth cendtiens structure was (amongst ether things) te previde the 
basis ef hew language relates te objective reality; it was alse mentiened that 
truth was defined via satisfactien, which, theugh it provided an immediate 
link with the werld, involved the idea ef a relatien between well-fermed- 
fermulae and sequences ef objects, a netion that will be shown te enable 
Davidsen to break away frem any feundatienal basis, ef objective reality - a 
netien central te traditienal realism and even recent philesephy. The truth 
cenditiens structure dees net need te be seen as being tied te any empirical 
basis in the werld te which it is subservient and ts which it corresponds, fits,
I
er organizes. Indeed, the very concept ef extra-linguistic archimedian points 
in the world te which reference can be made in interpreting the meaning ef a 
speaker’s utterance is unintelligible: mythical constructs anthrepemerphically 
imposed in an attempt to confer seme kind ef order on the flux ef experience. 
Davidsen's rejection ef any dualism between the truth cendtiens structure ef 
language and the werld has the profound consequence that many ef the notions 
central te traditienal realism have te be abandoned, leading te criticisms 
that his brand of realism is at best anaemic, at werst wholly instrumentalist. 
Nevertheless, it is argued that the concept ef objective reality dees remain 
central for* :0avidsen; what remains important is the idea ef a reciprecality
between language and the werld- a reciprecality , however, in which any 
structured access to objective reality must be frem within the truth cenditiens 
structure ef language. In effect, Davidsen abandons traditienal realism’s 
foundational basis in an objective world te which language is subservient, 
and replaces it with the idea ef an intersubjectively shared language frem 
within which , as will be seen in CHAPTER FIVE, the foundational basis ef our 
real relationship te objective reality occurs.
The role ef the truth cendtiens tneery in hew Davidsen sees the relationship
ef language te reality is thus ef fundamental importance. It will be recalled
(PART 1) that the objective Tarski set himself was te find a satisfactory
definition ef truth, one which was both materially adequate and formally
correct; a theery which would do justice to what he calls the Classical
Aristotelian conception ef truth, namely, 'to say what is that it is net,
or ef what is net that it is , is false, while to say ef what is that it is,
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or ef what is net that it is net, is true*. Plainly, something along the 
lines of cerrespendence te reality was envisaged, yet it is precisely Tarski’s 
definition ef truth via satisfaction , as a relation between well-fermed- 
fermulae and sequences ef objects,which raises the question ef just hew
’correspondence’ is te be interpreted - indeed, whether it is cerrespendence
in terms ‘of traditienal realism at all. Pepper, for example, claims that Tarski 
has ’rehabilitated the cerrespendence theery ef absolute or objective truth' 
and 'vindicated the free use ef the intuitive idea ef truth as cerrespendence te 
the facts’. ^ However, it is argued here that there is in Tarski’s ideas a 
profound difference from the idea ef correspondence to the facts as 
envisaged by traditienal realism, and that there is a philosophically ’neutral' 
cempenent te ^arski’s theory wnich enables Davidsen te circumvent the 
difficulties in the issue ef the cerrespendence ef language t® reality. One 
ef Tarski's central ideas comes in the following passage:
The possibility suggests itself, however, ef introducing a mere general
concept which is applicable t© any sentential function ? can be
J . o v j u j_ a iv c ± j u o n u o u  j  emu , w u c n  a ^ i i o u  u w  ocu o cu iico , xcauo  u o
directly te the concept ef truth. These requirements are met 
by the netien ef the satisfaction ef a alven sentential function 
by given object3 .^
The axiematically defined netien ef satisfaction thus stands te open sentences 
sentential functions, or predicates , as truth stands t© closed sentences, that 
axiematisatien then being used te define the truth predicate. Open sentences 
like 'Fxf do net have truth values, but are satisfied (or net satisfied) by 
infinite sequences ef objects - in general, by any ordered n-tuple ef objects.-^ 
Accordingly, Tarski defined a sentence as true in these cases where it is 
satisfied by all sequences, and false when it is satisfied by none.
It is already plain that such a defintien , which is going to form the 
basis ®f hew Davidsen sees the relationship ef language t© objective reality, 
is going to involve seme very different ideas frem these in tradtienal realism 
which see language as involved in seme kind ef cerrespendence te a werld which 
provides a foundational basis for that language . In a sense, Davidsen's use 
ef Tarski's truth cenditiens theery will be seen t® reverse these ideas , 
though there will still be interesting similarities.
4*21 Davidsen'a Rejection ef Any Foundational Basis in Objective Reality
The operative idea in Davidsen's reversal ef traditienal realism is his
rejection ef the netien ef rjiy dualism between language and uninterpreted
reality. In particular, the rejection ef the views espoused by the early
Wittgenstein and Russell regarding the idea ef a structural isomorphism
£
between individual prepositions and facts in the werld. Wittgenstein's 
ideas are the more relevent for present discussion, involving as they do 
reference te abstract entities , whereas Russell also sees an empirical 
component as crucially involved
In the Tractatus , then, Wittgenstein says that prepositions are
complexes truth functionally compounded out ef elementary propositions, these
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in turn being constituted by arrangements ef names. Such a structure
uuix*ra one way one wwxxu xa axxangeu; oacrc arc lauos ouirt ou l ©I states— 
•f-affairs which in turn are constituted out of objects in certain arrangements. 
Names directly refer to objects; since elementary propositions are constituted 
out of names arranged in the way that objects are arranged in states-of- 
affairs, Wittgenstein says that elementary propositions picture those states- 
of-affairs. Hence propositions compounded out of elementary propositions 
correspond to the facts built out of the states-of-affairs. Wittgenstein thus 
aims in the Tractatus to elucidate the structure of language and its function 
of describing the world on the level of correspondence to abstract facts: 
the fundamental doctrine is that propositions are pictures, the elements of 
which correspond to the scene they picture. The world, if it is to be capable 
of being represented in language must be an arrangement of an array of objects 
which have various possibilities of being combined with one another. What 
actually is the case is the way these objects in the werld are arranged. This, 
of course , has the consequence that the meaningful content of discourse is 
its picturing the facts that constitute the world. Language was literally 
pictorial: sentences picture facts. And, for a sentence to mirror the world, 
not only is there this one-to-one correlation between names in the sentence 
and objects in the world, but the very structure internal to the sentence and 
which relates the names in the sentence to each ©ther corresponds to the way 
in which‘objects in the world are related to each other by a structure 
internal to the states-of-affairs in the world. In some ways, as will be seen, 
the notion of the structure or logical form of propositions mirroring the 
structure of reality is close to ideas ©f Davidson's; however, one of the ^ 
major differences lies in Davidson's rejection of individual sentences as 
corresponding to any foundational basis of abstract facts in the world. Though 
Davidson sees Tarski's theory as being in some respects like a correspondence 
theory, the kind of correspondence involved will occur only via the whole 
structure of language •
Two further points are worth mentioning here which also distinguish
Davidson's theory from Wittgenstein’s. The notion of names as denoting will be
rejected and the failure in Wittgenstein to see—at this stage of nis writing 
anyway- of reference only being conceivable from within an overall theory •
Wittgenstein’s notion that tne world must, independently of any theery of 
language, consist ultimately of simple objects related to each other in 
certain ways, implies a dualism between language and reality; and it is 
the unargued assertion that the world consists ef such facts as arrangements 
of objects to which language passively corresponds which will be Davidson’s 
prime target. For Bavison, only through the autonomous structure of language 
as a whole can we approach tne structure of the world whose independent 
existence must remain unknowable. Interestingly, there are already hints in 
the Tractatus towards this end . Although language and the world have to 
share a certain structure in order that language corresponds to the world, 
Wittgenstein does say that the actual correspondence ef propositions to facts 
cannot itself be meaningfully represented in language or discussed in
g
language. And, by his work which followed, Wittgenstein conceives of language
in terms of a structural autonomy which is very close te Davidson’s ideas. In
Grammatik , for instance, he points out that 'the connection between language
9
and reality is made by means of verbal explanation' J , and concludes that
'language remains closed in upon itself, autonomous. ' ^  Similarly in Zettel
11
'the use of language is in a certain sense autonomous' • And finally, in
the Philosophical Investigations , 'what has to be accepted, the given, is-
12
so one could say- forms of life' The irreducible basis ©f language within its 
context is what is important, and by now Wittgenstein saw clearly that it was 
a mistake t© talk of justifying language by his early notion of correspondence 
to an independent reality, rejecting the picture theory ©f language as an 
illusion.
Before examining Davidson's precise criticisms ©f the idea of the • ■ 
the correspondence of individual sentences to facts in the world, it is 
instructive t© look at Russell's position. Epistemologioal concerns did not 
enter Wittgenstein's views sketched above: he is untroubled by being unable 
to give examples of names and objects, or of elementary propositions and states 
of affairs. But for Russell, empirical foundations are important : sense- 
experience is regarded as privileged in that it is somehow immediate; we are
m  touch witn ti.e woria, ana can cnecx our reports on it Dy seeing wnetner
they fit what we sense. The logical atoms or simples ( the correlates of the
objects in the Tractatus ) are sense data: for example , colour patches in
the visual field. These are the objects of direct acquaintance, and the names
out of which propositions are built refer to the simple objects of acquaintance
Descriptive knowledge is inferred from , or can be referred back to, such
episodes of acquaintance. In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism Russell says
'these ultimate simples, out of which the world is built...have a kind of
13
reality not belonging to anything else.* ^ Of more importance to us here is •
that for Russell, as for Wittgenstein, the central notion is of correspondence
of structural isomorphism between propositions and facts. In the same essay,
Russell insists that the world does contain non-linguistic things that are akin
to sentences and asserted by them; these things he calls facts. They are
allowed a full-fledged existence: 'Facts belong to the objective world'. ^
Facts are , for Russell, as much part of the real world as , say, a chair.
Moreover, they are things one can both assert and deny: both exist.
In the above essay, (1918) , Russell acknowledges Wittgenstein's influence,
15
but as early as 1904 Russell equates facts with true judgements ^ , and by
16
1912 he was urging a correspondence between propositions and facts
Undoubtably, Russell was receptive t© facts as extra-linguistic entities
beeause * of his tendencey to conflate meaning with reference: sentences , being
meaningful, had to correspond to something; hence, for each true or false
sentence , there is a fact, which the sentence asserts or denies according to
whether the sentence is true or false. Even as late as 1948, Russell says
17
'Everything that there is in the world I call a "fact"'. Notwithstanding 
these comments, however, it also seems apparent that in Russell, as in 
Wittgenstein , there is an increasing tendency towards naturalism which brings 
him close to some ideas in Davidson, and which at times go beyond what 
Davidson would accept. (See CHAPTER FIVE). Even in The Philosophy of Logical 
Atomism , the analysis of facts in the world rests on an analysis of language, 
itself, despite the misplaced concern with the structural isomorphism between 
propositions and facts. The latter notion may indeed be an influence carried 
over from the scientific thought of the day, as some critics have noted.
It is not surprising, then, that Davidson comes to refute, from a 
philosophical point of view, what is outmoded from the scientific point of view, 
or that his own standpoint reflects ideas in current 'Bootstrap' Physics. ^  
Crucial difficulties with any structural isomorphism between individual
propositions and facts soon become evident, and Davidson goes into great detail
20 21
over the issue, predominantly his Reply to Martin and True to the Facts.
In the former paper, Davidson seems at first to be saying that the entities
in the world to wniGh sentences correspond are nothing other than the facts
espoused by Wittgenstein and Russell: 'The entity to which "The eat has
mange" corresponds is the cat's having of mange; equivalently, it is the fact
22
that the cat has mange. ' A little later , Davidson asks what it is in the
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world that makes such sentences true , and answers '...in two words, the facts.* 
And then comes the comment which really appears t© suggest Davidson is in the
Wittgenstinean camp:'It seems that a fact contains,.in appropriate array, just
the objects any sentence it verifies is about. ; he even concludes there
25
may be something to be said for the notion of 'pictures. ' Yet Davidson's 
final ideas are , we will see, very different .
£gain , such sentiments initially appear to find an echo in the early
stages of True to the Facts ,Davidson proposing to 'defend a version of the
2 6
correspondence theory. ' and later indicating that 'The semantic concept of
truth as developed by Tarski deserves to be called a correspondence theory
27
because of the part played by the concept of satisfaction; * , truth having
28
been explained 'in terms of a relation between language and something else.'
(
But, as with the earlier paper, the ensuing argument shows that both the notion 
correspondence and facts undergo a radical change. For, the correspondence
29
theories of traditional realism 'have not done well under examination’ , and
'The chief difficulty is in finding a notion of fact that explains anything, 
that does not lapse, when spelled out, into the trivial or the empty. ' ^
Thus a sentence like
(5) The statement that Thika is in Kenya corresponds to the facts. ^
3 2
for Davidson says no more than '"The statement that Thika is in Kenya is true"
j  ~  ~  ^  a “  w j -  j -  a , o  i / o  e t u i *  ^ o i i c n j j w u a c i i u c  i,110.1,
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does net circle back immediately to truth1 would they be acceptable, for,
'...unless we find another way to pick out facts, we cannot hope to explain
34-truth by appeal t© them. 1 Unless, that is, we can provide clear criteria
of identity and individuation for facts, they should not be taken as an
independent basis for judging the truth of sentences. ^  Davidson's conclusion,
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in this paper,is that ’Talk about facts reduces to predication of truth1 ;
a similar conclusion is reached in the earlier paper mentioned: 'We may then
with easy conscience side with Martin in viewing "corresponds to a fact" when
said of a sentence, as conveying no more than "is true"'
Thus, -Davidson's truth conditions theory does not accept any structural
isomorphism between individual propositions and facts, and tie relation of
satisfaction is not what was traditionally accepted as 'correspondence'. As
seen on the discussion on Tarski, the satisfaction of sentences by infinite
sequences is very different from correspondence to facts, and whether a
particular function satisfies a sentence is dependent upon what entities
are assigned to the free variables of the sentence. Hence, for Davidson,
'...the failure of correspondence theories of truth based on the notion of fact
traces back t© a common source: the desire to include in the entity to which a
true sentence corresponds not only the objects the sentence is "about"...but
39also whatever it is the sentence says about them. 1 However, a truth
conditions theory based on satisfaction is not so ambitious , its entities 
being ' no more than arbitrary pairings of the objects over which the variables 
ff the language range with those variables. The variables , that is, refer 
to no particular individual. Though a theory of truth may be called a 
'correspondence ' theory, it offers no means of comparing sentences with what 
they are about- since it provides no entities such as facts with which to 
compare sentences.^ Davidson*a final position is aptly summed up in a series 
of quotations from the original edition of the paper with which we began:
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'We do not want facts', 'we do not need facts* and 'facts do not exist’.
Are Davidson's conclusions justified? Some interesting support comes from 
Strawson'a criticisms of Austin's attempt to rehabilitate the traditional.
notion 01 correspondence in terms 01 purely conventional relations between
language and the world, culminating in Strawson's judgement that 'The
correspondence theory requires , not purification, but elimination.
Strawson's criticisms are pertinent since they help to make the point , crucial
to Davidson's rejection of facts, that , unless we can find a way to identify
and individuate facts in the world, we cannot explain truth by appeal to them.
Austin, of course, stresses the conventional character of the correlation of
words and the world; accordingly, it in no way depends on the notion of
structural isomorphism , or for a true statement to mirror any state-ef-
affairs. Rather, there are descriptive and demonstrative conventions involved^ 
Thus, a statement such as 'I am hurrying' uttered by s at t would require
descriptive conventions correlating the words with the situation in which
someone is hurrying, and demonstrative conventions correlating the words with
the state of s at t . The statement is true if the specific situation given by
the demonstrative conventions as it correlates with words is of the type
of situation correlated with the words as given by the descriptive conventions.
Any arbitrary words could be correlated with any situation whatever, so long
as the correlations are sufficiently consistent for communication to take
place successfully. Strawson, indeed, seems to accept two features of this
'purified* version, in that he acknewledges the affixing of the predicate 
'true' to statements , rather than to sentences, as with the semantic theory;
further he accepts the purely conventional nature of the relation of cerres-
ondence. But the pertinent feature here is Strawson's contention that 'The
J
only plausible candidate for the position of what makes the statement true is
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the fact it states; but the fact it states is not "something" in the world'.
That statements can fit the facts is not evidence that facts are features of 
the world. Strawson does not think that facts are the sort of entities that 
can be described or referred to : 'Facts are what statements (when true)state; 
they are not what statements are about ' ^  Statements are indeed about 
properties and relations in the world; but the actual fact that a statement 
states is not itself something in the world. A fact makes a claim to an 
objectivity and independence from human judgement which cannot be justified^
If we grant that there is no semantic relation between a statement and a fact
then there can be no question of considereing a statement as logically- 
corresponding t© a fact in the traditional sense : they are simply ©n the 
wrong side of the semantic fence to be considered as candidates for corres­
pondence. It begins to look as though these so-called 'facts' of the material 
world are better construed as concepts embodied within-, our semantic conceptual 
scheme, rather than things we can know about in the objective world. Indeed, 
the conceptual map of the world , as it is drawn in the semantic structure of 
language, may not reflect ar correspond to - in the passive yet rigid sense 
required by traditional realism- the actual objective structure of the world 
at all , though , as will be seen in CHAPTER FIVE, there may be a sense in 
which it tends towards it. Facts, then, more a matter ©f the cognitive content 
of an indicative statement than objectively real, in a sense 'fictitious' 
entities , introduced into language by traditional realists(although they 
appear not to have recognized this) in order to anthropomorphically impose 
structure on the flux of experience. But this now transfers facts across the 
semantic border into the realm ef language itself, which Strawson seems to have 
recognized: 'If you prize the statements off the world, you would prize txie 
facts off too; but the world would be none the poorer. ^  Yet if facts are 
just 'what statements (when true) state’ as Strawson says, or if 'Talk about 
facts reduces to predication ©f truth*^ as according to ^avidson, then surely 
facts are no longer of any interest in the search for a realist theery of truth. 
Such a conclusion is in agreement with Quine's observation that we can abjure
facts, *.,. having satisfied ourselves that t® admit them would serve no good 
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purpose. Abjuration for Quine ,c,and Davidson, consists in not recognizing
facts as values for the variables; what is to replace them is another matter, 
to be discussed in CHAPTER FIVE.
The essential point remains that 'correspondence ' with objective reality
can only be under linguistic descriptions, facts being on the wrong side of the
semantic divide to serve in any explanation of the concept of truth. Naive
correspondence theories tried to go too far in assuming that individual senten -
ces are in isomorphic correspondence with reality: such a view fails to take
account of the probable complexity of the unconceptualized flux of things , 
which our language neither can nor needs to capture. Nor is i.t possible, ©r even
necessary, if Strawson's argument in Individuals is valid,te establish
traditional realism'3 need to siiow objects as really real- as existing wholly
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or absolutely independently of our conceptual schemes. As Nelson Goodman
has cemented, 'Truth is not a copy of the real werld. One of the damn things is
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enough. 1 J Facts, then, are net to be viewed witn the awe accorded them by 
traditional realism, and Popper's dictum that Tarski 'vindicated the free use 
©f the intuitive idea of truth as correspondence to the facts' has to be 
viewed with caution. Popper often views the T-schema as having a left-hand-side
that refers to a linguistic item , a sentence , and the right-hand-side as
referring to an extra-linguistic item, a fact. But this will not do; although 
Tarski's T-schema can indeed be construed as a 'correspondence* theory in the 
special sense indicated above, it is no more than a proposed criteria of the 
adequacy for a truth tneory ( see PART l), and does not specify the correspond­
ence theory as uniquely correct, let alone specifying correspondence to facts. 
Both Goodman and Sellars have pointed out that Tarski's criteria leaves us free 
to adopt a correspondence, a coherence,©r a redundancy theory,and this agrees 
with Tarski's own estimate:
'...we may remain naive realists or idealists, empiricists, ©r meta­
physicians ...The semantic conception is completely neutral toward all 
54these issues.
Tarski's truth conditions theory .carries with it an underlying philosophical 
neutrality such that 's is satisfied by all functions* does not need to mean 
what * corresponds t© £he facts' was taken to mean , though in the sense . 
described they are equivalent. Facts do not exist in that they cannot be 
intelligibly construed as extra-linguistic entities in objective reality to 
which our sentences correspond; rather, they are better viewed as theoretical 
postulations within our conceptual scheme of language- myths emplyed by 
traditional realism, but only one of the many such theoretical entities which
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the structure of our language allows us to reconstruct.
Davidson's use of Tarski's truth conditions theory can thus successfully 
circumvent any problems incurred by traditional realism's need for a 
foundational basis in objective reality to w.ich sentences correspond.
Names, Delinite Descriptisns, ana Predicates
There is no place in Davidson's truth conditions theory for the realist
reference of words. Proper names,for example, conceived of as they are ©n
certain traditional accounts and more recently by the causal theory of 
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reference in terms of 'labels' has no role within the semantic concept of 
truth. Rather, the holistic structure of language, on Davidson's account , 
requires that the function of words be subsumed within predicate structure.
It is also intrinsically linked to the rejection of any dualism between the 
elements of language and objective realityand ©f any empirical basis in the 
world as a foundation for language. Unlike the rejection by Davidson of 
sentences as corresponding t© facts, this issue is more contentious.
In his earliest papers, it perhaps appears that Davidson is not so opposed 
to the notion of words being directly linked to the world as he later becomes:
Statements are true or false because of the words used in making them, 
and it is words that have interesting', detailed, conventional 
connections with the world. Any serious theory ©f truth must there­
fore deal with these connections, and it is here if anywhere that the
57notion of correspondence can find some purchase.
This is not an ©pinion Davidson espouses in later works. In one way it is 
surprising that Davidson, in general, becomes so antithetical to the causal 
theory of reference, since it has been neld by philosophers such as Puti-am or 
Kripke to be the. sine qua non of scientific realism , principally through
CO
its explanation ©f how natural kind terms refer. Such a theery, taking its
impetuous from its repudiation of traditional descriptive theories, and with 
its thesis that names do not have their extensions determined by Fregean senses, 
may at first seem to offer good reasons why Davidson should acknowledge the
merits of its objective and scientific stance; yet one can reject the notion of
59Fregean senses and still remain a descriptionalist , as will be seen. "
The heart of tne descriptionalist point of view which the causal theory
attempts to refute is given by Kripke, who cites Russell and Frege as examples
of adherents t© the traditional conjunction theory whereby the intended referent 
of a name is determined by a precise set of descriptions associated with that 
name: 'Frege and Russell certainly seem to have the full-blown theory according 
to which a proper name is... synonymous with the description which replaces iti'^°
r
JCripke also adverts to Wittgenstein and Searle as contemporary philosophers for 
whom a cluster theory of proper names has seemed mor plausible , but denies that 
this is anything more than a refinement of the older , stricter view, and main­
tains it changes nothing:
There is a popular substitute for the theory of Frege and Russell...The
substitute that, although a name is not a disguised description, it
either abbreviates ©r anyway its reference is determined by, some cluster
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©f descriptions. The question is whether this is true...'
Kripke, Putnam, and Donnellan all oppose such descriptive theories as theories of
reference, arguing that proper names refer independently of such descriptions.
One of Donnellan's major insights, for instance, has been to shew that reference
can take place not only in the absence of identifying descriptions, but even
when the identifying descriptions associated with a name d© not correctly apply
62
to the individual to whom the name refers. Donnellan distinguishes between
two kinds of use for definite descriptions- the attributive and the referential.
In using the former, a speaker intends to be saying something about whomever
fits a certain description witnout necessarily having any idea who it is that
fits that description • In the referential case, a speaker has a definite idea
whom he means to be speaking about, and uses the description to refer to that
specific individual. An example given is the use of the sentence'The man who
murdered Smith is insane' ^  _ which, attributively, conveys that any person wh©
murdered Smith must be insane; referentially, it conveys that , for example,
Jones- whom both speaker and audience know to have been convicted of the murder,
even though perhaps wrongly— is insane. Furthermore, one can use a definite
description referentially referentiall,/ even if it is not true of the person
referred to, the criterion of successful referential use being that the speaker 
does bring to the audience's attention the person he has in mind.
Insofar as it is pertinent to to wnat will be se-.n to be Davidson's 
attitude to names and the causal theory ef reference, Donnellan's point is 
important in showing- that reference does not always or only occur via 
descriptions, and that it can and does o o c^r independently of them. Yet it does 
not show that in every case tne causal account is successful: as indicated 
below, there are some instances where the descriptive theory seems to be 
needed* .Furthermore, there are other difficulties in the way of accepting the
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causal account which the descriptive theory does not encounter •
The possibility of reference independent of descriptions is also made.by
Kripke, who claims that names are rigid designators': 'Let's call something
65a rigid designator if, in every possible world it designates the same object!
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and adds 'I will hold that names are always rigid designators* For Kripke,
a name (or later , as ne claims, a description) that is a rigid designator 
refers t© the same individual in every possible world in which that individual 
exists. Individuals will have different properties in different possible worlds 
and it cannot be the case that the name of an individual is synonymous with some 
set of descriptions. So, fer example, the name 'Aristotle' always refers t© 
that individual independently of satisfying any of the descriptions commonly 
associated with Aristotle who will only possess in all possible worlds such 
properties as are essential to his being Aristotle. Certainly this allows what 
is surely true- that we can discover of individuals that certain descriptions 
fail to fit them; yet , as with Donnellan, there are difficulties in maintain­
ing the notion of rigid designation across the board, and problems involving
i
essentialism will be seen t© make it unacceptable t© Davidson.
Indeed, it is in this second major aspect of the causal theory- its
extension of the insights claimed for proper names to nouns standing for
natural kinds such as 'gold', 'water*, or 'tiger' that tne issue becomes clear.
Both Kripke and Putnam in particular take the causal theory to support
scientific realism through this explanation of how natural kind terms refer.
For Kripke , tney too are rigid designators: 'gold' always refers to the same
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stuff whatever its phenomenal characteristics might be. Furthermore, what it 
is to be 'gold' cannot be specified by any list of properties , as on the 
traditional view; wnetner ©r not it is yellow and malleable, for instance,
what determines whether something is gold is its atomic structure. This rein­
forces what was said about descriptions not being the crucial factor in 
deciding whether a term applies to it or not; they may be a guide to identifioa-
tion, but do not settle what it is for something to be of that kind. Putnam
makes the same point with regard to water: something is water only if it has the
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right kind of chemical structure. Though Kripke acknowledges that we can
use descriptions in initially fixing the reference of natural kind terms, both
philosophers hold that reference is otherwise divorced form the descriptive
aspect. Rather- and this is the tnird major aspcet ©f the causal theory ©f
reference- reference is said to be determined by causal chains, historically
linking present uses of the term to the occasion ©n whiGh the referent of the
term was fixed; objects so ’baptised' having their names handed on from speaker
to speaker, the causal chain being maintained so long as later speakers intend
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to refer to what it was originally intended so to refer.
Yet there are grave difficulties in the face of accepting- the causal theory
of reference-, difficulties which manifest themselves when we ask what exactly
it is that is to constitute tne reference ©f a rigid designator , and what also
©f other referring terms such as those which pick ©ut non-natural kinds •
Rigid designators were defined as terms which designate the same items in every
possible werld. Yet how are these 'items' to be construed? They cannot be the
extensions of the terms, since extensions can vary across worlds . One solution
proposed is to say a rigid designatio designates the kind or species itself.
■This in turn raises problems with respect to non- natural kind terms, where we
I
don not normally have a kind of thing in mind at all: rather, we employ
general specifications shuch tnat if anything fits some of them , we apply
the label. So here, non-natural kinds lack bilegical or atomic essences , as
a ground fer designation, and , indeed, it seems that in such cases at least,
70
the descriptive theory applies.
But the very notion that a rigid designator designates the kind or speeies 
itself id fraught with difficulties involving problems of essentialisra.
As seen, on the causal account, properties associated with a term at agny given 
time have no inherent bearing- upon what the terra refers to; only on the condit­
ion that the pro,erties truly belong to tne things in a natural kind, that they
are essential properties of things in that natural kind can they indicate what
the term really refers to. For, unless these properties were essential, they
would inevitably direct us to false conclusions and we would end up including in
a natural kind term's extension things which do not really belong there. But
how are we to determine the properties essential to a natural kind? Even if we
knew many of the properties of things in a natural kind, there are apparently.
no grounds by which to distinguish the essential from the inessential properties.
Essential properties-assuming that there are such things de re - do not carry 
71identifying marks. Since an appeal to the obvious basis for determining 
which properties are essential- our beliefs about them- is explicitly ruled out, 
both Kripke and Putnam make the tacit assumption that the properties essential 
to an item as a member of a natural kind are the properties of its micro­
structure. The notion of internal structures of things is invoked by Kripke, for
example, because it is a scientifically precise and unequivocal way to give the 
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essence. But tne idea of tne essence of a kind consisting in the internal
structure of the individuals of that kind such that membership of that
kind essentially depends upon having the appropriate internal structure
73has been questioned by some philosophers. . Does the notion of internal 
structure make sense? Kripke says that it is necessary that a tiger, for 
instance, has a certain internal structure.^ But if such internal structures 
were nest*ed, if tigers were composed of an arrangement of physiological struc­
tures which in turn have internal structures of cells, which in turn have 
internal structures of molecules.. .atoms.. .subatomic particles.. .’//hat level 
then is to constitute its essence; The causalist could reply that any level 
would suffice; but t. is would apply equally to its external structure, and 
Kripke has specifically denied that external structure is enough to settle 
that something is a thing of a certain kind. Essentialists cannot invoke this 
idea of whatever the internal structure something may have constitutes its 
essence; Kripke, indeed, does however rely on this strategy. It would 
seem, then, that the causal theory of reference, and, more generally , 
possible worlds semantics, ^  is, by virtue of its essentialism , strongly 
realist in character. It requires that reference be possible to essences of
terms not determined by our descriptive or theoretical characterizations at all; 
thus it remains unclear what essences are or how they are to be recognized. This 
requirement that the reference of terms is not determined by theoretical consid­
erations, that terms refer invariantly regardless of the descriptions and the
scientific theory in which they are embedded makes, as Putnam says, the notions
of truth and reference available extra—theoretically. It thereby removes semantic
concern with the reference of words from any overall theory: realist intuitions
are invoked by assigning the workings of reference to a reality independent of
human conceptual or theoretical schemes.
Curiously enough, there is in Putnam a hint that though x bears the relation
'same^ to y just in case x and y agree in important physical properties,
the added qualification needed is that 'importance is an interest-relative 
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notion.* Earlier, Putnam also says that 'the relation same^ is a theoretical 
77relation.' Yet if Putnam means here that the essential nature of the things 
in a natural kind is stipulated by a scientific theory, though there would be 
no difficulty in deciding which properties to employ in order to judge the 
extension of natural kind terms, it would destroy the premisses on which the 
causal theory is based. For, if the relation 'sarne^' is theoretical, what a 
natural kind term refers to is then characterized by a scientific theory, and 
a term's reference could no longer be said to be de-limited solely by the real 
as construed by essentialists. Rather, it would be de-limited by what we happen 
to find important in the v/orld by virtue of our scientific theory ; natural kind 
term's extensions would then have to be regarded at least partly dependent uponI
how we ( theoretically ) regard the world, and the natural kinds could not be
thought of as entities wholly independent of our scientific theories.
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This, of course, is precisely what Quine has pointed out and which is
also to be a central feature of Davidson's rejection of the causal theory of 
reference: the unintelligibility of regarding our classifications of things 
as being- governed by anything other than our conceptual scheme: essence is 
always relative to interest, and does not and cannot lie out there in an 
extra-theoretical world , there are no de re necessities as reqapured■by 
essentialism.
associated with a description theory of names, and that he favours such a stand- 
79point. This is no longer surprising in tne light of what has been said
about the Gausal theory requiring that a direct relationship be envisaged
between words and the world. Neither should it be surprising to find Davidson
accepting Quine’s thesis of the ’inscrutability of reference: that there is no
way to tell what the singular terms ©f a language refer to, or what its
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predicates are true of. ; presumably , too, Davidson would approve of Quine’s 
use of Russell’s theory ©f descriptions to this end. His object is plainly to 
subsume the function of words to the predicate structure ©f sentences, and 
thence to the holistic truth condtions structure ©f language. The realist 
reference of words thus is not , in'Davidson’s view, a necessary part of semantic 
strcutre; yet, since there is a tendency to think of names as the means by 
which language gets its most direct grip on the world, this is an unacceptable 
conseuence for some philosphers espousing ’full-blooded’ realism of the 
tradtienal kind.
Quine’s proposal for tne elimination of singular terms involves , first, the 
replacement of singular terms by definite descriptions, and is clearly in the 
spirit of Russell’s approach to proper names. On Russell*g view, as elaborated 
by Quine, the role ef proper names in semantic theory is taken over by the 
role ©f predicates, and it is this notion - though in a slightly different
form, which is endorsed by Davidson. Russell held that what was important
»
about his Theory of Descriptions was ’the discovery that ,in analysing a
significant sentence, one must not assume that each seperate word ©r phrase
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has significance on its own account. ’ Hence, for Russell, most common
nouns and proper names are concealed descriptions; only logically proper names
directly refer to sometning in the world (though it even seems doubtful whether
there are any logically proper names in ordinary language. ) Such a theory
enabled ussell to conserve tne denotative theory of meaning, whilst enabling
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him to avoid Meinong’s notionef subsistence, since propositions like 
’tne present King of France is wise’ were palpably meaningful despite having 
nothing , apparently, to denote . The correct analysis for such sentences
containing' definite descriptions Russell held to be:
1. The present King ©f France is wise
2. There is a King of France
3* There is n©t mere than ®ne King ©f France
4* Anything which is King- ©f France is wise; or, more perspicuously,
(Ex )(Fx »( (y)(Fy-+-$=x) )* Gi).
Because (2) is false, (l) is also false; whereas in (l) , the descriptive
phrase appears to have a denoting role, it can be seen that in the paraphrase
©f the entire sentence there occur no singular terms, but only variables
bound by quantifiers, predicates and identity. •This eliminates the difficulty
created by vacuous descriptiens by shewing that they are not in fact logically 
83proper names.
Quine's proposal for eliminating singular terms makes .extensive use #f
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Russell's Theory of Descriptions. Singular terms are replaced by definite
descriptions, and then definite descriptions themselves are eliminated in 
faviour of quantifiers and variables; sentences containing names (such as 
'Socrates took poison') can be replaced by sentences containing descriptions 
( 'The x which socratises took poison') , and then by sentences containing 
only quantifiers and variables('There is just one x which socratises and 
whatever socratises toek poison’. ) Quine concludes that since whatever can 
be said with the help of names can be said in a language without names, it 
cannot be names which refer , but that rather it must be the quantified 
var ibles. Quine'.s thesis has come inf or some criticism , however, : for example, 
the fact that Quine can supply an appropriate definite description to replace 
a name only by the use of predicates which are explained witn the help of
85names .
Aa it stands, therfore, Quine's proposal seems inadequate, but a recent
modification of Russell's and Quine'3 predicate view has been put forward by
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Tyler Burge, and it is tnis which is specifically endorsed by Davidson.
On Burge’s view, instead of a name being regarded as abbreviating a definite 
description, it is held to be , itself, a predicate, and that predicates
underlie all occurrences of proper names, proper names rarely, if ever, stand­
ing' for a unique object:
In a limited context, proper names may be- and often are- assumed to
apply to a unique object. But a semantical theory (like eurs) that is
applicable t© a language without restrictions on the context in which
sentences of the language may be used, Gannot commit itself to such 
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an assumption.
Hence, on Burge’s account, ’Jones is tall1 , for instance, is best regarded as 
an open sentence, with ’Jones’ as a predicate boverned by a demonstrative - 
’that Jones is tali’- the reference of wnich is fixed by the context. Regarded 
thus, as a predicate, ’Jones’ is for Burge, true of an object just in case 
the object is a Jones, that is, that the object has been given that name in
88an appropriate way. Criticisms of Burge’s view have, ©f course, been lodged.
But what is important for this part of the discussion is that Burge’s conclus­
ion that ’Proper names are predicates. One need net distinguish truth-the©ret-
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ically the objects of which they are true’ ' is accepted by Davidson, with 
tne consequence that names are not allowed, as on the causal view, any direct 
contact with the world, their reference rather being explicated in terms of the 
reference of their descriptions.
For Davidson, then, there can be no rigid reference between words and 
objects along the lines required by the causal theory of reference. We have 
seen two of the reasons why Davidson would reject the causal thesis: first, ; 
that it would seem to rely on a basis of extra-theoretical internal structures 
and second,the role of werds themselves is subsumed to that of predicate 
structure within the truth conditions theory as a whole, omitting any indepen - 
dent connection between words and the world. Davidson emphasises these points 
over and over again in various papers . For example:
...it is the semantic features of sentences (for example truth) that 
should be viewed as most directly connected with the evidence while the
semantic features of words, however posited, would do their work 
provided they explained the features of sentences: t© take this stance 
is to assume that truth is easier to connect witn non-linguistic
90
evidence than reference. For tnis I think we can make a good case.
T© make good his case, Davidson seems to rely on Wallace's notion that it is
91only in the context ©f sentences that words have meaning ; thus, the reference 
of words to© is dependent upon the function of sentences . The sine qua non of 
scientific realism, the causal theory of reference, goes out of the window, 
for even if it were true, Davidson holds, it would simply not affect his project 
Such an independent explication of the relationship of words t® the world is 
simply not a consideration of the truth conditions theory, which dees not 
explain reference. ^  Davidson likens the causal theory of Xripke and Putnam 
with the 'Building -Block' theories of the traditional empirical realists:
©n such a view, says Davidson, reference must he given an empirical interpre­
tation which is clearly not amenable to Davidson's analysis since it is one 
that is independent of how sentences containing these names work. A truth
conditions theory, ©n the other hand, i3 not open to 'direct confrontation with 
93the evidence' and 'it assigns no empirical content directly to relations
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between names or predicates and objects. ' Even if the causal theory wsse
shown to be correct (and elsewhere, Davidson maintains that in some cases this 
ceuld be an accident) ^  “ though it would mean his concept of naming would 
need to be revised- nevertheless, it would not mean Davidson's project would
i
have to be abandoned, since the question of whether the former theory is true
is independent of the issue of whether the truth conditions theory is true:
'even if words do have, say, causal connections with what they refer to. this
does not mean that the adequacy of a theory of truth is not to be tested at
the sentential level. 1 The reason for this independence is plainly that
a translation manual is only a method for going from the sentences of one
speaker t© another, and 'we can infer from it nothing about the relations
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between words and objects. Questions of what object a word refers to, or what 
objects a predicate is true of, have no answer from this particular perspective. 
On this view, how a truth conditions theory maps the non-sentential expressions
onto objects is unimportant 30 long as the truth conditions themselves are not
affected. Indeed, on Davidson's view, 'nothing can reveal how a speaker’s
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words have been mapped on t© objects...' y Thus, ’we know, or think we know, 
what the words in our language refer to, but t;:is is information no translation
, 99
manual contains.
There is, then, no place in Davidson's truth conditions theory for realist 
reference . It is this rejection which has led many philosophers to see this 
as an abjuration of any full-blooded realism and even as more than an espousal 
of an anaemic form ©f realism, but rather as a move in the direction of complete 
instrumentalism. A typical criticism would be that 'The realist has to insist 
that the relationship of word to object is mere fundamental than any relation­
ship ©f word to word. ’ As Davidson recognises, the argument against giving
up the referential function of words to the world is that they are needed to 
complete the account of a truth conditions theory. The argument of such philos­
ophers seems to be that a theory of truth explains the truth conditions of 
sentences in terms of the referential properties of the words they contain; if 
we are to complete the task of explaining truth, therefore, they would see it 
as necessary to explicate the reference of the actual words contained within 
these sentences. S©, for example, one philosopher maintains:
We must say something in non-semantic terms about the nature of these 
links between words and the world ...In the absence of this, we do not 
seem £0 have explained how the whole structure of language is related t© 
the world.
This same philosopher, in common with many, would see this task as being 
accomplished by means of the causal theory of reference. He would hold that 
there is ultimately no question of explaining the truth of sentences without 
explaining the reference of words since a sentence is true because of the
1
refeence of the words it contains;nor does he understand Davidson's claim that 
truth is, but reference is not, a place @f direct contact with the non—
1 C\0
linguistic world! Finally, he mentions that we need an argument to talk us 
out of a 'full-blooded' realism in wuich 'the truth values of our sentences
depend on the objective referential relations their parts have to an independ­
ently existing reality. 1 adding that Davidson's argument to tnis
effect seem to him to have failed. A causal theory of reference is needed'in 
order to anser the question of how language hooks onto the world.
We have already seen that Davidson would not accept that a causal explanat­
ion of the reference of words could operate independently of an overall 
scientific or semantic theory and that it is the semantic features of sentences 
(‘that is, there truth) which is most directly c© nected with the evidence, with 
words doing their work in explaining the features of sentences. Thus, those 
philosophers who think that what makes sentences true- and Davidson cites 
Hartry Field as an example - most involve an independent explanation of the
role of words as they refer** to the world - make the mistake, in Davidson*s 
view, of assuming that the truth conditions theory , since it explains what 
ma^es a sentnece true by assigning semantic roles to their parts (see PART 1 ) , 
must therfore b£ able to give an independent account ©f the semantic properties 
©f these parts with respect to their reference. Yet, for Davidson, 'It is 
perfectly consistent to hold that a theory is testable only at the level ©f 
sentences while explaining the features of sentences on the basis of an inner 
structure. *
The issue , then, is again concerned with(as it was in deciding on the 
relationship of facts to the world) those who hold that , in this case, there 
must be a, 'correspondence' between individual words and an independent reality 
as against those like Davidson who hold that in interpreting an (alien) 
speaker's linguistic scheme, the truth conditions theory neither requires nor 
allows such a relationship te be considered. In such a way, Davidson avoids 
any 'dualism' between individual words and extra-semantic reality. Reference 
cannot be given any independent analysis in terms of a relationship between 
words and extra-linguistic reality, and the need for a theory ©f realist
t
reference in’traditional*terms falls through.'In order for that to be possible, 
says Davidson, ' reference must be a place where direct contact between 
linguistic theory and actions and objects is described in non—linguistic terms'; 
yet, since it is inconceivable , for Davidson that one could explain the
relation between a word and the world ’without first explaining- the role ©f the 
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word in sentences' , reference cannot and does net involve such direct
contact:
...the essential question is whether it is the , or at least one, place 
where there is direct contact between linguistic theory and events, 
actions, or objects described in non-linguistic terms. 1
The anwere received , vorm Davidson's work, is a resounding 'no1: 'We don't
need the concept of reference ; neither do we need reference itself, whatever 
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that may be. ' Davidson finally wraps matters up with the injunction that
109'...we must give up the concept of reference as basis ...' and that
reference ' plays no essential role in explaining the relation between language 
and reality. 1 The Building-block theories of traditional realism, and
theories such as the causal theory of reference which-try to give reference an 
independent interpretation in terras of non-linguistic concepts are unacceptable 
as far as semantics is concerned, and those like Field who hold that a realist 
account needs reference are making untenable claims about a pre-existing 
relation between words and things.
It would seem that on Davidson's thesis, t© ask for something like a causal 
theory to nail language to reality would be to fail to recognise that we are 
adrift in Neurath's boat, and can only work from within-a truth conditions 
theory of the structure of the whole of language, and that we have no alterna­
tive but to reinterpret reference instrumentally as a theoretical construct:
'Words and one or another way of connecting them with objects are constructs
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we-need to implement the theory. ' Since reference is ‘a posit for imple­
menting a theory of truth*, the only evidence for reference is evidence for 
that theory of truth, without needing any independent confirmation from a 
foundational basis in objective reality. Once again, as with 'facts', the 
autonomy of Davidson's trutn conditions theory is preserved: it is only from 
within such a theory of the structure of tr.e whole of language that we ean 
relate to the world.
4*23 Conceptual Schemes
So far in considering Davidson's rejection of the need for any foundational
basis in objective reality, the correspondence of individual sentences to facts
and the reference of words to objects has been examined. In this final section
of this part of the chapter consideration is given to Davidson's equally adaraent
rejection of the notion of their being any 'correspondence' or 'fitting' of
the whole of a language to objective reality. This is epitomized for Davidson
by Quine's thesis of language as a 'Web of belief' whose edges impinge on
experience, and which is rejected as 'the third, and perhaps the last,'
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'dogma of empiricism. ' Such a discountenance is a refusal to admit the
dualism Davidson finds implicit in Quine's relative conceptual schemes, and 
finally puts paid to the idea that language requires any foundational basis in 
objective reality. Rather,we are left with language as the!'real intersubjective- 
ly snared basis from within which we must approach any structured view of the 
world.
Quine's theory of language has been dubbed by Dummett as an organic version
113of the verificationist theory implied by the Logical Positivists, who
wanted t© maintain that statements reporting immediate perceptual experience
(the 'protocol’statements) are certain because they correspond to the 'facts’
«
©f sensory experience; the truth of the other (non-protocol) statements being
determined by their logical relations to these basic statements. Thus, Carnap
held that' scientific knowledge rested upon such protocol sentences consisting
in incorrigible reports of sensory observations, which , because of their
foundational certainty, required no further verification. Likewise,Schlick
argued that protocol sentences constitute 'the unshakeable point of contact
between knowledge and reality' and that they are 'the only synthetic statements
that are not hypotheses. ' This is the very thing Neurath denied: 'There
is no way of taking conclusively established pure protocol sentences as the
' 1 1 6  ■ -
starting point of the sciences. No tabula rasa exists. Leurath was concern—
with showing that we cannot investigate reality by beginning with a clean slate, 
but that we already nave an apparatus of-theories which constitute the very
conditions of our inquiry; we cannot hope to get outside this steoretical 
structure to a reality wnich is not conditioned by theory. There is no 
protocol language: all observation is itself theoretical.
It is not hard to see Quine as the inheritor of such a tradition. Though
all discourse is theoretical for Quine, and he follows Duhem in stressing that
it is not individual sentences, but the corporate body of the theoretical
network as a whole which confronts empirical experience, nevertheless, the role
©f sensory stimulation still plays a crucial part in Quine's analysis. Honce,
stimulus meaning is 'the entering wedge not only for the field linguist but
also for the child who's learning the language , and even for observational
117evidence for scientific tneory. ' and 'Two cardinal tenets of empiricism
remain unassailable...namely, thaf'whatever evidence there is for science is
sensory evidence1' and "all inculcation of meanings or words must rest ultimately
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on sensory evidence" '. Within this outline, observation sentences have
a privileged status , being the basis for translation between different langua­
ges , the point of contact between observation, and theory in language learning, 
and as the check points for 'Science as a linguistic structure that is keyed 
to observation here and tnere. * Nevertheless, though sensory stimulation
is the bedrock of scientific tneory, and thus of language, it is inconclusive 
for Quine and always will be ; since nis espousal ©f holism means that even 
the observation sentences themselves must be 'associated as wholes with the 
stimulatory situations tnat warrant assent to them' with 'no hint of what
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aspects of trie stimulatory situations to single out somehow as objects. '
There is always an inherent indeterminacy , an under-determination by the 
evidence, se that any appeal to sensory experience will not be sufficient to pin 
down the relevent terms of a theory.
This theory -ladeness of all discourse- even the privileged 'observation 
sentences^leads to the indeterminacy of translation, there being n© Archim­
edean point in reality to which subscribers to one language, conceived of as 
a scheme ©f reference, can refer in order to neutrally compare an alien 
scheme of reference. Though, according to Quine, reasonable translations may 
be possible for observtional sentences (and truth functions) , to go beyend 
this, we maice assumptions in equating an alien's words with ours , which Quine
terms ’analytical hypotheses' and 'There can be no doubt that rival systems of
analytical hypotheses can fit the totality of speech behaviour to perfection,
...and still specify mutually incompatible translations of countless sentences
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insusceptible of independent control. ' . Hence, 'The point is not that
we cannot be sure whether the analytic! hypothesis is right, but that tnere
is not even, as there was in the case of "Gavagai" an objective matter to be
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right or wrong about. ' Since an analytical hypothesis cannot be object­
ively right or wrong, Quine concludes that no manual of translation can be 
objectively right or wrong either: we may consider the translation of a given 
expression right ©r wrong only relative to a certain translation manual ; 
absolutely speaking, translation is 'indeterminate'.
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As Davidson notes, it is from the inscrutability ©f reference that
the indeterminacy of translation follows: both of which Davidson accepts; but
the further step to which this leads Quine- the relativity of reference scheraes-
is rejected by Davidson. For Quine, as we have seen, it is pointless t© try
and say what the objects of a theory are, beyond saying how to interpret one
theory in terras of another theory or reference scheme; but Quine also adds that
'What makes sense is to say not what the objects of a theory are, absolutely
speaking, but how one theory of objects is interpretable or reinterpretable in
another' 12^ - and it is this use by Quine of the term 'absolutely ' which
bothers Davidson since to him it suggests that 'there is a way of relatively
speaking'that will decide, perhaps arbitrarily, what the objects are’, and
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this I have strongly denied. ' Quine, it seems, though he holds that there
can be no such thing as absolute reference, as on the 'myth' of traditional
realism, does think that there is no need to give up the notion of reference
entirely, and that relativity of reference is feasible.
However, is not such a view paradoxical? Field, fer instance, maintains
that Quine's views on the relativity of reference are untenable, and it seems
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Davidson agrees with Field's reasons for ^his. For instance, Field critici­
zes Quine's view that 'To say tnat a term T used in one lang-uage signifies
the set of rabbits, relative to a translation manual M, is in effect just to 
say that M translates T as "rabbit " ' as unsatisfactory since the notion
©f relative reference still needs the notion of some link between the word
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'rabbit1 ©f our own language and the actual rabbits. But this is the kind
of connection which Quine's indeterminacy thesis denies . It seems, says
Field, that we have to understand an unrelativized notion of reference befere 
we can understand Quine's relativized version. Quine himself appears to have
become a victim of the 'myth of the museum' , and Field concludes ; 'It is
clear , then, that line's indeterminacy thesis forces us to give up not only
the absolute notions of denotation and signification, but even the relativized
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notions which Quine has proposed as surrogates for them. '
Davidson agrees with Field:
The fixing of reference and ontology for the object language has been done 
on the basis of an arbitrary choice; but tne arbitrary choice succeeds in 
doing this only if the relativized "refers" ©f the metalanguage has some­
how been nailed down. And this is what we argued cannot be done for any 
language. '
Davidson's rejection of Quine's relativity of reference , like his rejection
of correspondence to 'facts’ or or the realist reference of words, hinges on
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the idea that for Davidson- as for Field, and also Putnam y -it requires an 
essential dualism between language as a conceptual or reference scheme and
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uninterpreted reality*'Quine settles, at the end, for a "frank dualism" 
and leaves the problem of the relative ©f reference unresolved, whereas for
t
Davidson'at n© point has anyone been able to specify the objects of which a
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predicate is true, no matter how arbitrarily or relatively.'.
Elsewhere, too, conceptual relativism comes under fierce attack from 
Davidson, and fer the very reason that it implies a dualism between language 
and uninterpreted reality, and 'this dualism of scheme and content, of 
organizing system and something waiting t© be organized, cannot be made 
intelligible and defensible. And for Davidson,its rejection is the final
rejection of the idea that language needs any foundational basis in objective 
reality: 'It is itself a dogma of empiricism, the. third dogma.The third,
and perhaps tne last, for if we give it up it is not clear that there is 
anything distinctive left to call empiricism. ' 1^4
If Davidson’s and Field’s criticisms that Quine’s conceptual relativity
is etiose is correct, what is tne consequence? There is a hint in Davidson’s
comment that ’Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a common
co-ordinate system on which to plot them * elsewhere, Davidson
mentions that Quine was aware of 'the paradox in cultural relativism’ ^  -
that ine ’cannot rise above it without giving it up' - and that now Davidson
would like to say the same about Quine's relativity of reference, toghether
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with the more extreme variants suck as Feyerabend’s • Such ideas Davidson
holds to depend upon the notion of’something neutral ane common that lies
outside all schemes’ and to which relativized conceptual schemes correlate .
Davidson cites Feyerabend’s suggestion that we can compare contrasting schemes
by '"choosing a point of view outside the system or the language" and
equates this with the idea expressed by Quine with which we began this section:
that»"The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs...is a man-made fabric
which impinges on experience only along the edges...’”  Yet 'Given the dogma
of a dualism of scheme and reality, we get conceptual relativity, ...Without
139the dogma, this kind of relativity goes by tne beard. ’ In other words,
there can be no place in Davidson’s philosophy for the nation of relative
conceptual schemes , since if we reject the idea of uninterpreted evidence as
a foundational basis for our conceptual schemes so relativized, there is no
longer any room left for the dualism of scheme and content; there is nothing
any longer to relativize t o •.
This does not, in Davidson's view, mean giving up the idea of objective
truth, or that giving up the dualism of conceptual scheme and objective reality
means the notion of world is otiose ; the idea of total evidence is valid, but :
'Nothing, however, no thing , makes sentences and theories true: not experience,
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not surface irritations, not tne world, can make a sentence true. '
For 'the notion of fitting the totality of experience, like the notion ©f
fitting the facts, or of being true to the facts, adds nothing intelligible
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to the simple concept of being true...' And ;
Our attempt to characterize languages or conceptual schemes in terms of 
the notion of fitting some entity has.come down, then, to the simple
thought that something is an acceptable conceptual scheme or theory
T A O
if it is true.
V/hether or not Quine would agree is another matter, since he has very recently 
still urged the notion of his empiricist concept of sensory stiraulation- 
apparently to avoid the danger of seeing the pursuit ef scientific method as 
becoming solely a quest for internal coherence. Davidson's earlier point
that for a theory to fit the totality of possible sensory evidence is merely 
for that theory to be true certainly suggests the idea of a coherence theory. 
(And we must recall that Tarski's constraints countenance a coherence theory- 
as seem in section 4*21 . ) Certainly we have now reached the stage where it is 
clear that it is only through the truth conditions theory of language as a 
whole that we Gan confront objective reality and 're-establish unmediated 
contact with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and ©pinions 
true or false'. But does this mean Davidson's construal of his truth
conditions theory is in terms of just a coherence theory? This is the issue to 
be taken up in the next section.
4*5 Truth Conditions Structure as 'Entering Wedge* to Objective Reality
So far ,Section 4*2 has made it abundantly clear that Davidson's truth
conditions theory rejects entirely the idea that language- whether in terms of
sentences^ words and predicates, or whole conceptual schemes- requires any
foundational basis in objective reality to which it passively corresponds in
the sense required by traditional realism, and to which language is subservient.
The arguments in favour of such a position are substantial, even though some
philosphers still have not accepted that Davidson'g use of Tarski's trutn theory
does not need the world in this sense; they see Davidsonfg refutation of all
dualisms between language and uninterpreted reality as resulting in , at best,
anaemic form of realism, and at worst, a total concentration on on language as
a formal system wnich ignores the needed connection with 'real' reality ; thus,
even Quine hints at the danger, as he sees it, of Davidson’s thesis leading 
only towards a coherence theory. Certainly,, of course, there are strong
similarities between Davidson’s views and those, who, like Rescher, adhere to 
a pure coherence theory; yet there are also important differences. Though we 
must work from within a (truth conditions ) theory of language, the idea of 
objective reality is not jettisoned by Davidson, but rather has a reciprocal 
role t© play with language. All that is required is the notion that for any 
structured view of objective reality, the thrust must come from the 'entering 
wedge' of the truth conditions theory. Only in this sense is language 
dominant , becoming the basis for our intersubjective reference to the world.
Initially, it must be admitted that Dayidson's truth theory has many marked 
resemblances to a coherence theory (which Tarski's philosophical neutrality 
sanctions)- but is it merely that? As seen earlier, Neurath's views led 
directly to the idea that all discourse is theoretical ; in some respects - 
HSinefith.la is an undisguisedly coherence -style theory: ‘because the object is 
to construct a consistent system of observational and theoretical- that is, 
protocol and non-protocol sentences - the only test available for new sentences
i
offered., as.candidates for membership of the system is to compare it with the 
system...' ^-5 For Neurath, the primary motive for adopting a coherence 
theory is the apparent impossibility of getting outside theory or language to 
reality. Since no word-word relation can serve as the foundation for truth, 
truth itself must consist in a relation of coherence between prepositions , 
viewed as constituting a system satisfying criteria of consistency and 
completeness. These notions of systematization are undoubtably fundamental 
to Davidson’s project and also to Rescher's recent effort to make sense of the 
idea of of a pure coherence theory"^. It is not necessary to look at the 
various criticisms that have been levelled at Rescher's attempt to 'reinstate' 
the coherence theory; what is important here is now and why Davidson's views
differ from Rescher's , and thus from holding to a pure coherence theory.
Rescher's notion ©f truth as coherence unconnected with external criteria
has consequences for his view of the nature of the relationship of language and
i reality unacceptable to Davidson. In a very different way from the ideas
considered so far, it too uepends upon a dichotomy between language and reality
- not,this time, in terms of any correspondence between the two; - but in terms 
•f language as an organized scheme operating on an ©therwize wholly unknowable
reality , a formless reality: ’A conceptual scheme is an instrument for
organizing our experience into a systematized view of reality. 1 ^ 7
Furthermore, the ultimate justification for the coherence theory rests not on
an appeal to truth , but to pragmatics- its basis of legitimacy , says Rescher,
is solely pragmatic : 1 "Does it work?'.'.. "Is it successful in practice?"'1^8
It replaces the isomorphic correspondence ©f traditional realism (which Rescher
is also adamant in rejecting) with a coherent system whose marks of adequacy
of representation are ' Purely internal to the prepositional realm1. ^ 9
Accordingly, there is a fundamental divide, a 'dualism* betweeen tne theorizing
system and external reality, whose ultimate forms remain unknowable and beyond
reach: 'Conceptual Idealism...is not a theory as t© the structural nature of
reality...but addresses itself solely to the nature of the framework of concepts
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in terms of which this conception of the real is articulated. '
It is this last quotation which illustrates the fundamental and irreconcial-
able difference with Davidson's thesis, and which take Davidson's claims far
beyond what Rescuer would want t© say. For Rescher, his coherence theory is not
a theory about the actual structural nature of reality: in a manner almost
exactly opposite to the ideas of traditional realism , objective reality is new
seen as completely subservient to the coherent system which is language , and
can only answer ' yes or no' in response. We are in o way necessarily giving
a direct'description of tne structural nature of reality; rather , language
fcarves-up* an ©tnerwize formless and unknowable 'chaos' of reality.Almost
nothing can be said about reality itself , and individual things cannot be
thought ofdas having any existence as particulars apart from the categories of
our conceptual scheme : a cnair , for instance, can only be specified relative
to a framework of identification; but there can be no sense in asking what the
chair is objectively. Ihis is noc just to maintain the view about wnat has
been said about all discourse being theoretical : the 'chair' , for Rescher,
does not seem to exist independently of the various perspectives of our
conceptual sbheraes . He says: 'It's identity, and so it itself as the specific
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individual it is , is perspective-restricted. '
The result is that everything of importance is included on the side of the 
conceptual scheme- wnich is reasonable in light of what has been said, and
which Davidson would accept- but the actual structural reality of the independ­
ently existing thing itself becomes totally irrelevant to Rescher in a way 
wnich would not be acceptable to ^avidson. Reality for Rescher is totally out 
of reach, and language is a kind of screen or barrier against the unknowable 
chaos of reality beyond.Rescher gives the example of the moon . The moon would 
exist independently ©f language, but in the form of some undifferentiated chaos. 
In asking what it would be that exists, Rescher answers 'Certainly it wouldn't 
be the moon as we conceive it.'
That language as our conceptual scheme is 'at bottom not a constitutive
153conception descriptive of reality per se ' ^ is antithetical to Davidson's
thesis. Unlike for Rescher for,whom our conceptual scheme need tell us nothing 
abeut nature.as it realy is, but is merely an instrument for organizing our 
experience and to which the world'just answeres* , for Davidson, the structure 
of eur language as defined by the truth conditions theory is also directly 
describing the structure of the real world. (See CHAPTER FIVE). Hence, Davidson 
dees wish, as noted,to speak ©f his use of ‘^arski's truth conditions theory as 
'something like a correspondence theory' - even if it is a different kind of 
correspondence from what we expected. From ©ur perspective, certainly, language 
is primary: we, as human beings must work from within ©ur conceptual system ; 
yet, for Davidsonthere are many indications of the reciprocity of language with 
a world which is still, in a sense, existentially prior in importances '...it
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is the whiteness of snow that makes "Schnee ist weiss" true'. Language
alone does not produce truth for Davidson: truth is still a relation between
language and the world. This may appear to conflict with Davidson's earlier diet
155
urn that 'Nothing...makes sentences and theories true...' ' until it is
recalled that it was tne tradional, realist , notion of language as fitting
a pre-existing reality which bavidson was inveighing against, not the idea that
there is some kind of isomorphism involved. Though Davidson often regards truth
as a property of sentences for simplicity,, we must remember that the truth
conditions structure which is being investigated is tne structure of a language
already taken to be 'immersed',as it were, in the relativized context of the
realities of a time and speaker; already, tiie trutn structure is seen as the 
resultant of the interaction of the world and speakers , and in this sense,
JLJO
language is in a reciprocal relation with reality.
What has dissapeared, then, is tne idea of the objective world as the
ultimate foundational basis to which language must correspond in a subservient
fashion; for Davidson, we must speak from within a theory, and so what does
evaporate is the transcendental question of the reality of the external world-
the question whether , or in how far , our language measures up to Kant's
Ding an sich . Reality is not transcendent , but immanent within language; yet,
in abandoning straightforward realism and the notion of objective reality as
a foundational basis for language, we do not in the process need to abandon the
notion of objective reality, a reality whose real structure is describable
from withing language.Rescher'a insistence on how things are seen from an
internal perspective of scientific theory certainly points to what is important
but a scientist surely has t© think he is investigating something independent
of his theoretical schemes and not .just playing with theory..Oriqe we make .
reality an unknowable something, always blocked off from the true descriptions
of our conceptual scheme, it begins to look as if the total concern is only
with the positing of entities .For Davidson, (See CHAPTER FIVE) , such
theoretical posits are certainly an important feature of our conceptual scheme,
but, in addition, the conceptual scheme is taken to directly describe reality;
in this sense, both tne notion ©f Davidson's truth conditions theory as a
correspondence theory, and as a coherence theory are preserved both of which
were seen to be implicit in Tarski's original idea. The erucial factor— that,
if we want to describe the structure of objective reality , we must and can
only do so from within'the 'entering wedge' rdf the (truth conditions )
structure of language thus making us reject a theory—neutral reality as the
ground for ©ur conceptual schmes ( reality immanent within language)- need
not drive us to the opposite extreme wnere the 'coherence theory "is true"*
157
is all we can kne w  Rdther, through our truth conditions structure of
language, we can 're-establish unmediated touch with the familar objects whose 
antics make ©ur sentences and opinions true or false. ' ^ 8
4*4 Truth Conditions Theory of Language and Intersubjective Reference
The argument in the last section suggests that , on Davidson's thesis, language 
cannot he thought ©f as requiring any foundational basis in objective reality 
to which it subserviently refers, nor can it be considered wholly 'dominant* 
in the sense that reality is otherwise unknowably formless and chaotic, even 
though for us any structured view of that reality must , and can only, come 
via the 'entering wedge' of a structured view of language. Reality is immanent 
within language by virtue of the truth conditions theory , but the structure 
provided by such a theory actually, on Davidson’s view, also describes the real 
structure of extra-linguistic reality . Whether such a thesis is adequate will 
be examined in CHAPTER FIVE ; for the present, what is important to stress is 
that with the rejection of the kind of foundational basis in the world 
required by traditional realism, and tne rejection of relative reference as 
promoted by Quine, reference for Davidson becomes entirely a matter of 
theoretical postulation.
Since n«w we have no access to extra-linguistic reality, intertranslata-
159 . .bility becomes the real criteria of languageheod, , and the truth conditions
theory must provide the basis for an intersubjective theory of reference. For,
if intertranslatability is to be successful, it must mean that the language
of an interpreter must share certain features in common with the language
whieh is being translated, and amongst these features will be the means by
which reference is achieved. Nothing could count for us as a language if it
were not recognizable as so; Qhus, just as intertranslatable schemes must be
seen against a background of shared beliefs and attitudes (see PART 111) , so
part of the criteria of shared languagehood will also show itself at the
level of reference. There will be devices for identity and individuation
within the alien's conceptual scheme which must be recognizable in ways
parallel to our own understanding of the same linguistic features in our own
language. Davidson's comments do not take us very far in this direction, but
it is plain from what he does say his truth conditions theory provides the
need, elements of which suffice as an objective and intersubjective theory of 
reference.
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schemes to share common means of identifying and individuating aspects of the
world is a matter for the following chapter, since reference in the traditional
sense has now become otiose for Davidson, and is tied directly to ontology, which
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is now taken as being basic. But it is important to make it clear how this 
requirement for languages to possess over-lapping reference schemes is seen as 
being provided by means of Davidson's truth conditions theory. Since the 
semantic features of language must be public- the notion of private, idiosyn­
cratic, reference is as untenable for Davidson as is the idea of reference being 
tied to any foundational basis in the world, - the objective, shared features 
of reference, the invariant aspects preserved by intertranslation, must be the 
responsibility of a truth condtions theory. It is in this sense that Davidson
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sees the truth conditions theory as ' sufficing for a theory of reference. *
To briefly rehearse the considerations of this chapter, the fundamental 
problem to be answered was how the truth conditions theory accounted for the rel­
ationship of language to objective reality. Davidson's use of Tarski's notion 
of satisfaction lends itself to a pnilosophical 'neutrality' which enables 
Davidson to reject the requirement central to traditional realism of language 
as corresponding isomorphically to a foundational basis in objective reality; 
thus all dualisms between sentences, words, or conceptual schemes and un - 
interpreted reality are abjured: the truth conditions theory does not need a
foundational basis in objective reality. Nevertheless, if language is no longer
1
subservient to a world to which it must rigidly correspond, and if reality 
is immanent within language, there is still a reciprocality between the two in 
the sense that the structure of language is taken to actually describe the 
real nature of reality, which is not some kind of neutral , formless chaos 
'organized' by language. What is crucial is that, for us, if we wish to 
describe a structured view of objective reality, we must and can only do so 
from withing the 'entering wedge' of tne truth conditions structure of language 
Such an entering wedge also provides, for Davidson, the means of securing an 
objective, intersubjectively sharable theory oi reference.
CHAPTER FIVE 
ONTOLOGY AND OBJECTIVE REALITY
5*1 The Truth Conditions Theory, Direct Description, and Assumed Objects
Reference- in the sense required by traditional realism- is abandoned, and,
for Davidson, ontology is basic. ^ Language, being the new foundational basis,
directly describes reality, but also (in the special manner to be made clear)
'invents ' the reality it describes: reference becoming tied to what is
assumed to exist. Having rejected any foundational basis in extra-linguistic
reality, and equally, the retreat into a pure coherence theory, the inter-
subjectively shared truth conditions structure of language is envisaged as
directly describing the real structure of the world whilst simultaneously
postulating the hypothetical entities required as the variables satisfying
the relevant quantificational structure. One aspect of Davidson's move away
from , for instance, any correspondence of sentences to the 'museum myth* of
abstract facts , is the distinct tendency towards (but not a total acceptance
2
of) nominalism and away from Platonic realism. The main reason for the 
rejection of facts was , as seen, the impossibility of giving suitable criteria 
for their identity and individuation; Davidson wishes to maintain that his 
postulated events are completely extensional, and thus completely identifiable 
and capable of complete individuation. This is open to dispute, some philoso­
phers holding that events, as abstract entities, are every bit as mythical as 
the empirical facts they replace, calling for their elimination on the grounds 
that reference to abstract entities is not possible. However, on the truth 
conditions theory what seems certain is that reference to something in the 
world cannot be entirely eliminated, even if Davidson's'events' is an ideal 
which , though it may suffice in some respects, requires augmentation .Never­
theless.., for us, objective reality is linguistic reality.
How do we arrive at such a conclusion? How , t.at is, form within the 
perspective of an intersubjectively shared language can the truth conditions 
theory by said to directly describe and 'invent1 the objects it refers to 
and which are assumed to exist in the world? To understand this, it is first 
necessary to see that Davidson espouses Quine's notion of objectual quantifica­
tion.
Since all discourse is theoretical, it is of the greatest importance that 
we possess some criterion by means of which we can determine just what entities 
a given sentence or theory is committing us to wnen we assume that sentence or 
theory to be true. Quine has proposed such criteria for determining the 
ontological committments of any given body of discourse . Quine fist argues 
that the mere using of a name or a descriptive phrase does not committ us 
to accepting there is some entity that is designated by that name or descrip­
tion- as was seen in CHAPTER FOUR, with the elimination ©f singular terras and 
descriptive phrases. Where, then, are we to look in order to determine what 
entities we are committed to wnen we assert a given sentence or theory? 
Firstly, for Quine, it is emphasize that the ' criterion of ontological
'I
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committment applies in the first instance t© discourse and not to men* -
indicatin linguistic reference is to be our onlLy channel for committment. The
vehicle of tnis reference is the bound variable, when ordinary language has
been rendered into tne context of quantification: 'A theory is committed to
those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must
be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in the theory be
true. 1 ^ Thus, on Quine's view, one tells what a true theory says there is
by putting it in predicate calculus and asking what kinds of entity are
required as values of its variables if theorems of the form '(Ex)...' are to
be true. The foregoing statement also encapsulates the two key ideas in Quine's
views on ontology- both of which are taken up and used by Davidson : 'to be
5
is to be the value of a variable' and 'ho entity without identity' . We need 
a test of wnat kinds of thing a theory says there are, and only entities are 
tolerated for which adequate criteria of identity can be supplied. Equally
crucial to both Quine and Davidson is tne great importance attatched t© an 
objectual interpretation of the quantifiers. On such a proposal, '(Ex) Fx'
means xnax mere is an ODject x, m  tne domain -o, which is F. If one says that 
there are F's , one is obviously committed on this reading to there being real, 
existent, objects which are F's, and ontological committment is indeed located 
in the bound variables of a theory.
A great deal of criticism has been leveled at Quine’(3 criteria. If Quine's 
elimination of singular terms is correct, variables are the only remaining 
devices of reference, and the only ones necessary: they are the means by which 
language gets its grip on objective reality, since anything to which we are 
ontologically committed must'be a referent- even though they do not tell us 
specifically what thing is referred to. But what if it is responsibly argued 
that there are entities to which reference cannot significantly be made, entit­
ies to which we may be ir-referrentially committed? Some philosophers, for 
example , question whether Quine's presupposition that linguistic reference 
does always carry existential import, urging that we often refer to what does 
not exist.,making reference to entities which are n© more or which are not ye.t; 
in short, that we nave no reticence about referring to what dees not exist. 
Linguistic reference , on their view, is no sure guide to ontological committ­
ment. Other philosophers are skeptical about whether Quine is corredt in
7saying his criterion is extensional, and throw doubt over whether it 
belongs to the theory of reference at all. Again, questions have been levelled
at the fstct that Quine's criterion is framed within the context of quant if icat-^
8
ien, and perhaps the committments of ordinary language are differenct.
Finally, and ironically, Quine has himself shown how we can do without the
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language of quantification and bound variables by using combinators.* Since the 
quantifiers and variables dissapear in this system, this suggests that reference 
and ontological committment has its source elsewhere.
Notwithstanding these criticisms- and each point comes up more explicitly 
with respect to Davidson's ideas- the above notions :*are central to how 
Davidsen understands how the structure of natural language describes the 
structure of the world , and also what objects are assumed to exist in that 
world. Also of relevance is that for Quine , it is only from within the holism 
of the network of language that objective reality is to be identified and des­
cribed: all entities are conceived of as theoretically postulated constructions,
whether the abstract objects of mathematics(numbers) or of material bodies 
(space-time regions) which, with numbers in terms of sets, and space-time in 
terms of quadruples of numbers, leaves Quine with an ontology of pure set 
theory. All such entities are thus internal to the overall scientific theory 
of the world— theory being a body of sentences. ^  And, what is important to 
a theory is, for Quine, net the choice of its objects , but 'only that it be 
so structured as to assure the sequences of stimulation that our theory gives 
us to expect. More concrete demands are empty. With this background in
mind, it is easier to appreciate Davidson*s similar but distinct ideas.
Davidson’s starting point, in accordance with what was said in 4-4 regarding
an intersubjective theory of reference, is that ’In sharing a language.. .we
share a picture of the world that must, in its large features, be true. '
and that therefore '...in making manifest the large features of our language,
12
we make manifest the large features of reality. ’ The raison d ’etre for
such a point of view being that since here can be no foundational basis in 
objective reality, which is immanent within language 'it is plausible to hold 
that by studying the most general aspects of language we will be studying the 
most general aspects of reality. ’ ^  And, elsewhere, Davidson makes it clear 
that ’when we study what our language -any language- requires in the way of 
overall ontology, we are not just making a tour of our own picture of things; 
what we take there to be is pretty much what there is. ' ^  - a statement which 
also indicates his difference in perspective from Rescher, mentioned in the 
last chapter. Again, Davidson goes on to elaborate upon what these general 
features of language are wnicn are to reveal the general features of reality:
What we must attend to in language, if we want to bring into relief 
general features of the world, is what it is in general for a sentence 
in the language to be true. The suggestion is that if the truth conditions 
of sentences are placed in the context of a comprehensive theory, the
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linguistic structure that emerges will reflect large features of reality.
On Davidson’s account of language given in PART 1, the truth conditions
structure , and thus the ’large1 features , is given in terms of first-order 
logic: a set of expressions generated recursively from a finite list of 
primitive predicates and singular terms via quantifiers and truth-functions.
The need to construe the structure of language within first-order logic puts 
certain global constraints on the primitive vocabulary which has direct ontolog­
ical consequences: we adopt a particular logical form with its particular 
predicates and singular terms, and in its wake we will have certain ontological 
committments, as with the method proposed by Quine. Hence ’semantically 
relevant structure is apt to demand ontology' and 'The issue of ontology is
forced into the open only where the: theory finds quantification structure, and
that is where the theory best accounts for the pattern of truth dependencies 
by systematically relating expressions to objects. ' ^  In other words, it is 
the postulating of the needed truth conditions theory of the structure of 
language, in terms of first-order logic, which brings ontology in its wake,
’the logical relations between sentences providing the only real test of when
17©ur language committs us to the existence of entities. ' Yet- and this issue
will be taken up in 5*2 - not only must it be shown that a certain first order
logical form is indispensable, but also that the quantifiers themselves must
be interpreted objectually, if the ontological conclusions Davidson reaches
are t© prevail. And sucn issues are open to doubt. However, let us elaborate a
little on Davidson's concept of tne needed ontology of events.
In various papers Davidsen gives examples of different types of sentence
which apparently require the postulation of events in order that they can be
considered true; only one or two are cited , but they are pertinent since they
illustrate Davidson's ostensible certainty over the issue. Consider, for
example, ’...if any of those sentences is true, there must exist such things
as events...'18 or again' I argue that a very large number of our ordinary
19
claims about the world cannot be true unless there are events. ' together
with the more specific claim that '"Jack fell down, which caused a breaking of
his crown" is true if and only if there exist events £  and f such that e is a
20
fall Jack took, f is a breaking nis crown suffered, and e_ caused f . ' In
general, then , Davidson’s position is summed up by the statement that there is
21
'no interpreting language without supposing there are events '.
The postulation of events is plainly central to Davidson's project, and one 
of crucial reasons for this refers us back to what what was mentioned in PART 1, 
where events were seen to be indispensable part of explaining entailment. In 
the attempt to attribute predicate structure to action sentences, we were 
involved in the process of adverbial modification- recasting, for example,
'slowly1 in the guise of 'slow', with the consequent need to conjure up entities
22
to fill the bill of 'x is slow*. Such entities, are, of course, events, and 
are envisaged by Davidson as providing a viable semantics of adverbs and ad­
verbial modification which satisfactorily avoids the problem of variable 
nufabers of relations required on the traditional analysis • The traditional 
means of explaining such sentences requires relations with varying numbers ©f 
places according to the number of adverbial modifications, leading to the need 
far an infinite basic vocabulary, as well as failing to explain the inferences 
satsfactorily. Dut, by interpreting these sentences as being about events, 
thinks Davidson, we can solve the problem; indeed, for him , there is no other 
solution. ^  V/ith events such a central pivot for Davidson's philosophy of 
language, one wonders what will be the consequences if, as will be the case, 
the precise nature of these events is called into question.
What, exactly, then is their nature? Davidson gives us many indications
24
tnat he construes them as dated, unrepeatable , particulars. As yet this
does not take us very far; but if sentences such as 'Sebastian strolled through
25
the streets of Bologna at 2 a.m.' ^ includes not only objects like persons
t
and cities , but alos events as dated, unrepeatable , particulars, then this 
particularizing must be taken seriously. Ohe of the fundamental reasons why 
Davidson rejected the idea of abstract entities such as facts, for instance, was 
that they lacked adequate criteria for identity and individuation, and thus 
failed to offer any basis for one of the central linguistic devices, that of 
reference. If Davidson and Quine are correct in regarding facts as merely myths 
conjured up as devices for working a manageable structure into the flux of 
experience, then it is not surprising that they fail to provide a means of 
making sense of the required notion of when any two referential devices have 
the same reference or not. If events are to provide a satisfactory solution
to the gaps left in semantics by Davidson's rejection of facts and realist
reference, then we must have a proposal for determining when two designating
expressions refer to the same event, and this will necessitate providing
26identity and individuation conditions for events as particulars.
What,, then is the exact nature of events? Hight from the start there is
perhaps a fundamental uncertainty about the matter of reference to events in
Davidson and how such entities should be characterized which, as will be seen
in 5*2 of this chapter, some philosophers regard as accounting for the
difficulties which such postulations encounter. Central to this is the possible
confusion of the nature of events with the nature of physical objects. Of
course, Davidson does not in any way confuse the issue of the criteria needed
for the identity of events with those needed for the identity of the spatio-
temporal location of physical objects, or assume that the former are in any
way parasitic upon the latter;just tne opposite. For, in considering Lemmon’s
criteria for the identity conditions for events, ' Davidson agrees that
’Lemmon is surely right that a necessary condition for the identity ©f events
27
is that they take place ever exactly the same period ©f time 1 but he is 
reluctant to admit tnat sufficient conditions are provided by criteria for the 
spatial location of events. Doubts arise, for instance, over the fact that it 
seems that identical events can occupy the same space-time zone; or perhaps 
we can have two different events in the same space-time zone.
Yet elsewhere, in discussing the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the identity of events, Davidson announces that 'We very often describe and
identify events in (verms of the objects te which they are in one way or another
28related.’ even though he refuses to countenance Strawson's dictum that the
identity of events is parasitic upon an ability to refer to objects. — events
themselves being unable , Strawson contends, to provide a single, comprehensive
and continuously usable framework of reference ©f the kind which can be
29provided by physical objects. Strawson holds that tnere is a conceptual
dependence of events upon objects, and that we can eliminate quantification
over events, but that we cannot eliminate reference to objects. Plainly , for
Davidson, events do not have the secondary status to which Strawson relegates 
them: 'It would be a mistake to suppose that ,even for events that are naturally
aescnbed as changes in an object, we must describe them...by referring to 
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the object. 1 and 'if some categories of sentence resist transformation
into an eventless idiom , then the fact that we can apparently banish events
from other areas cannot suffice to relegate events to a secondarjr status;
indeed it does not even serve to show that ehe sentences we know how to parse
in superficially event-free terms are not about events. 1 Even so,Davidson
still wishes to agree with Strawson that ‘most events are understood as changes
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in a more or less permanent object or sustance ' . What this seems to
indicate is that , although for Davidson events cannot be regarded as parasitic
upon the notion of objects, or secondary to them, they do appear to be
complimentary to them , at least with respect to the temporal features which
their identification involves. More importantly at this stage, it shows a
fundamental uncertainty among philosophers, Davidson included, as to the
precise nature ©f events, and how they are to be identified- an uncertainty
which will be a crucial issue in the following section (5*2). For Davidson, they
may involve spatial, and certainly involve temporal, features, for 'No principle
for the individuation of events is clearer or more certain than this: that if
33events are identical, they consume identical stretches of time. * - a
matter which is itself disputed.
Even accepting that events are 'dated* individuals, Davidson go e s en to 
admit 'tie have not yet found a clearly acceptable criterion for the identity 
of events*^ . The corollary tot he  notion of 'dated' particulars of events
for Davidson is that they are alse 'unrepeatable* : again something open to 
dispute. It is clear , maintains Davidson, tnat the events which sentences
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such as 'The boiler exploded in the cellar' are about are 'ephemeral ' events. 
Unlike for Chisholm, for instance, who cannot accept that the notion of 
ephemeral events can satisfactorily account for the fact that there are some 
things that recur more than once, and who holds that his notion of timeless 
states ©f affairs, better serve the purpose ,Davidson contends that Chisholm's 
states of affairs are too much like universals and are thus unacceptable to 
him. ^  Chisholm's 'mythical' timeless constructs are not needed, on David­
son’s analysis: unrepeatable , ephemeral events being all that are required. 
This issue to, is obviously fraught with uncertainty.
Davidson's third proposal is even more contentious with respect to the 
criteria for identifying and individuating events; again , it will be an issue 
facing the criticisms of many philosophers as descrioed later in 5 •2 ; here , 
we must first see what the proposal is. What more is required in order that 
to distinguish events as the particulars wnich ©bjectual quantification
i
demands they are? Davidson proposes to legitimize the intuition that events are
true particulars by recognizing explicit reference to them or quantification 
37over them1 , and the proposal favoured by Davidson is that two expressions
refer to the same event if, and only if, the event referred to by the one
expression has tne same causal ancestry and the same causal consequences as that
referred to by the other expression. In other words, 'events are identical if
and only if they have exactly the same causes and effects. ' ^  ; though;
it is arguable for jjavidson whether spatio-temporal are essential elements in
identifying events, yevt 'perhaps sameness of causal relations is the only
39condition always sufficient to establish sameness of events...' Events 
as particulars, in their most primitive form , are causes; not only do we 
often identify or describe events in terras of their causes and effects, accord­
ing to ^avidson, but these features are guaranteed to individuate them in the
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sense not only of telling them apart , but alos of telling them together. '
An example Davidson gives is the instance of someone's having a pain on a 
specific occasion, where, if it is identical with a complex physiological 
event, then the best evidence for the identity is to treat the evidence we 
have that tne pain had the same causes and the same effects as the physiolog­
ical change; 'Sameness of cause and effect seems, in iases like this one, a
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far more useful criterion than sameness of place and time. '
Davidson's characterization of events as 'dated, unrepeatable, particulars' 
thus seem to have the following aspcets, as far as our ability to identify 
and individuate them is concerned, ‘fhey are to be regarded as having an 
independent fundamental ontological status in as much as they are not to be 
considered as secondary in status to physical objects; even so, they do appear, 
on Davidson's analysis, to be complimentary to them in certain respects. Also,
to estaolish whether an event referred to by one designator is identical to
that referred to by another, we have to establish whether there is identity of
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causal ancestry and causal consequences. Furthermore, (unlike for
Chisholm and many other philosophers) for Davidson , events are considered
purely extensional. Thus, in the original version of his Reply to Martin
but not in the abridged , later version, jjavidson agrees with Martin that event-
talk is thoroughly extensional, and that most sentences about events do not show
referential opacity.
However, also in the original version , there is an interesting rider which
sets the scene for the question to be posed in the next section ©f this chapter.
Wo have already seen that for Davidson the truth conditions structure of
language is taken to directly describe the world,reference being tied to the
assumed objects. Plainly, for Davidson, his postulated events are real entities
in the paper eited, Davidson states that the central issue is whether ©r not
events exist in the world. And on this, apparently, he is at odds with Martin,
for whom the internal structure of events is not part of the real structure of
44the world: 'We cannot say tnat events are real things in the worod. 1
Whereas for Martin events are not regarded as real things in the world , for
Davidson, they most certainly are , reinforcing Davidson's position as discussed
in the last chapter. Indications of this with respect to the internal structure
of events is given by Davidson's assertion that events are entities about which
an indefinite number of things can be said, and that ordinary talk about events
entails that there are different descriptions ©f the same event. In talking
about descriptions and true causal laws, he notes: 'All this talk of descript-.
ions and redescriptions makes sense, it would seem, only on the assumption that
45there are bona fide entities t© be described and redescribed. ' Elsewhere
he says: 'Once we accept the idea that there are events and actions, there is
no difficulty-in understanding the claim that two descriptions refer to the
same one. ' ^  Quite so; but this is surely first making the assumption that
events really exist , and then saying since they do really exist then we can
feel justified in referring to them. . The suggestion is, therefore, that , as
Martin and others have said, events are perhaps not the explicitly perspicuous 
entities wnich Davidson supposes.
The assumption by Davidson tnai nis postulated events are real existing particu­
lars is , at this stage of our discussion , just that - an assumption wnich 
may or may not prove to be every bit as 'fictitious1 as the facts they have 
replaced; Davidson's assertion tnat events, with their particular causal 
structure is one 'witnout which we cannot make sense of much of our common
talk1 ^  or that he does 'not know any better, or furtner, way of showin what 
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there is’ must be examined more closely. That events are particulars
picked out by descriptions - and not referred to by sentences, since for
Davidson sentences such as 'Doris capsized the canoe yesterday' , for example,
by virtue of its general, quantified structure, can be true ©f any number of
49events like the capsizing ©f the canoe^ - depends ultimately on whether the
the events deemed to exist as a fundamental ©ntological category are as open
to identification and individuation as readily as Davidson suggests, since
unless sense can be made of such criteria , such assumptions are unintelligible.
On the other hand,perhaps we should be beware of expecting too much certainty
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in such linguistic and ontological considerations. As Davidson points out, we 
have just as difficult problems with material objects themselves.
Similarly with nomological considerations. Laws , too, for Davidson, do
not deal directly with events, but rather with events as described in one way
51©r another. Davidson is concerned not with the analysis ©f causation itself 
as on the traditional analysis- fer example in terms of constant conjunctio - 
but rather with tne logical form of singular causal statements reporting a
i
relation between particular events. If one event causes another event,for
example, the important thing for Davidson is that there must be descriptions
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of these events figuring in a true causal law. A causal statement can be 
true even if it refers to causes and effects by means of descriptions which 
cannot be generalized over- such that no causal law covers all events which 
answer to just those descriptions. This is important , since it indicates we 
can held a Humean view about causation while admitting that no singular causal 
statement entails any particular causal law: all that a singular causal state­
ment does entail is that there is some causal law covering the events in
53
question. Mill was wrong, in Davidson's eyes , for thinking that if we have
not specified the whole cause of an event when we have not wholly specified it
by description, and he was confused in thinking that every deletion from the
description of an event represented something deleted from the (actual )
54event described, in other words, there is a distinction, unacknowledged on
traditional accounts , between explanations of the logical form of causal
statements and the analysis of causality itself.
As regards the evidence for singular causal statements, Davidson says:
f...very often, I think, eur justification for accepting a singular causal
statement is that we have reason to believe an appropriate causal law exists,
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though we do net know what it is. 1 ^  The causal law covering the case
itself is probably quantitative, and might employ completely different concepts
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to the generalization which provides evidence for its existence. Davidson 
seems to agree with what Popper has said about the peculiar ontological 
character and structural nature of laws: that the idea ©f laws in nature is 
entelogically of great importance in our attempts to understand reality, but
that it is of course impossible to establish such metaphysical ideas on
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empirical grounds. '
The fact that events as particulars, and the notion of laws must be con­
sidered purely ontological notions emphasizes the point that for ^avidsen, like 
Quine, with whom we began this part of the discussion, all there is is language 
and the world. From within the existentially quantified structure ©f eur 
intersubjectively shared language, objective reality is identified and 
described , for Davidson, in terras of the theoretically postulated framework 
of events as dated, unrepeatable , particulars with causal relations , 
and which are complementary to spatio-temporal material objects. Such ideas are 
concurrent with the special relativity theory in contemporary science, where 
the basic reality is in terras of a manifold of events (and possible things)
CQ
which bear (perhaps) causal relations to one another. But in view of what
has been said, Davidson's notion of events is an assumption: events are the
assumed entities to which we (ostensibly ) extensionally refer, and whether
they should be regarded, as entities in objective reality is, it has been 
suggested, questionable, and a matter whicn must be further investigated.
5*21 Davidsonfa Fourtn Dogma?
Do events as construed by Davidson as purely extensional dated, unrepeatable, 
particulars, really exist? Certainly Davidson's earlier comments to the effect 
that events must exist, and that there is no better way of showing what there is, 
suggest great confidence in his criteria for their identity and individuation. 
Why then the scepticism hinted at in Martin's comment that we cannot say that 
events are real things in the world? Could it be that the ostensible precision 
of reference to events is as much a myth as the vagueness of reference to facts 
they were designed to replace? Or maybe- events exist, but it is just Davidson's 
proposed criteria which are faulty.Perhaps, again, the truth conditions theory 
can do without such constructions altogether, and that Davidson, as he portrays 
traditional realist philosophers and Quine, has himself become a victim of the 
museum myths. To try to solve this puzzle, we will go back to first principles 
and ask the following questions: firstly, is Davidson's initial presumption that 
logical form should aecide what is said to exist correct; secondly, are his 
postulated entities and the criteria on which they are based intelligible; 
thirdly , if Davidson's assumptions are not satisfactory, what alternatives have 
we at our disposal; fourthly, are any of the possible alternatives satisfactory, 
and , whether they are or not, where does this leave us with respect to David­
son's truth conditions theory and the question of realism?
From a nominalist point of view, Davidson's demand for an ontology of events 
is embarrassing. For seme philosophers, it ought not to be a matter ef logical 
structure that anything is said to exist in the world. Such a means of repres­
enting the world within language may reflect and create constraints on how we 
refer to objective reality, and upon hew we understand such referenc te the
world, but that the one thing we cannot do is to adjust the contents of that
59reality to fit the descriptive resources of language. On such a view, it will
not do to posit or 'invent' entities for the sole reason that, in talking abeut
the world,these invented objects seem to be mentioned as well: it is not 
sufficient, for example , that we argue for infinitesimals on the grounds that
we mention them in the calculus of motion. Likewise, it is not a sufficient 
argument for the existence of any kind of entity that in order to display the 
logical form of our sentences, we have to portray them as referring to that 
kind of entity. In otner words, analysis of logical form contributes to seeing 
what our language committs us to, but does not determine what there is in the 
world, as it does for Davidson^This is not yet to go as far as saying that 
in implimenting a referential programme theoretical posits to which we refer 
can be avoided entirely, as will become clear.
Certainly there is a tradition that holds to the doctrine that the struct­
ure ©f logic should net decide what is to exist in the world.As seen, for 
Quine and Davidson, ©bjeetual quantification involving first-order variables 
committs us to an ontology with individual objects(quantification involving 
higher order variables, unless we can get rid of it, committing us to an 
ontology of higher categories of being). Similarly, for the early Russell, 'The 
primitive propositions in Principia Mathematica are such as to allow the
inference that at least one individual exists. * ^  ; however, his considered
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opinion by the time he wrote Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy appears 
to have been that no logical principle should assert or imply the existence of 
anything. Seemingly innocuous statements formulated in the language of 
quantification and carrying with it ontological committment to individual 
objects* now offended Russell, who now demanded a new purity of logic, and a 
corresponding ontological neutrality- entities such as events now being 
regarded' as logical fictions. Already, then, if this tradition is to be 
believed,there is a hinQ that Davidson's edict that events must exist, at 
least in the form he delineates them, may be exaggerated, even, perhaps, false. 
And, if this is the case, we should find evidence that we cannot identify and 
individuate them, or refer to them, in the manner Davidson anticipates, l^his 
being so, it may well be that reality need not, after all, have the kind of 
structure which Davidson requires it to have.
It has already been noted that Davidson*.-a criteria for the identity and 
individuation of events requires that they be temporally-dated, unrepeatable 
particulars with the same causal ancestry and consequences, and that they are
reierred to directly, being ostensibly purely extensional. Yet there seem to be 
many kinds of events which fail to be individuated on Davidson's criteria, some 
of which are explicable by property theorists, propositional theorists, and 
those who s&y that there are events which do not have causes and effects. These 
will be considered in order , as g i v e n above.
For bavidson, events may have multi-descriptions (see 5*1) » for instance, 
the following alternative descriptions of the same event would have the same 
reference:
(I) The movement by Peter that caused the spilling of the tea,
(II) The movement by Peter that caused the knocking over of the cup,
(ill) The movement by Peter.that caused the vicar to be shocked.
t.
On the assumption that just one movement (or action) is involved in all
three cases, we may infer that tne events denoted by the three sentences are
identical,that is, the same event.
Such reasoning appears to be behind Davidson'§ analysis of the following .
The entity whose existence is asserted by the given sentence is , according to
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Davidson, an event, namely, a 'strolling':
(I) Sebastian strolled through tne streets of Bologna at 2 a.m.
This becomes
(II) (Ex) strolled(Sebastian,x) & through(the streets of Bologna,x)& at(2a.m.x) 
which entails
(ill) (Ex)strolled(Sebastian,x) & through(the streets of Bologna, x)
And, assuming that Sebastian strolled through the streets of Bologna but once,
(IV) (x)(y) ((strolled(Sebastian, x) & through(the streets of Bologna, x)
&  strolled (Sebastian, y) & through(the streets of Bologna, y))=*x=y).
Following Russell's use of definite descriptions (see 4*22) , then the 
strolling ©f Sebastian through the streets of Bologna at 2 a.m. must be 
identical with his strolling through the streets of Bologna:
(V) (7x) (strolled(Sebastian, x) & through(the streets of Bologna, x)
& at(2 a.m., x) )
= (?x) (strollea(Sebastian, x) & through(the streets of Bologna,x)).
On Davidson's account, therefore, the strolling of Sebastian through the streets
©f Bologna and the strolling of Sebastian through the streets of Bologna at
2 a.m. are identical.
Yet this, and many other examples of Davidson’s sentences, are construed by
Property theorists as referring to distinct events. Such arguments against
Davidsen's notion of events are given by those like Goldman and Kim.
According to Kim, for instance, the theory of events , or 'structured complexes',
requires viewing an event as 'a structure consisting of a substance(an n-tuple
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of substances), a property(an n-adic relational attribute) , and a time. ' ,
events being identical if they have the same constitutive property, object, 
and time.In view of Davidson’s tnesis that events , though complimentary to, 
are not parasitic upon, objects (5*1) > his rejection of essentialisra (4 *2), 
and his requirements for a minimum ontolgy (3 *4 )» if is not surprising he 
repudiates Kim's version of events. Taking these points in reverse order, Kim 
presents a variation on the Sebasian theme indicated above and is forced to 
admit that , on his thesis, the outcome is not only distinct events being 
required, but a proliferation of events: indeed, in the version Kim describes,
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'there were indefinitely many strolls strolled by Sebastian that night i'
Kim sees such a consequence as harmless, but there is no doubt that to philoso*-
phers of Davidson's persuasion , such a multiplication of events beyond 
necessity cannot be countenanced. Another example in a similar spirit is whether 
Brutus's stabbing Caesar is the same event as Brutus's killing Caesar ;Kim 
expresses approval of tne arguments in favour of seeing them as distinct events 
as given by Goldman and also Martin. On Martin’s argument,, an event of Brutus 
stabbing Caesar at a time t is a distinct, but simultaneous,event from the
60
event of Brutus killing Caesar at that time t. Hence, for Martin, identity
does net hold , wnereas for Davidson, it does: 'Davidson apparently thinks they
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are the same event. I should prefer to think that they are distinct...'
Tne same proliferation oi events transpires, and again is unacceptable to
70
Davidson's austere ontology. Furthermore, though such theorists as Martin
wish, for various reasons, to hold to their more finely individuated notion
of events, Davidson's response appears to be that events as construed by such
philosophers are not the kind of entities which our ordinary language demands:
that we do riot require such fine discriminations. Yet such a point of view
is surely curious when one considers Davidson's other reflections ©n the
value of the use of the ideal precision of first -order logic in delineating
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fine differences in linguistic behaviour, and his very espousal of events.
However, to turn to Kim's other criteria for events as property exemplifica­
tions, Kim's second point is equally an anathema to Davidson. It seems that 
Kim's theory requires countenancing views which have implausible consequences 
(for Davidson) concerning the essential properties of events; '...' find it
plausible ', says Kim, 'to think ef the constitutive substance of an event as
73essential to the identity of 'that event.' But, to return t© the example of 
Sebastian's stroll, is it essential to think that , for example, Sebastian 
took that stroll. Davidson points out, in another context, that 'had the cards 
fallen out differently, '- assuming the stroll was a result of some kind of 
lottery- 'another person would have taken that stroll. ' ^  Again, whereas 
Kira is willing to accept essentialist consequences for his theory, Davidson is 
not.
On the third point ef Kim's criteria, the existence of events depend upon 
physical objects- since events for him are physical objects having a property 
during a time. On Davidson's view, however, ^ though events are complimentary to 
physical objects, they do not depend on there being physical objects - as they 
do for Strawson, as we saw- but appear to be ontologically independent in at
least some ways. Even so, as will be seen, some philosophers would maintain 
that any analogy , even such as Davidson's, which link in any way the concept of 
reference t© events with that of reference to physical objects is mistaken.
There are also features which are claimed to be needed characteristics of 
events by those who hold to the Prepositional theory of events, and on which 
account they maintain Davidson's criteria for identity and individuation fail.
Since this version of events - held most notably by Chisholm*^ - assimulates
events to propositional-like objects , its rejection by Davidson goes hand-in-
hand ..with his rejection of propositions in general, and is fully discussed in
PART 111 of this thesis. Suffice it to say here that Chisholm, for instance,
as one of the most modern proponents of the view, sees quantification over
prepositional objects as necessary to account for events, as he sees it, being
repeatable- in the sense that they can occur on more than one occasion. As
Davidson comments: 'What looms in the foreground in Chisholm's theory is "the
7 6
fact of recurrence...' And indeed, according to Chisholm, it is one single
thing, a timeless state of affairs , that is happening more than once. For
various reasons made clear in PART 111, together with his abnegation of
universals and a demand for a minimum extensionalist ontology, Davidson will
not accept the Propositionalist account. Moreover, as a particularist, events 
cannot be literally repeatable for Davidson; his response to the problem of
recurrence is that 'recurrence may be no more than similar,but distinct, events
77following one after another. ' Some things are seen as happening more than
once when parts of a summational event occur at different times: ' events have
parts that are events, and the parts may be discontinuous temporally ©r spat- 
*78
ially... and hence the sum ©f all such summational events retain their unity
79even if scattered. However, as some philosophers have pointed out, Davidson's
proposal'loses its plausibility when the events in question are themselves
spatio-temperally disparate: the alleged summational event of electing a prime
minister jevery five years does not seem to be a single event with many parts.
It seems difficult, if not impossible to specify conditions under which several
events are constituents of a single , covering event, and it is argued that
it is not sufficient for events to be considered constituents of a single
covering event that they share some things in common, as Davidson's proposal
requires. Davidson himself acknowledges that his explanation 'seems strained' ,
and that ‘we do not normally'require' a single, entity as reference to back
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every use of "the same thing" Furthermore, they may be other , independent,
reaons , as later work in this chapter and also in chapter seven make clear,
that propositions , even if not needed for cases like that above, may be 
required for , for example, an adequate account of opaque contexts.
Perhaps it is Davidson’s adumbration of a third feature of events which is 
held to be most contentious : that events, for him, are held to be identical if 
they have the same causes and effects. That is , letting e,f,...range over 
events and with C as tne relation ’causes' :
(l) e = f  iff (g) (gCe =  gCf) & (h) (eChsfCh).
However, many philosophers hold that though such a criterion has an initial
plausability,and may be the one we employ in many instances, it cannot be applied
across the board as Davidson assumes: it may be that there are what has been
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termed 'ineffectual events' which Davidson's criterion fails to identify and 
individuate. One example taken from science would be where there is a causal 
chain in which an object first undergoes fission and afterwards is reunited by 
fusion. Assuming there is no other causal interaction with another object , then 
there are apparently two events that are occurring frem the time slightly prior 
to the fission to the time slightly later than the fusion- since each event 
itself involves distinct spatio-temporal objects - two distinct events which 
nevertheless have the same causes and effects • Davidson's criterion, however, 
sees these events as identical, with their causal ancestry and causal consequen­
ces being identical.
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For Davidson, for whom ’Cause is the cement of the universe...’ , there 
could be-no such 'ineffectual events'; yet tnis defence depends upon a prior 
assumption by Davidson of the correctness of the philosophical thesis of
universal causal determinism . But, as the above example indicates, the thesis
♦
is highly controversial, particularly in current science, where the kind of
causal determinism promulgated by Davidson is seen as inadequate to all but
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the most naive explanation of events in the world. Of course, it would be
hasty to jump to the opposite extreme and claim, as some have done, the the
notion of causality is otiose . Russell, for instance, argued that , from the
standpoint of contemporary science, causation was outdated, and that it should
be replaced by tne notion of functional relations : we should replace 'same
cause, same effect' with 'sameness of differential equations„ ' ; science
should no longer be concerned with regular sequences of distinct events, the 
idea of events and causal relations being nothing more than a linguistic
oa
convenience. Similarly for Schlick, for whom the scientist 'invents a kind
of glue and assures us that in reality it is only his glue that holds events
together at all. But we can never find the glue...' 85 it is easy to see why
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such views were shared by physicists like Kach, and is still finding wide 
acceptance among science today . For Kneale, too, ' influence by Russell's 
scepticism ©f causality, the hypotheses of particle physics being concerned 
with things which are not observable even in principle, deal only with struck - 
ures expressed within the language of mathematics , with no prospect of ever 
being able to derive laws of nature about material objects from such truths. 8^ 
S® that though the connections in the world of transcendent entities posited 
by a theory may all be self-evident, the relations between this structure and 
the world of perceptual objects remains opaque to the intellect, and it is only 
by assuming these relations that we can explain our laws about observables.
Such views, whereby causality is nothing more than a linguistic or mathemati­
cal convenience harkens back to the discussion on conceptual idealism (4 *3)a-nd 
was shown to be '.unacceptable to Davidson, for whom the notions of the structure 
of events, causality and laws, though ontological conceptions, , also directly 
describe the real structure of the world.(5*1). Yet is it possible to overcome 
the kind of criticism levelled at the idea of causation really existing ?..
Mackie , for one, has argued against the views of those like Russell , to the
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idea of causal laws as merely 'conceptual re-constructions. ' Of course, 
Mackie accepts that the use of causal language is only a rough guide as to 
what we ate to take as causal relationships themselves: it is always possible 
that our causal statements carry meanings and implications wnich the actual 
situations do not fully bear out- that our ways of describing and reasoning 
about the sequences which we recognise as causal should tnus be nothing more 
than a guide, the 'autnority' of causal language being far from absolute; our 
linguistic resources set limits as to what we have any right to assume to be 
there. Even so, for Mackie, , as for Davidson, for wnom the analysis of the 
logical structure of causal language is one thing, actual causation beR*g anotn— 
er, it is 'undeniabxe that we ordinarilly suppose both that there are some
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regularities underlying tna^y of tne sequences that we take to be causal, 
and that scientific enquiries make progress towards fuller and fuller
formulations of these. Mackie acknowledges that the oalance of scientific opinr- 
ion is against tne notion of strict determinism, yet, if causal determinism of 
any kind goes, all we can nave left is statistical laws, telling us what happens 
in some definite proportion of cases. Again, like Davidson, Mackie will not 
accept tnis as an option for physics, generating as it does only approximations 
to regularities assumed by causal explanations. • The crucial question is 
complex regularities constitute causation as it is in objects themselves .
What is needed in Mackie's view, over and above our notions of complex regula­
rity, ,is some notion of causal priority '.together with the postulation of 
some underlying process : 'If we attend rather to what is there in the objects, 
it is the common pattern that impresses us, and it is this which justifies the
extension of causal terms and causal concepts to cover not only all event and
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state inus conditions...but also functional causes' ( o f  the kind espoused 
by Russell). Mackie thus maxes all explanation causal by definition , 
characterising a cause by means of what he calls an INUS condition , so that a
cause is 'an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself
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unnecessary but sufficient for the result. ' Thus, for example, pressing
the button on the television set is the cause of the picture appearing- since
pressing the button, while not on its own sufficient, is necessary if a
picture is to be obtained and pressing the button together with the other
necessary factors is sufficient to obtain a picture, but not the only possible 
way. Furthermore, basic laws, for Mackie, seem to instantiate underlying 
'deep' processes of 'forms of persistence' • At the 'surface', perceptual
i
level, we have cases of 'unrelieved change, of a cause being followed by an 
entirely different effect ', whilst at a ‘deeper level of consideration we
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would have 'the persistence of self-maintaining processes. ' Thus, Mackie
indicates that if a match is struck and a flame appeares, (on the face of it, 
the effect has nothing in common with its cause. But if one were to replace 
that macroscopic picture with a detailed description of the molecular and atomic 
movements with which the perceived processes are identified by an adequate
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physico-chimical theory, we should find far more continuity and persistence.
The heterogeneity of cause and effect at the surface level of explanation 
dissapears at the deep level, though not wholly so. Mackie thus offers tni3
notion or tne persistence or structural continuity 'as a kind of necessity 
that may belong- objectively to basic laws of working' ^  . Such structural 
forms of continuity are, for Mackie, something in the objects over and above
complex regularity, and wnicn provides some backing for the analysis of our
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ordinary causal concepts. It is for this wider and richer concept of causa­
tion for wnich Mackie ar ues and wnicn 'holds the universe together1: when 
we get things right by means of our linguistic laws and descriptions , our
causal inferences 'retrace or anticipate the sequences by which the universe
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creates itself'. y
Unless we are willing to accept that the idea of causation has no part to
play in our scientific explanation of objective reality, as those like Russell
and Schlick maintain , it is hard not to be sympathetic to Mackie's view »
97though it is open to criticism too, according to some philosophers. Davidson, 
as seen earlier takes the notion of cause to be central to his criteria for 
events. ; yet, even if something like Mackie'a explanation is useful in dispell­
ing any wholesale scepticism towards causation, it is unclear that it would
aid Davidson in his thesis, since Ma’ekie's suggestions were not developed within
98the framework of a truth condtions theory. It is therefore an open question if 
it would apply to Davidson's analysis, and whether his universal causal determ­
inism is defensible. The notion of an indeterministic , causally irregular 
world i s ‘still a logical possibility- and this could be such a world. Cn this 
score, Davidson's criterion in this respect for event identity is inadequate, 
since it, should not depend for its trutrr on the unsustained substantive
99philosophica tfiesis of universal causal determinism.
Prom all three angles, then, Davidson'q criteria for the indentity and 
individuation of events as dated, unrepeatable, particulars with the same 
causal ancestry and consequences is open to attack, and— at least in the terms 
Davidson delineates them— we cannot merely assume that events 'must exist'.
This is not yet to say tnat events do not exist, or that Davidson'53 criteria
(or those of the Property or Propostional theorists) are wholly misplaced.
Obviously not; but it is to say that the concept of reference to events is very 
far from tne foregone conclusion that Davidson's comments sometimes suggest.
5*22 Subs t i t u u i o na1 Quaiibiiicatlcii and Unavoidable Reference
As seen in the last section, even though we cannot in any way as yet say that 
events do not ’really exist1 ,(to use Martin's phrase) the fact that there do 
appear to be characteristics about tnese proposed entities which makes 
reference to them , in the terms Davidson construes them, extremely problematic* 
And, unless it can oe shown that events are not merely 'logical fictions', as 
Russell called them, and that terms referring to tnem are not mere facons de 
parler , then it could still be argued that philosophers are in an extremely 
poor position maintaining that questions about their identity and individuation 
make any sense at all, and that the virtue they were deemed to possess - their 
ostensible perspicuity of reference is but a myth. Cebik, for instance, regards 
it as a confusion to consider events as entities which can be described or 
referred to as if tney were objects: 'The desired constancy of reference, which 
theorists desire for events in order to account for the many possible descriptive 
assertions, is often imported via objects' and that'the feature of langu­
age called description only furthers the illusion that event concepts have 
referents. ' Similarly, for Jubien, reference to abstract entities such as
events cannot be used in explanatory semantics: 'Whatever the needs of logical 
theory*, he maintains, we cannot use objectual quantification with respect 
to abstracta such as events , since reference to abstracta is simply unintelli­
gible. Similar points are made by Dummett10  ^ (see CHAPTER SIX. ) Others, 
such as Benaceraff, hold that semantics, and particularly mathematics, 
cannot do without such abstracta. We have reached the third of the four points 
which it was noted at the beginning of 5*21 would be forthcoming : if reference 
to Davidson's assumed events is not satisfactory— as it clearly is not for many 
philosophers— have we any alternatives? Namely, is it possible to avoid refer­
ence to such problematic entities altogether- the answer to which will take us 
into the final assessment of Davidson's truth conditions theory with respect 
to realism.
In 5*1, the considerable importance which Davidson attatched to Quine s 
objectual interpretation of the quantifiers was stressed. To recap, Quine's
explication of ontological committment is:
(1) T is ontologically committed to a/F's iff T logically implies 
'(Ex) (x=a)/(Ex) Fx'.
And, since for Quine we cannot do physics without mathematics, or mathematics 
wit out set theory, sets are indispensable.
Davidson follows suit with his argument for events: since his logic for 
adverbial modification has it that a sentence such as 'Steve ran at midnight' 
has the form '(Ex) (x is a running)» following from it, such a logical form 
only being correct if we assume objectual quantification :
(2) T is ontologically committed to a/F's iff T logically implies 
'(Ex) (x s.a)/(Ex)Fx' .
If, however,./we could find a way to convince ourselves that ©ur ultimate theory 
of the world will not logically imply '(Ex) (x=a) or '(Ex)Fx', then we could 
conclude that there is no reason necessarily to suppose that we must assume 
that a and F ’s exist.
Similarly for Davidson's proposal that, in order to have a finite-based 
semantics and to capture adverbial entailments in first-order form, we introduce 
a quantifier whose substituends are singular terms that refer to events (whose 
'internal structure' is interms of causes and effects) , and where a sentence 
like 'Steve ran at noon' might be regimented as
(5) (Ex)'(Running (x)$by(x, Steve) & At(x, noon)), where x is an event.
and where, if we regiment 'Steve ran' as 
(4) (Ex) (Running (x) & By (x, Steve))
then first-order logic will properly count the latter as a logical entailment of 
the former; but, as seen, wit.: the proviso that if the quanfifiers are interpre- 
objectually, then we are committed to the existence of events , prompting all 
the problems about how we refer to themAgain, it would be much simpler if we 
could find a way to avoid committment to such entities altogether.
The problem is whether sucn a project is feasible. The issue may be put
like this. There are those, sucn as Quine, Davidson (and other like Deneeeraf or
Field) who hold that at bottom, truth conditions semantics must be based on
reference: that we can never avoid committment to abstract objects ; and there
are those , such as Jubien and others for whom such realism can be renounced
in favour of wholly nominalistic point of view. Quine holds that , though we
can go a considerable distance towards complete nominalism, we cannot go all
the way: the expression of all scientific language requiring , ultimately,
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that we use a realistic language J , hence his readiness to admit the propri­
ety in semantics of classes. Davidson concurrs, and Putnam, too, states that 
'the restrictions of nominalism are devastating for ...science...1 Yet
Putnara'p endorsement of realism is elsewhere tempered. For though , in one part 
of his discussion , he saysthe case for realism is a qualified one, ’at least 
sets of things, real number and functions from various kinds of things to real . 
numbers should be accepted as part of the presently indispensable (or nearly
indispensable ) framework of both physical science and logic, and is part of
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that whose existence we are presently committed to. 1 he goes on later
'one question which may be raised, for example, concerns the very intelligibil­
ity of such sentences as ’’numbers exist” , "sets exist” ...' for 'If these are
not genuine assertions at all, but only, so to speak, pseudo-assertions, then
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no argument can be a good argument for believing them...' We are back, it
would seem, with the question which Russell's criticism provoked: are we to 
regard events , for example, as merely logical fictions, and if so, is there 
any feasible way, notwithstanding Quine's views, to avoid reference to them? 
Putnam*a position is especially pertinent, since , in the work cited, he con­
fronts the problem of a nominalistic theory of measurement, which poses 
directly the issue of the existence of the only abstract entities admitted 
by Quine those of numbers; and, if numbers can be shown not to be needed, who 
could doubt that abstract entities such as Davidson's events cannot also be 
shown to be eliminable from our language? Putnam's own conclusion, however,
in line with his (qualified) realism is that'we cannot account for the nuraer-
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icalizqtion ef distance without quantifying over functions.
this is not a conclusion wnicn is accepted oy one pnnosopner . LiottneD 
argues that, given all the machinery that.Putnam presuposes, such as space­
time points, line-segments, and congruence relations, then it is easy to 
formulate a nominalist definition, and he in fact does so. Furthermore, for 
Gottlieb, the total nominalization of langua0e is a feasable project: by the use 
of substitutional quantification, it is apparently possible to avoid unwanted 
committment to abstract entities- first with relation to numbers, then , by 
extension, bo events as construed by Davidson. Since the issue of the use of 
substitutional quantification in truth conditions semantics is so controversial, 
it must now be examined.
If, on the objectual interpretation of quantification, *Fa' is true only if 
*a' is a singular term which denotes an existent object, and there will have to 
be an object which is 'F' if '(Ex) Fx' is to come out true, this is not so on 
the substitutional interpretation. Marcus, for example, and others , have 
advocated such an interpretation wnich deprives such a sentence of ontological 
import. ’(Ex) Fx ' is interpreted as saying 'some substitution instance of
Fx is true' , and nothing restricts substitution classes relevant to quantifi­
cation to the category of singular terms; no dubious ontological implications 
lurk in such constructions, since the interpretation of bound variables does 
not committ us to taking tnem as ranging over things. Whereas the objectual 
approacn favoured by Quine and Davidson forges an intimated link between 
reference and quantification, the substitutional method severs this bond, since 
its quantifiers do not nave ranges or values at all: what Marcus calls values 
of a variable are simply members of the appropriate substitution class, and the 
substitutional interpretation is blind to the distinction between values and 
substituends of a variable- a distinction central to the objectual view. It 
thus leaves no way of distinguishing referring expressions from others; the 
only objects for the substitutionalist are bits of language. Can it therefore 
be used to avoid completely reference to troublesome abstract entities such 
as events ?
Davidson disparages the use of substitutional quantification— or at least 
he did initially, though there is recent evidence he is more amenable now to
au ucp  oj-xig ±  oa v ir u a e a  -  auun u e ^ re u c ii iu u  unuuuu u a u iy  u e x i l g  l a r g e l y  a u e  10
Wallace's influence, wno maintains : 'baive substitutional truth theories, 
which preserve aspects for the substitutional approach that have excited 
philosophers, are not adequate in Convention T's sense. ' Wallace is
obviously concerned with the question of what limits are set for acceptable 
theories of truth by Convention T- a matter which will be seen to be of crucial 
significance to whether we should accept the constraints Davidson suggests. 
Wallace argues it is impossible to satisfy Convention T without introducing a 
relation like that of satisfaction, which holds between objects in the world 
and linguistic expressions. For Wallace, the heart of the referential approach 
is 'a recursive definition of satisfaction, a realation which connects sent­
ences open and closed with nonlinguistic things, whose ■ characterization 
makes essential appeal to a range of quantification , and in terms of which 
truth can be explicitly defined. 1 whereas the substitutional approach 
'attempts a direct recursive characterization oi trutn. ' The heart of
the problem is tnat Wallace fears that a definition of truth for a language 
using substitutional quantification will not be able to imply the instances of 
Tarski's schema unless it is embedded in a tneory in which denotation is 
definable , and which makes possible a referential semantics for that language. 
Furthermore, there will have to be axioms in the metalanguage to the effect 
that everything in the range of the quantifiers has a name , and that every 
name names something in the range of the quantifiers. If this were so, there­
fore, there could be no ontological significance to the 'retreat' to substitut­
ional quantification,gfor we will eventually want a truth definition for our 
object language , and that will reinstate in the metalanguage all the onto­
logical committments we wished to avoid in the first place. For Wallace, if he 
were correct, a satisfactory truth theory cannot fail to connect quantification 
with the existence of objects. His challenge come to this: in order to know 
that a substitutionad definition of truth is materially correct, we need a 
metalanguage thai makes the very ontological committments we were trying to 
avoid by the appeal to substitutional semantics. In other words, the criticism 
here is that the substitutional interpretation , though it does not give a 
negative answer to ontological questions, simply postpones them, and, since we
nave to reier eventually, wny not straightaway via objectual quantification?
This appears to be the view shared by Davidson and Quine, who holds that to use
substitutional quantification is not to avoid ontological committment, but rath-
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er to fail to disclose it. Quine rightly observes that the motive for
adopting the substitutional approach is to avoid reference to abstract 
entities; however , he also seems to make the tacit assumption that the meta­
language in which the truth conditions are given must be interpreted objectually 
and this has been questioned by Dunn and Belnap 1:L^ , who maintain that we can 
interpret the metalanguage substitutionally as well, and also by Parsons, 
who introduces what are linguistic abstract entities into his theory. In turn, 
Parson's committment to abstract linguistic entities has been criticised by 
Tharp:
In substitutional quantification, one appears to be defining truth in
terms of linguistic entities alone, with no appeal to objects over which
the quantifiers range. However, there is an oversight here which Wallace
has noted...If one could define truth in some way directly, appealing
only to linguistic objects, or at least not appealing to all individuals,
then this would be demonstrably deficient from the usual definition if
one could show that no definition of satisfaction emerges. Unfortunately,
there appear to be difficult technical problems in constructing such
definitions, and even if one finds examples, it may not be possible to
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to get a satisfactory general picture. *
Even Kripke, who argues, as against Wallace and Tharp, that Tarski's Convention 
T is not violated by substitutional interpretations, accepts that some of the 
quantifiers at least must be provided with the kind of semantics for which 
Tarski satisfaction is designed. Kripke argues that it is fact, not opinion, 
that determinate truth conditions can be given for substitutional quantifica­
tion; nevertheless, he observes, 'some particular formal systems may be 
incapable ef a substitutional interpretation, even though they have a referen­
tial one.' and gives the example 'if (Ex) 0(x ) is provable in the system, but 
-0 (t) is provable for every expression t which can be substituted for x,
so as to yield a meaningful sentence 0 ( t ) , it is manifestly impossible to give
the system a substitutional interpretation, but if its formation rules are
standard, and it is formally consistent, a referential interpretation is 
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possible. ! y
Thus, although there are a few dissenting voices, the consensus among 
philosophers seems to be in overall agreement that, even if substitutional 
quantification does not violate Convention T , sooner or later we must refer.
But this is not yet to take the strong line that Wallace has taken on the matter 
as we shall see.
Against this background, it is not surprising to find Davidson , in his 
early papers, being as opposed to the substitutionalist brief as Wallace; that 
a collapse of substitutional quantification into referential quantification 
must inevitably come about^hat the terms of our language must denote or the 
determination of its truth conditions will be impossible, and that a covert 
appeal to an extra-linguistic ontology is hidden in the substitutional defini­
tion. Davidson in fact cites Wallace (and Tharp) as having shown substitutional 
quantification to be impossible in that it violates Convention T (but which we 
have seen is not held to be tne case by many philosophers):
Theories of truth based on the substitutional interpretation of quantifi­
cation do not in general yield the T-sentences demanded by Convention T.
...substitutional theories have no evident virtue to set against their
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failure to satisfy Convention T.
( \
Davidson acknowledges that there may be exceptions in the case of object 
languages whose true atomic sentences can be effectively give, but hints that
this is not possible in general.
But, unlike for Davidson and Wallace, for whom -since substitutional 
quantification merely postpones the problem to the ultimate semantical analysis 
of certain atomic sentences for which we have to give a referential interpre­
tation, thus committing ourselves to the ontological consequences of those sent­
ences -.substitutional quantification should be rejceted, for Gottlieb it can
still provide tne means wherby we can avoid completely a committment to unwanted
abstract objects such Davidson’s events. Furthermore, if Kripke is correct, and
substitutional quantification does not violate- Convention T, the way will be
open for a widening of the kind of constraints on the truth conditions theory
which may help to overcome some of the difficulties encountered by Davidson’s
criteria for events.
Gottlieb fully acknowledges that we cannot use substitutional quantification
in place of referential semantics altogether, and thus it is not an all-purpose 
panacea, Nevertheless he holds that it can be used to avoid ontological 
committment, whilst at the same time providing the necessary reference for 
the atomic sentences. Thus, though Gottlieb contends that ’...to avoid committ­
ment in tne end, it seems that a nonreferential semantics must be provided for
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the atomic sentences. But we have no such semantics' and that the tie of
our language to the world will ultimately rely upon reference, nevertheless,
this is no reason not to use substitutional quantification, since it is not
required that all the quantifiers be explained ©bjectually in order to tie
sentences to the world. It is sufficient the connection of a sentence with a
substitutional quantifier to the world be explained via reference at some point-
122
but this point need not be the sentence itself. Thus, in other papers,
this philosopher seeks to explain that though the atomic sentences will 
be assigned referenctial truth conditions, we do not re-introduce ontological
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committment with respect to all substitutionally interpreted quantifiers. 
Gottlieb then applies his thesis to the problem with with which we began- 
whether Putnam is correct in requiring <*hai a (Platonic ) realist realm of 
numbers as abstract objects is needed to which to refer in solving the issue of 
numericalization of distances ▼ then extending his application to the more 
gneral problem of Davidson's committment to first-order lo6ic with quantifiers 
whose substituends are singular terms that refer to abstract events. He claims 
that by using substitutional quantification with respect to 'what Davidson 
would call "predicates of events" ' we can pospone the decision to add or not 
to add events to our ontology until we give a semantic analysis to the atomic 
sentences; tnen, what is required to avoid committment to events completely is 
to provide truth conditions for the atomic sentences which are referential, and
which do not imply the existence of events- and this Gottlieb maintains he has 
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shown how to do. Hence, though reference of our language to the world is
unavoidable, by the use of substitutional quantification- which does not
violate Tarski's constraints on Convention T- we can, if Gottlieb's thesis is
at all correct, avoid the unwanted ontological committment to Davidson's
abstract events, together with the problems which his criteria for reference
to such events engendered. Whether such a project is going to prove workable
is an open question at present, since this work is on the brink of present
research; nevertheless, Gottlieb holds that the success of Davidson's, truth
conditions theory stands or falls with the success of his own ideas. And, with
respect to the use of substitutional quantification, it is interesting that
Davidson has only very recently admitted that Convention T does not preclude
the validity of substitutional quantification, and that he previously failed
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to take account of its full possibilities.
In answer to the third of our fourth points posed at the beginning of this 
section (5*22j, reference to Davidson's events being admittedly problematic, 
we do appear to have at least some possiblility of alternative solutions 
which will ameliorate the issue of reference to abstracta such as events, though 
tne reference of our language to the world at some point is , of course, 
unavoidable. Yet the matter is not over for Davidson’s truth condtions theory: 
for, if we are to admit the efficacy of substitutional quantification in the 
manner indicated above, it will have strong repercussions for the constraints 
Davidson assumed to be necessary for his truth conditions theory, repercussions 
which will also have consequences for our attitude to realism.This,however, is 
the fourth point our inquiry, and takes us into the final assessment of this 
aspect of Davidson's truth conditions theory.
5 *3 Degrees of Discriminability
The 3uspician aroused by the discussion in the last section- that Davidson’s 
interpretation of the constraints imposed by Convention T upon suitable truth 
conditions theories is too narrow, or at least is not the only option open- 
is one which may have repercussions for invoking richer theories of discrimina­
ting behaviour, and thus of reality itself. In other words, the fine discrimina­
tion of objective reality which can only occur via the structure of our 
intersubjective language, and which for Davidson can only be in terms of
first-order logic and events, construed in terms of causes and effects, may, 
within the limits of its applicability indicated in £*2 , be a viable 'ideal*
solution, but it is not the only option open to us, nor is it the one which is 
imposed upon us by the constraints required by Convention T as Davidson thought. 
If so, then it may be possible, from within language of course, to consider 
alternative, richer, means of discriminating reality by the methods opened up 
by, for example, substitutional quantification.
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Ever since Davidson's paper Truth and Meaning, the problem of giving
a recursive procedure has been identified with the problem of giving a finitely 
axiomatized truth theory for the language - and it is this requirement which led 
Davidson to state tnat 'theories of truth based on the substitutional interpre­
tation of quantifiers do not in general yield the T-sentences demanded by 
Convention T...'"^ Both Kripke and Gottlieb do not think such a restriction, is 
needed. Kripke points out that we may have perfectly acceptable truth conditions
for all the sentences of a language, and yet the deduction of the Tarski ^
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equivalences may stiil be blocked; and Gottlieb maintains that 'I can see
no reason why an acceptable theory of truth must deductively determine the
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extension of "true"...* The latter philosopher does not accept that the 
characterization of the Tarski equivalence is the basic fact that a theory of 
has to explain; he maintains that the substitutional truth method is correct 
without appeal to a Tarski-style referential semantics. He 'explicitly 
dissociates himself from Davidson's view that the only constraint on the 
provision of truth conditions is that Tarski equivalences be deducible from 
the assignment...' and says 'In my opinion, tnis condition is neither necessary
nor sufficient.' ->Ou The.'strong componentialism1, where the truth value of a
sentence is a function of the semantic features of its parts— and which is one 
of the primary desiderata required by Davidson (see PART l)- is unnecessary 
according to Gottlieb, and is lost in the substitutional interpretation, its 
characteristic being that the truth conditions of a substitutionally quantified 
sentence depends upon the truth conditions of its instances- and these contain 
expressions which are not sub-expressions of the original s e n t e n c e . H e n c e ,
the semantics for substitutional quantification does not fit the Davidsonean 
framework, which now becomes too narrow, with its severe restrictions on the
semantics for L. For Gottlieb, there is nothing that forces Davidson's strong 
componentialism upon a truth conditions theory of meaning; in his view, what is 
wrong with the criteria Davidson invokes is, not that Davidson picked the 
wrong restrictions, but rather that he invented restrictions where there are 
none: all that is required is a finite, effective assignment of truth conditions, 
and this, says Gottlieb, can be accomplished equally well by the substitutional 
interpretation. However, jettisening the ersatz of the constraints imposed by 
Davidson may require that we have to admit there is no definite answer to the 
question of what our expressions mean. What this would seem to suggest, then, 
is that the imposition by Davidson of the severe constraints on his truth 
conditions theory of meaning in terms of an ideal first-order logical form , 
with its ensuing austere ontology of abstract events as Davidson envisages them, 
though not wrong, is an 'ideal1 which we are not constrained to accept: there 
are other' possibilities for providing the needed truth conditions semantics 
which, despite Davidson's early views to the contrary, can be accommodated 
within Convention T.
Very recently, Davidson has indicated that a liberalization of the con­
straints he originally anticipated as necessary to comply with Convention T is 
in o r d e r . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  it seems Davidson is now amenable to accepting that 
the use of substitutional quantification ,and of modal logics, can provide 
the route to richer theories of meaning and thus of physicalism. This is an 
interesting admission by Davidson, since it is far from clear that Davidson's 
ideal of first-order logical form and austere ontology can cope with the
delineation of tue structure of opaque contexts such as belief(see CHAPTER
SEVEN). If Davidson’s programme is to be plausible, it must provide truth
conditions for all ordinary natural language sentences ; it is not open to
Davidson ,for example, to deny the intelligibility of , say, modal sentences,
as Quine does, and it may yet be that a richer semantics is required to
accomodate their structure than Davidson’s completely extensional approach
Of course, we want to limit ourselves to first order logic if we can manage
without recourse to non-extensional forms, due to the benefits of an austere
ontology ana the clarity and precision its use brings- though , as seen, tnere
has already been snme doubts expressed as to its supposed advantages in this
area, advantages wnich perhaps become evan more dubious when dealing with the
problems of the intensionality of language. Popper, for instance, with his
notion of verisimilitude- that we approach, but never attain a true model of
134objective reality by endless cycles of conjectures and refutations- seems 
to hold strongly to the fact that in our exploration of deeper and deeper 
structures of the world (and we have seen that this is synonymous with the 
deeper and deeper exploration of language itself) we should use the strongest 
logic possible, that is'ideal’ first order logic. Such a logic may fail to 
capture the 'richness' of the more opaque contexts which intensional logics 
do, yet all Davidson requires of such an ideal 'entering wedge1 is that it 
captures tne minimum outline needed for communicative intelligibility.
In any case, Gottlieb's use of substitutional quantification is predicated 
solely oh the use of extensional logic. It is substitutional quantification 
alone which is said to provide tne extensive advantages of quantification into 
opaque contexts, and tnis is endorsed by many authors. Kripke points out that 
the intelligibility of substitutional quantification into a belief context is 
guaranteed ; ^  Belnap and Dunn claim that it is a special advantage of the 
substitutional point of view that it legitimizes quantification into quotation,
as is admitted by Quinej ^ and Marcus has shown that we can explain unactual—
ized possibles by using substitutional quantification which does not require
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the queer entities which Quine castigates
Nor is there any reason not to invoke its advantages in truth conditions
semantics, as far as Gottlieb is concerned, for , as we saw, form his point of
view , it can do all that is required of such a theory- that is, provide a finite
effective assignment of the truth conditions, without the unwanted ontological
implications. It may be of course, that Gottlieb's thesis is wrong, and that an
ontology for natural language rich in exotica is ultimately unavoidable, but
only further research will prove this point. The investigations carried out
earlier in this chapter suggest that if we can find a way to avoid committment
to the problematic events, we should do so. It must also be remembered that
what Davidson could only mean when he maintains.: that events must really exist
in order that sentences of various kinds could be considered true is not that
such postulations with the particular nature he accords to them must exist, but
that such objects - by any name - are required in order to preserve the requisite
truth conditions structure . It is the structure of sentences which matters, and
not the choice of the assumed objects. This comes out clearly when Davidson
begins to vacillate over the question of whether his events must really exist,
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after all. He admitts now that though 'we know no promising alternative'
139'The presumption lies with events' and that 'deep metaphysical problems
will remain as to the nature of tnese entities, their mode of individuation, 
their relations to other categories. ' Furthermore, Davidson goes on to
offer what must be tne coup de grd.ce to events , at least in the terms he 
conceives them:
Perhaps we will find a way of reducing events to entities of other kinds,
for example, sets of points in space-time , or ordered n-tuples of such.
Successful reductions along these lines may, in an honoured tradition, be
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advertised as showing that there are no such things as events. '
Elsewhere, too, he says that a tneory of truth of the kind he proposesfwould not
,142 • .
specify which events exist,.{n o r even that any do. - • If thdse are not'
admissions that those such as Martin and Russell are correct to hold that events
are , in a sense, fictitious, then it is the next best thing. Yet jugt why
Davidson can apparently recant on his early position that the existence of 
events are inviolable is made clearer in subsequent remarks: 'As long- as the
quantiiiers and variaDles remain in the same places, however, the analysis of
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logical form will stick. ' ^  Plainly, what it is crucial to hang on to is
the overall structure of tne truth conditions theory, and not the exact nature
of the assumed entities as Davidson has described them; there is nothing
sacrosanct about Davidson1 .interpretation of events- even if , perhaps*they
are the most perspicuous construal to date. As Quine has remarked, since the
scientific system or total theory , including its ontology, is a ’conceptual
bridge of our own making* , the nature of the events internal to our
theory being our choice since*5he. objects, or values of variables, serve
merely as indices along the way, and we may permute, or supplant them as we
145please, as long as the sentence-to-sentence structure is preserved. '
This being so, what we are interested in doing is building the most unified 
theory of the structure of our language which is possible, and which , realist­
ically interpreted,also describes the real structure of objective reality..In 
this sense Davidson is correct to hold that When we study the kind of structure 
our language requires 'we are not just making a tour of our own picture of
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tnings; * and that ’what we take there to be is pretty much what there is' 
but perhaps mistaken, if something like Gottlieb's thesis is not incorrect, 
to think that in reconstructing the 'best' most unified truth condtions struct-t 
ure, we need an ontology of abstract events as he initially imagined.
5*4 Truth Conditions Theory as a Unified Theory of Objective Reality
The arguments in the last section indicate that , as far as semantics is 
concerned, what is required is to build the most unified truth conditions 
theory of the structure of our language which we can manage, since, on the 
conclusions reached at the end of CHAPTER FOUR, in describing deeper and 
deeper structures of our language we are describing deeper and deeper structures 
in reality itself. The raison d'etre behind Davidson’s rejection of the notion 
that his truth conditions theory required any foundational basis in objective 
reality , and to which language subserviently refers (4 *4 ) » is plainly that , 
as far as structure is concerned, our descriptions of reality are immanent 
within the truth conditions theory of language, and do not require any 
direct 'correspondence' with reality in order to be considered true. This is 
the force behind such comments as to the effect that though we may need eventu­
ally 'to investigate directly certain relations between words and objects, and 
perhaps people too ' (an interesting admission) 'there is no reason that would 
necessarily even touch the constraints I'm talking about'. and that there
can be no direct contact between linguistic theory and extra-linguistic 
reality(4«2) The only concern , as far as Davidson's semantic truth conations 
theory is concerned, is , in the first instance, with the most perspicuous 
description of the structural relations within language.But if the 'best ' 
theory of the internal structure of our language is what is of primary signifi­
cance for semantics, as it surely is, we should be prepared to accept the 
benefits of methods sucn as substitutional quantification if it can help us 
to provide the kind of truth conditions structure we are seeking, and at the 
same time avoid reference to problematic entities like events • For events, 
even though they are said by Davidson to really exist, are also , in the 
first instance, postulations of our overall theory, designed to enable us 
to progress towards the best and most unified structure possible. Hence, if they 
fail to perform this task adequately, or are not needed in the process, there
seems good reason not to admit them into an integrated total theory of our
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language and thus of our picture of the world. H In the process,itself, the 
use of substitutional quantification may aid a richer concept of reality.
To summarize the main issues of this chapter, we began with Davidson’S 
rejection of the idea central to traditional realism, of any foundational 
basis in objective reality to which tne truth conditions structure of language 
had to correspond.; ontology was now basic for Davidson. With the structure of 
intersubjective language as the new foundational basis, reality is directly 
described via the postulated entities of events to which reference is made, 
such events being ostensibly completely extensional , and thus able to provide 
what facts could not: criteria for what it is for two sentences to refer to the 
same thing. In this , Davidson follows Quine's notions of objectual quantifica­
tion and criteria for ontological committment, and his starting point is that 
in making manifest that large features of language(by virtue of its quantified 
structure) we are also making manifest the large features of objective reality- 
ontology following in the wake of the required truth structure.
Hewever, some philosophers hold that it should not be a question of logical 
form which decides wnat is said to exist , and that reference to such abstracta 
as events is impossible, they being logical fictions. And certainly, reference 
to events as Davidson construes them is not as perspicuous as Davidson thinks, 
and his criteria for their identity and individuation are at least open to 
doubt. Should we then attempt to side-step tne difficulties involved in 
referring to such entities by eliminating their unwanted ontology? At least 
one philosopher thinks such a project is feasible , despite Davidson's early 
scepticism (probably following Wallace) that the use of substitutional 
quantification to do so fails because it contravenes the constraints of 
Convention T and anyway implieb-a covert reinstatement in the metalanguage 
of the ontological committments we were trying to avoid. The work of those 
like Kripke and Gottlieb seems to show, however, that the use of substitutional 
quantification does not contravene Convention T, that suitable truth conditions 
can be obtained, and that tne unwanted ontology can be eliminated, even though 
it is true that eventually we must refer.
There are consequences for truth conditions theories , since the suggestion
is that Davidson's assumptions about the constraints imposed by Convention T,
and leading to his own acceptance of first order logic and objectual quantifi­
cation , and his construal of events, thougn not wrong, are an austere 'ideal'
which we do not necessarily have to accept, perhaps opening tne way for more 
oomplex and richer theories of discriminating objective reality from within a 
unified theory of tne structure of language, Davidson himself now appears to be 
more conducive to accepting the value of such methods as substitutional 
quantification in opening up the possibilities for richer theories of the 
truth conditions structure of language, and thus of how we construe reality. 
Since the thrust in semantics is towards the ’best’ most unified theory possible 
and Davidson’s conception of events as really existing is internal to such a 
theory and designed towards the most integrated theory semantics can achieve, 
the accomodation of such methods seems a plausible step.
What remains certain, whether or not sucn techniques prove feasible , is", 
that our conception of objective reality must and can only be via such a 
truth conditions theory of language,and thus , reality for us is linguistic 
reality. Yet the use of such a framework in constraining our structured view 
of reality is a human enterprize, and as such involves considerations of what 
features of human behaviour are operative in such actions. But tnis is the 
concern of PART 111 of this tnesis.
t
PART THREE 
LANGUAGE AND SPEAKERS
CHAPTER SIX 
REFERENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY
6*1 The Role of the Truth Conditions 'Iheory
One cannot eliminate reference to human psychological reality from any theory
of meaning. Wittgenstein asked: 'Every sign, by itself, seems dead. What gives
it lifeT'^Gadamer provided an answer : 'Language has its being...in the
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exercise of understanding between people', and follows this with the observat­
ion that for this reason, Artificial Languages are never languages in the true 
sense of the word. Dummett makes a similar point when he maintains that a 
theory of meaning which takes truth conditions as its central notion has to 
supply an explanation of what it is to ascribe to someone knowledge of these 
truth conditions, and thus he takes understanding to be the key idea in his own 
theory? Therefore, if the fundamental question in the philosophy of language , 
the one which was dealt with in PART 11 , is how language relates to objective 
reality,*it is joined by the equally fundamental question in the philosophy of 
mind about the part which a speaker's psychological states play in enabling him. 
or her to refer to the world, and how such a speaker understands such a use of 
his or her words. We , as (radical) interpreters of another's language need to 
understand how such a speaker understands the use of his or her own words; and 
this in turn raises the issue of what exactly is the nature of such human action 
and the psychological attitudes wnich lie behind such actions.
In Davidson's earliest papers, he seems to maintain, arguably, that the 
reconstruction of the concept of meaning could follow from the concept of truth 
conditions formal structure alone: 'I suggest that it may be enough to require 
that the T-sentences be true. ' ^ But his latest position , possibly under the 
influence of such Philosphers as Dummett, shows a marked change: 'It is wrong 
to think that- we can automatically construe T-sentences as "giving the meaning"
ui sentences jli we put no uiure ouna traint un tnera tnan tnat tney come out true*' 
The truth conditions theory is now thought of as giving the right kind of 
structure, but not meaning; apart from formal constraints, further empirical 
constraints will be needed.
It is easy to see now why the trutn conditions theory alone gives the right 
kind of structure, but not necessarily tne rignt meaning. As seen in PART 1, the 
uninterpreted intentional linguistic behaviour with which the radical interpre­
ter is confronted is deemed to jointly manifest both what an (alien) speaker 
means about the world, together with what the speaker believes about that world. 
(Other psychological attitudes will be involved , too. ) Plainly, the attribut - 
ion of a structure of meaning and tne attribution of a structure of belief are 
interdependent concepts, the sentences held true being partly a result of what 
is meant and partly a result of what is believed by tne speaker. Davidson quotes 
Quine's argument that, from the linguistic behaviour, what a speaker means by 
his words can only partly oe disentangled from what he believes abo-~*.t the world, 
adding: 'A better way way to put tnis would be to say: belief and meaning 
cannot be uniquely reconstructed from speech behaviour. ' ^ Equally, the 
problem of interpretation is t©' simultaneously abstract , from the sentences 
held true, what the speaker's words mean, and what his beliefs arej'yet the 
reconstruction of. such components can only be fixed by the formal and empirical 
constraints which we (the interpreters) choose to place upon such sentences.
But any number of theories are compatible with the available dataj giving the 
right kind of structure , and which wil fail to come up with the correct meaning. 
For example , we could have one situation wiiere a truth conditions theory 
governed by formal constraints implies that ' "Snow is wnite" is true (in 
English) if and only if grass is green1 is no less acceptable tnan ' "Snow is 
wnite " is true (in English) if and only if snow is wnite. ' A truth conditions 
theory meeting the formal constraints alone need not correlate an object langu­
age with its metalanguage translations; at best, conditions yield extensional 
isomorphism: its extensional truth value is preserved, but not the (alien) 
speaker's meaning. Hence the formal schema 'is true if and only ii p' cannot 
be equated as it stands witn tne claim that to give the meaning of a sentence is 
to state the conditions necessary for its truth. The point has been noted by
many philosophers, and unuerlies Dummett's criticism that Davidson's truth
conditions theory may give insight into problems of truth and reference, but
B
does not provide a suitable theory of meaning. Foster also claims the truth
conditions schema '3 is true iff p' gives the correct extension but not tne
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correct sense. ' Similarly, Loar notes tnat *S is true iff p' is far too 
permissive to capture even approximately what S means. ^  Obviously, it seems 
that more stringent conditions must be imposed upon a truth conditions theory 
if it is to serve as a tneory of meaning, if it is to generate the correct 
meaning relationship between an uninterpreted sequence and the truth conditions 
of the interpreted sequence. How are we to construe these additional constraints, 
placed on the truth condtions theory, so that it yields anything like meaning?
It seems that we will have to find some way of referring to psychological 
attitudes of the (alien; speaker in order to understand the way in which such 
a speaker understands the reference and meaning of his own words. As Davidson 
more recently comments:
... to explain why someone said something we need to know, among other 
things, his own interpretation of what he said, that is, what he believes 
his words mean in the circumstances under which he speaks. 11
In order,then,to .ensure that the truth conditions theory will provide an accu­
rate manual of translation- maximizing agreement between the claims generated 
by tne truth conditions theory and the truth claims of the speaker- additional 
empirical constraints will be required, and reference to the psychological 
reality of the speaker, his or her beliefs and other attitudes deemed to be 
behind the use of the language to refer to objective reality. As Putnam has 
remarked: ,rfo state the reference (extension)- of each term and to describe
12
what the language user believes of each term is t© tell the whole story .*
For Davidson, the theory of truth suffices for a theory of sense and of 
understanding.1  ^ Yet how is reference to the fundamentally indispensable 
features of human psychological reality — to the beliefs and other attitudes to 
be made, if these are seen js playing a 'constraining role in how a speaker
himself understands what his own words mean? Such explanations are notoriously 
the b6te noire of any approach which aims at scienfific realism; even so, in 
attempting to explicate such intensional features as beliefs, and other attitu­
des involved in understanding intentional linguistic behaviour, there are 
distinct similarities to reconstructing the relationship of language to objective 
reality as described in PART 11 and Davidson says in fact that in elucidating 
the nature of the relationship of such intensional features as beliefs to 
intentional linguistic behaviour, no radically different concepts are involved}^- 
Whether Davidson's particular proposals are adequate is another matter which 
will have to be considered; what is important at present is to see that for 
Davidson’s truth conditions theory, the reconstruction of such intensional 
propositional attitudes as 'A believes that p ', essential to understanding how 
another speaker understands the use of his language, also involves a rejection 
of any foundational basis in psychological reality , conceived of in extra- 
linguistic terms , and to which any interpreter can have access in understanding 
a speaker’s words. Thus, it will be seen that Davidson repudiates ’traditional’ 
Fregean and neo-Fregean theories of sense which require reference to intensional 
entities sucn as propositions as will as contemporary theories such as those 
of Grice wnich require reference to excra-linguistic intentions , in the 
foundatipnal sense. Such a standpoint leaves Davidson’s theory open to criticism 
to the effect that he ignores such essential features , as some would see it, 
of psychological reality , and which are necessary to a full understanding of
i
the use of language . However, though for Davidson his truth conditions theory 
does not need any basis in psychological reality to which it is closely tied, it 
is certainly not his intention, as it is with Quine, to eliminate all reference 
to intensional and intentional aspects : indeed, there will be seen to be in 
Davidson'g work a definite reciprocality between language and psychological 
reality. Although, however, language is not , in this sense, given the total 
conceptual primacy which it has for some philosophers, what is central to 
Davidson's thesis is tnat , for us, any structured access to intensional and 
intentional psychological features must be via something like the truth condit­
ions structure of language. Thus, Davidson replaces the concept on which some
other 'traditionlly -orientated ' theories are based, and upon which language
is subservient to abstract, intensional and intentional features , and replaces
it with the notion in which our intersubjectively shared language is the new
foundational basis from within wnich, as will be shown in CHAPTER SEVEN, sucn
psychological features as beliefs and intentions are seen as reconstructions
15m  relationship to such a language.
6-21. DavidsonVg Rejection of Any Foundational Basis in Psychological Reality
In a sense, Davidson’s truth condtions theory reverses the roles , and the
respective importance , given to the relationship of language and psychological
features by more traditionally -orientated theories, and rejects tne idea of
any dualism between language and uninterpretea psychological reality. As '.radical
interpreters , Davidson maintains that we have no privileged access to the
contents of a theory of sense - wnether we are endeavouring to interpret another
speaker's discourse or our own ; central to his conception of how an intepreter
is to construe what it is for a speaker to believe his own words mean, therefore,
is the rejection of the Fregean Theory of. Sense and Propositions, and a return
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to a ’pre-Fregean semantic innocence. ' A rejection of the kind of theory of 
sense in,which the senses of proper names and other features are envisaged as 
the building blocks for the sense of sentences themselves, and in wnich senten­
ces of the form 'A believes that p ’ themselves are seen as referring to abstract
1
intensional entities or propositions— the ’grasp' of which is also seen as 
essential to any understanning of such sentences. If, as has been suggested, 
Davidson is to completely reject any reference to such entities, and that his 
truth conditions theory can afford to dispense with them,, it will be best to 
examine Frege's Theory of Sense a little more closely, especially since it is 
regarded by philosphers such as Dummett as the paradigm for a theory of 
understanding, as will be seen shortly.
In the introductory paragraphs of Frege's paper On Sense and Reference 
he raises a problem about identity statements: 'Is it a relation between objects,
17or between names or signs of objects ?' ; Frege observes that there is a
cognitive diiterence between 'a = a' and 'a=b' , and proceeds to demonstrate 
the distinction between sense and reference wnich he thinks is necessary to 
account for the difference. Frege sees the reference of an expression as the ■ 
object named by that expression , and the sense of an expression as containing 
the 'mode of presentation1 of the reference, whereby tne sign gives us its 
reference.
Used in their ordinary way, words refer to 'definite objects' which we wish
to speak about, but it can also happen that 'one wishes to talk about the words
19themselves, or their sense .' For example, in reporting the words of others-
that is , in indirect discourse. When one reports the words of another, and they 
stand within quotation marks, it 'must not be taken as having its ordinary 
reference', but rather as having an indirect reference.
A proper name expresses what is taken to be some kind of public, 'objective'
meaning or sense , and wnich is to be distinguished from any private, subjective,
representation called an idea- which may be different for all men. For example,
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we must distinguish , says Frege, between the public sense of a name such 
as a 'lion*, wnich everyone understands, and the private idea of a lion, which 
is idiosyncratic and private. Frege seems , in this respect, to maxe the sense 
into an entity wnich can be thought but not observed, and which is part of some 
psychological mechanism .
Finally, Frege generalizes his conclusions from names to the semantics of 
other expressions and to whole sentences. He maintains that sentences , too, have 
both sense and reference: all true sentences have the same reference- the 'True', 
and all false sentenced have the same reference to the 'False'; the sense of 
such sentences being the proposition expressed. However, such senses of 
sentences- the propositions or the thoughts which are expressed- are again - 
public, not private: the thought is '...the common property of several think­
ers Furthermore- and this is crucial importance to what is to be said later-
every individual declarative sentence is to be regarded as a proper name, the 
motive being’ to preserve the intersubstitutivity of coreferential terms salva 
veritate . 22 And , just as the reference of a sentence is a function of the 
reference of its constituent features, so the sense of a declarative sentence
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is a function of the senses of the various signs ocurring within that sentence.
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follow- in the case of sentences in wnich an embedded ’that1 clause follows a 
prepositional verb, as in 'Ptolemy believed that the earth was flat' , the 
truth value of the whole sentence is not a function of the sentence in the 
subordinate clause. For Frege, then, such sentences are nonextensional, ; the
reference of the embedded sentence following 'that* being the proposition it 
expresses(which is what its sense would be in an extensional context). The 
sense of such nonextensional sentences is then identified with the sense of 
the words'the proposition that...1
From the above outline of Frege's ideas, the following main points seem to 
emerge concerning his Theory of Sense. Firstly, sense is a cognitive notion, 
being introduced in the first place to resolve the problem about the information 
content of true-identity statements. Secondly, sense is the means by which 
reference is secured: a name or sentence has a reference only if it has a sense,
the referent being whatever uniquely fits this concept. Thirdly, sense accounts 
for the meaningfulness of sentences which lack a reference, as in indirect 
discourse. And , fourthly, the 'grasping* of the sense is meant to provide an 
account of the speaker's understanding- it has to do with what we know when we 
know that a proposition is true, and it connected with one's beliefs. Fifthly, 
sense has an objective character: it is something which can be communicated 
from one* individual to another in a way in which mental images and the like 
cannot. Sixthly, the point which returens us to our introductory statement, 
the senses of names and singular terms are the building blocks of the senses of 
sentences themselves(thoughts); in fact , since Ptrege, propositions havf been 
seen as constructed out of the senses of tne terms used in their expression , 
and the senses of such terms are the contributions they make to the truth - 
condtions of any whole sentence incorporating them.
Clearly, Frege's Theory of Sense is an extremely complex affair. If we are 
to accept that Fregean senses can accomplish such manifold tasks, we have to be 
sure of what exactly such entities are and how they function .The tentative 
suggestion at present is that, on tne two primary functions singled out for 
criticism from the theory indicated above, Frege's notion of sense fails to
provide for Davidson what he thinks his truth conditions can provide: an 
1 intersubjective theory of sense and understanding. These two primary issues 
are that , in trie first place, Frege’s Theory of Sense requires us to accept in 
the case of indirect discourse, for example, tne notion of some kind of isomor - 
phic ’correspondence 1 between an infinity of individual sentences and an 
infinity of propositions or thoughts construed as Platonic abstract intensional 
entities. But, since such entitities appear impossible to identify or individu­
ate ,it appears a hopeless task attempting to construe such a relationship or 
to reveal them as possessing any kind of internal structure , and without which 
it would seem we are free to reconstrue them more or less ad libitum as any 
ethereal objects satisfying the meager conditions laid down by Frege. The 
second primary issue is one wnich will be considered in relation to Dummett's 
ideas (6*22), and concerns the fact that for Fregeans, •. what it is to understand 
sentences requires us to accept the idea that we somehow 'grasp* such entites; 
yet no-one, least of all Frege, has ever said how such entities are 'grasped' 
or understood. The remaining question for this part of the study will then be 
to consider whether or not Davidson's truth conditions theory can , as he says, 
suffice to avoid any dualism between the structure of our language and these 
undefined entities construed as extra-linguistic abstract objects , and can 
suffice as a theory of understanding. Of course, the extremely complex and 
varied tasks which Fregean senses or propositions were introduced to solve 
means that the truth conditions theory also has some formidable problems to 
confront;but the two we are inters bed in , as radical interpreters trying to 
ascertain what an alien) speaker believes his own worak- mean, and how he 
or she understands tne use oi sucn words, are the two outlined above. That is, 
can Davidson's truth condtions theory suffice to replace what Fregean proposit- . 
ions were primarily introduced to explicate: what 'thing' it is which two
people who believe the same thing both believe, (since we are concerned here 
with belief) , and what is 'gaasped' when we understand the use of our words, 
or the words of other speakers.
theory is in agreement with Frege’s Theory of Sense: that is, with Frege’s 
insistance on the objective character of sense, as something which can be 
communicated from one individual to another, as opposed to subjective , mental , 
images, Lockean ideas, or Humean streams of consciousness • ^Certainly semantics 
need not concern itself with such entities, and , as usual, the point is well - 
put by Quine: ’We do not aim to make clear what the users of the unclear expres­
sion had unconsciously in mind all along. We do not expose hidden meanings...’2^
Siraarly, Putnam makes the point that understanding language has little to do
26
with images in the mind. And Popper indicates that the semantics of language
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has nothing to do with the inner psychological workings of thought. H. Price
shews that a good deal of thinking does not need to be accompanied by any
28
imagery at all- verbal or otherwise And , of course, since Wittgenstein’s 
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critique, ' it is accepted that it is impossible to determine the character of 
silent private thoughts, by any direct intersubjective means. Contemporary 
philosophers are agreed on such points .
But what of Frege’s so-called ’objective * senses or prop©sitions?Can these 
postulated abstract entities also be regarded as ultimately nothing more than 
mythical constructions hypostasized in order to try to see some order in the 
flux of psychological experience, and wnich can perhaps be dispensed with altoge­
ther by the truth conditions theory of meaning? It would seem that for Davidson 
they should be so regarded, for he seems to . see it as an error to think that 
an infinity of the individual sentences of our language could be envisaged as 
in any way isomorphically corresponding to such entities , Oor as being required 
for understanding. The paradigm target for Davidson is the vagueness- as he 
sees it- of the Fregean notion of sense . He rejects as bogus the Fregean analy­
sis of indirect discourse, since such an analysis requires the existence of 
intensional objects, as noted, and the idea of an infinity of sentences in 
correspondence with an infinity of intensional entities, whereas Davidson's 
holistic truth theory and extensional approach claims to suffice without such 
entities. There are many papers in wnich D’avidson brings our attention to this
aapect of his work . For example,Davidson notes that for Frege,' a sentence like
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•Daniel believes tnat there is a lion in the den” ' being as it is dominated
by a two-place predicate,'believes' , with its first-place filled by a singu­
lar term, ’Daniel’, and its second- place filled by a singular term naming a 
sense or proposition, means that not do we have to treat such sentences as 
singular terms, but tnat we also nave to find entities for tnem to name , and 
tnat this requires an infinite number of such entities. . Davidson sees tnis 
as a consequence of Frege’s failure to conceive of tne tneory of our language 
in holistic terms.
The important aspects of Frege’s ideas which Davidson does not mention, but
which are obviously important to our argument are these. Frege's Theory of Sense
does seem to require the notion of some kind of structural isomorphism - a one-
to-one correspondence between individual sentences and thoughts or propositions,
but it is an isomorphism which appears to make the abstract entities themselves
basic: 'To the structure of the thought there corresponds the compounding of
31words into a sentence...' ; and hence, there are as many thoughts (proposi­
tions) as there are sentences.expressed. But even if , as Sellars says, for
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Frege these abstract entities 'must have structural characteristics, they
are not to be thought of a3 having , on Frege’s analysis, any determinate
character: Frege does not give any analysis of their internal structure ; all we
have is a host of artificially postulated sui generis entities of dubious
character whose undefined structure determines the expression of our sentences.
For Frege, such abstract entities are, in a way, foundational; and when Frege
says that a sentence is true, he really means that the corresponding thought or
proposition is true.
Yet surely Frege has matters the wrong way round in making, such entities
with,at best, a dubious structureal nature, and for which there seems to be no 
evidence, as basic in the way he does. Certainly, they are not the kind of enti­
ty wnich could significantly enter into scientific discourse. Any notion of 
individual sentences as corresponding to such 'foundational * abstract objects 
is rightfully rejected by Davidson, and for the very good reason that such an 
idea would require us to envisage language as corresponding to entities which 
are completely obscure; any reference to such intensional , extra-linguistic 
entities is fraugnt with difficulties. Quine , of course, has mounted his own 
attack against such non-extensional objects, and has vehemently rejected
Frege's anti-physicalism. If Fregean intensions are entities with any discern- 
able structure, wuat are their identity conditions? Deciding that they in fact 
lack any such clear criteria, it is not surprising Quine regards them as 
'creatures of darkness' and that ne will rejoice when tney are exorcised, ^  
and sees their principle of individuation as obscure. Quine'g objections centre 
on the failure of substitutivity in such non-extensional contexts: the context 
is 'referentially opaque' in tne sense that individual terras within that 
context fail to refer to anything at all. For example , in the sentence 
'George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverly' , do we 
refer to something? Can it be the author of Waverly- i.e. Scott? Surely nnot, 
Quine argues, since George IV did not wish to know whether Scott was Scott. In 
the absense of any plausible entity for the referent of 'the author of Waverly*, 
the expression itself must fail to refer to anything in that context; thus, for 
Quine, failure of substitutivity of a term in a given context is tantamount to 
failure of reference of that term in that context. Furthermore, failure of 
reference of a term prevents us from assuming that there exists any such object 
of which the predicate is true, and therefore bars existential generalization. 
Thus Quine concludes one cannot meaningrully quantify into referentially opaque 
contexts such as intentional contexts expressing the propositional attitudes ... 
Although Davidson does not specifically say so, his reasons for rejecting 
Fregean propositions include the apparent impossibility of referring to such 
entities outlined by Quine.
Yet if reference to propositions advocated by Fregean and neo-Fregean
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theories such as the one propounded by Church is rejected, to what does 'that p'
in expressions of tne form 'A believes that p' correspond? What kind of entities
can be discerned which will provide the kind of structure which reference to
propositions fails to provide? There are several alternative suggestions which
have been put forward by philosophers, none of which will be considered in any
great detail since the point of importance here is that they are all rejected
by Davidson - and for the same reason as he abjures Fregean propositions- that
for him they fail to provide.the requisite structure for intensions. For
instance, for Carnap, indirect discourse involves a relation , in terms of 
intensional isomorphism, between a speaker and a sentence.^5 Carnap, then,
would analyse 's said(believes) that p f as fs uttered some sentence intension-
ally isomorphic to »p) in English' . Similarly, Scheffler treats 'that p»
in 's said(believes) that p' as corresponding to 's uttered (believes) a
that—p utterance' , wnere there is a separate predicate corresponding to each 
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sentence'p'• . Quine goes further in this direction, treating the whole of
'said(believes) that-p' as a predicate of s. ^  Quine's position is interesting,
illustrating as it does a discouraging search for any theory of the structure of
belief sentences, concluding tnat ’...there is no need to recognize "believes"
and similar verbs as relative terms at all' , and tnat 'a final alternative
that I find as appealing as any is simply to dispense with the objects of the
20
propositional attitudes. '
All these approaches are unacceptable to Davidson,for" they all, in their
way , fail to give the needed structure. Unlike Frege's reference to proposit-
39ions , which 'is a dark doctrine' , .together with tne similar idea of
Church's, and neither of which , Davidson says, are amenable to a Tarski-style
truth conditions theory , his account does not need appeal to intensional
entities. Unlike Carnap's analysis, it does not need explicit/reference to a
language .And, unlike Scheffler's treatment, , which Davidson thinks gives no
hint as to how the meaning of the predictes depends on their structure,it allows
that what follows tne 'that* is a sentence with 'significant structure' of
the kind his truth conditions theory can exploit. And , of course, Quine's
proposal which does not detect logical structure facilitating the incorporation
of intensional discourse within a truth -definition is not one which goes far
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enough for ^avidson's project.
Whether or not Davidson's 'paratactic ' analysis ^  can succeed in detailing 
the required structure is a matter wnich is considered in CHAPTER SEVEN, 
involving as it does theore.tical and ontological considerations within the 
extensional truth conditions metalanguage. But enough has been said in this 
section to show why, in attempting to understand wnat it is a speaker believes 
(anu the same will apply to other attitudes such as Desires ,wants , or wishes) 
Davidson will not allow any recourse to any Fregean theory of sense which 
requires any reference to any 'foundational* extra—linguistic propositions, or
reiBrence t;o any otner entixies such as sentences since, for Davidson, all such 
proposals are not to be successfully utilised in delineating structure. Davidson 
is surely right to want to avoid reference to such intensional entities as 
propositions for, as Quine's criticisms indicate, being on the wrong side of the 
semantic fence, such mysterious objects are impossible to identify and to 
individuate; rather than accept any dualism between language and such unanaly­
sed entities , Davidson's proposal in effect reverses Frege's notion, since it 
starts, as will be seen in CHAPTER SEVEN, with a well-developed semantics and 
then builds up the necessary intensional and intentional features of psycho­
logical reality from within sucn a truth conditions theory, and which , Davidson 
hopes, will also provide the kina of structure which the other methods mentioned 
could not.
6*22 Dummett and Understanding
Whether or not Davidson can successfully circumvent the need for reference to
propositions as the objects of the propositional attitudes, there remains the
second major point , mentioned in 6*21 , for which they were introduced by
Frege- that is, what it is to understand sentences requires us to accept, on
Frege's analysis , that we somehow 'grasp' such entities, even though Frege fails
in any way to explicate this notion of 'grasping'. Nevertheless, a major
problem to be faced by 'Davidson's truth conditions theory, if it is to prove
adequate to delineating how it is that one understands one's language, is
whether his truth condition^ t.feory can suffice for a theory of understanding.
This is just what Dummett has been led to deny, insisting instead on a
Fregean Theory of Sense as the traditional paradigm for a theory of understand- 
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m .  In fact, Dummett's criticism of Davidson's truth conditions theory as a
theory of meaning is really founded upon his criticism of Davidson's rejection
43of the Fregean notion of sense and - as Dummett once saw it- the attempt by
Davidson to explicate the whole function of language entirely in terms of a
theory of reference. This is an .inaccurate picture of Davidson's work, but the
ensuing censure by Dummett possibly stimulated Davidson into formulating more 
clearly how an interpreter could understand how a speaker understands the use of
his words.
For Dummett, a theory of meaning is a theory of understanding. The point is 
made in several of his papers, for example, 'We ought to say that the meaning 
of any expression is determined by wnat a speaker must know if he is to be 
said to understand that expression...1 ^4 Elsewhere he stresses that he thinks 
a truth conditions theory gives no way of determining the content .which a 
speaker gives a sentence: ' I deny that Davidson's truth conditions theory
45can represent an individual's grasp of the meaning of a particular sentence' ,
and concludes that Davidson's holism is wrong, since , unlike F r e g e ' s 'atomistic*
theory , it does not allow that the sense which any speaker may attatch to
each sentence may be different . Davidson's theory ,in Dummett's view, lies
'beyond human capacities' , and fails to realize that our language is a
'diversity of many types of expression 1 which a 'single story* truth conditions
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theory cannot hope to cover . This of course is reminiscent of Wittgen - 
stein's notion of language as a diversity of language games having only a 
family resemblance , and in fact Dummett's later ideas on the centrality of 
the 'use* of language again reflects this closeness. Dummett complains that there 
is no guarantee that the complexity of practices carried out by language will 
conform to the kind of systematic tneory envisaged by Davidson.
In later papers, Dummett makes more specific his criticisms, and the issue 
of exactly what it is to understand the truth conditions of sentences comes to 
the fore, a matter central to Dummett's concept of Antirealism, since for 
Dummett, ‘any theory such as Davidson's in which sentences must be true of 
something (see 5*2) is equivalent, to Realism . But it is important to note that 
Dummett's views which lead to his Antirealism and verificationism arise because 
of his fundamental concern with what it is to understand the use of language; 
and it is Dummett's exclusive concern with such notions as competence, epistemo- 
logy, and the theory of sense, which, it will be argued, lead Dummett to his 
false conclusions.
Questions about meaning, then, for Dummett, 'are best interpreted as quest-
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ions about understanding, * Kence, a theory such as Davidson's , which takes 
truth conditions as its central notion, must supply an explanation of what it is
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for a sentence to be true. But just what is entailed by this 'knowing* the truth 
conditions? It is the failure, as Dummett sees it, on the part of Davidson's 
theory to satisfactorily explain this knowledge of what it is for someone to 
understand the truth conditions of a sentence , which leads him to reject 
Davidson's thesis.
Any theory such as Davidson's is equivalent , in Dummett's view to realism:
that the world is determinately constituted and that sentences about the world
are determinately true or false whether we can know this or not. Dummett
objects to this 'transcendent' capacity ; in his opinion, only a 'few sentences'
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are so decidable, natural language being full of undecidable sentences which
are beyond our capacity to recognize as true or false. Such transcendent notions
will not do for Dummett because a tneory of meaning according to his orignal
definition -.must tell us exactly wnat speakers know when thy understand truth
conditions, and Davidson's theory fails to account for this connection between
the speaker's knowledge or understanding and the use of his sentences. Thus, the
crucial link between the Theory of Sense and Understanding and the acutual
use of such sentences is broken in the large number of crucial cases where we
cannot ascribe knowledge of truth conditions to c-the speaker. It is at this
49point of Dummett's argument that the closeness of his ideas to those of the
Fregean ilotion of sense comes through, and indicates that the fundamental issue
for Dummett concerns the Theory of Sense, and not the derived arguments relating
to his vprificationism and antirealism, which follow directly upon Dummett's
requirement that the notion of sense be rna.de fully manifest, rjor , in his view,
'someone who knows, of a given sentence, what conditions must obtain for it to
be true does not yet know all that he needs to know in order to grasp the
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significance of an utterance of that sentence' , and the point of a theory 
of meaning is to make explicit this connection between a speaker's knowledge 
of the truth conditions of a sentence and the use of that sentence.
Hence , the tneory must show how that knowledge enables the speaker to use 
the various sentences of the language . Dummett gives specific examples wnere 
Davidson's theory apparently fails to show what counts as the speaker's 
manifestation of his knowledge , and concludes: 'even the most thorough-going
realist must grant that we could hardly be sais to grasp wuat it is for a
statement to be true if we had no conception whatever of how it might be known 
1 51to be true. What actually happens, according to Dummett, is ..that the
realist surreptitiously extends the cases where sentences are decidable on an
observational model to cover the cases of ’undecidables’: we try to convince
ourselves what it would be to be. able to use such undecidables to give direct
reports of observation; but, Dummett maintains, there is no justification for
such an extension . Hence the truth conditions theory fails to answer how
we come to be able to assign to our sentences a meaning dependent upon a use
52to which we are unable to put them.
Thus, for Dummett, understanding the truth conditions of a sentence must 
come down ultimately to having the recognitional capacity of precisely when such 
truth conditions obtain, and the understanding or grasp of sentences both 
determines,and is determined by, the uses to which sentences can be put. But 
a theory such as Davidson1 .-.cannot explain what it is to know the truth condit­
ions of a sentence since we have no way of saying how knowledge of the truth 
conditions can be directly manifested: it cannot show how a speaker’s sense and 
the manifestation of a sentences use determine each other. Davidson’s truth 
conditions theory is tnus rejected by Dummett, and along with it the notions of
bivalence. An alternative semantics is formulated based on the intuitionist
53account of the meaning of mathematical statements. Understanding statements 
on this view does not rest on . whether we can know when these statements are 
true, button an ability to recognize whether there is a proof for any given 
statement. Further, understanding any mathematical expression occurrs if one 
knows how it contributes to determing what counts as a proof of any statement in 
which it stands. On tnis line , therefore, it is guaranteed that a grasp of 
any mathematical statement or expression is fully manifestable in a mastery 
of the use of mathematical language because the grasp is directly connected to 
use. ^  Dummett maintains that tnis mathematical paradigm is readily trans­
ferred to ordinary language: the notion of proof generalising into that of 
verification. And verification here is the thesis that the understanding of a
statement is being able to recognize precisely what verifies it; exactly what 
conclusively establishes it as true.
Dummett concludes his thesis with an acknowledgement of tne efficacy of
EC
Quine's Verificationism (see 4*2), but enough has been outlined of his ideas to
illustrate the motivation behind his attack on Davidson's truth conditions theory
Elsewhere, Dummett admitts that his 'Anti-realist position is a very strong 
5 6
one' in relation to how we come to grasp the sense of statements , and 'the
57use which is subsequently made of these statements. ' Indeed, the central 
features which seem to emerges from Dummett's papers include the predominance 
he gives to the Theory of Sense at the expense of linguistic considerations, and 
the desire that our understanding, grasp and knowledge of the truth conditions 
of the sentences we use should be guaranteed ; and further, the derived notion 
that the sentences concerned must be manifestly shown to be conclusively verified 
But to use such arguments against Davidson's theory is to argue that it fails to 
meet constraints which it neither purports to have nor it needs to have. Dumra- 
ett's concern to do justice to the notion of understanding means he gives an 
undue emphasis to the ideas of competence and grasp of our language at the 
expense of the objectivity of language itself; and his concern that the sentences 
concerned be conclusively verified is verification of the worst kind , requiring 
as it does conclusive certainty. Rather than a step forward, the suggestion is
CQ
that Dummett's theory is a retrograde move. Dummett speaks continually of
his quest for certainty in the Theory of Sense: about how meaning should be
determined by what a speaker must know in order to understand expressions, or
how the problem for a Theory of Sense is of saying conclusively what speakers
know. ^  1 Likewise, he says that the Theory of meaning(sense) must be a
complete representation of the propositional knowledge of the understanding it
consists in- and how this must be fully manifested in practical use; and he
speaks of the mastery of'undecidables'.
Dummett's concentration of competence and the need for certainty in a Theory
of Sense and Understanding makes it hard to see how the kind of structure
a truth conditions theory accords to this area (see 6*3 ) of psychological
reality via language can have any place in such explanations- and , of course,
for Dummett it does not . For Dummett begins hiw enquiry into understanding by
asking whether or not truth (structure) should be central to a theory of meaning, 
and his answer is a resounding 'no': But the thesis Dummett does end up with
and which destroys any hope of making the truth conditions structure of language 
a central feature in discerning structure within the otherwise pre-theoretic- 
ally inaccessible contents of psychological reality is surely misplaced. Surely 
the kind of structure as given by Davidson's truth condtions theory (or at least 
something like it) is essential to any suitable explanation of understanding- 
even if it can only be considered a part of the total explanation. For part of 
what is fundamentally needed to explain the capacity of a speaker to understand 
unfamiliar sentences uttered by other speakers is common accesss by all such 
speakers to some kind of recursive truth conditions structure, since , for one 
thing, a good case can be made for the argument that understanding what iis 
said is largely a matter of data processing which in some sense involves 
analytical and synthesizing processes akin to decoding and the like, and one of 
the criteria for such processing is that the utterance to be understood must 
also have a complex structure capable of being analysed and synthesized* And 
Davidson's 'farski-style truth conditions theory , with its necessary structure, 
(or something very like it) would account for this requirement, even if it 
eventually proves unable to account for the whole story. Dummetts concentration 
on sense and understanding in the manner he does so , takes us away from ever 
being able to see such a truth conditions structure of language as the means 
whereby we caa have such common access to understanding between speakers, and 
must be rejected. The total focus on understanding by Dummett as the primary 
thing to be explained wrongly concentrates matters exclusively in this area 
and thus misses a large part of what also needs to be explained: the structure 
of language and the part tnat this structure plays in our understanding, and
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for which common access to a recursive truth conditions theory seems essential.
Similarly, iJummett's cry for 'mastery' over the contents of what is 
understood is also wrongly conceived—especially since it berates Davidson's 
truth conditions theory for failing to achieve what it never set out to achieve, 
and what it probably does not need to achieve. Davidson in fact specifically 
notes that he wishes to avoid speaking about the 'mastery' of this aspect of 
of understanding jr 'gra ping' a speaker's use of his language, tnough his
position to date is still that the possession of a truth conditions theory
together with the knowledge tnat it is possessed suffices for understanding:
'Indeed it still seems to me right, as far as it goes , to hold that someone
is in a postion to interpret the utterances of speakers of a language L if he
has a certain body of knowledge entailed by a theory of truth for L - a theory
that meets specified empirical and formal constraints - and he knows that this
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knowledge is entailed by such a theory. ' Davidson even goes as far as to
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suggest , in a much earlier paper , ' that there is a mechanism in the interpre­
ter which corresponds to the truth conditions theory- a point which emphasises 
what was said earlier about truth structure as essential to understanding. Yet 
Davidson is equally firm in making it clear that such a theory can be used to 
'describe an aspect of the interpreter's competence at understanding what is 
said1. ^  and, in one of his earliest papers^ Davidson fully concedes that 
there is always something grasped in understanding which we cannot communicate. 
In other words, the complete certainty and mastery in the area of understanding 
demanded by Dummett is not the aim of Davidson's truth conditions theory.
Of course, it can readily be accepted that such propositional truth conditions 
knowledge is not understanding in the pre-tneoretical sense - that actual under­
standing and competence is quite different in certain ways from what the theory 
says it is. Some philosophers urge that because people have complex theoreti­
cal knowledge about language, always assuming that they do, it does not necessa­
rily follow that tney possess the skill for mastery and understanding of 
language. ^  It can be plausibly argued that tne connections between Davidsons 
truth conditions account and actual competence is ultimately left mysterious, 
or that the truth conditions approach does not account comprehensively enough 
for the real processes involved. But even if all this is admitted, it does not 
show that the theory of truth could not be a part of the overall explanation. 
Davidson allows that he has as yet not given a completely satisfactory formu­
lation ©f what it is to understand another speaker's utterances, and that a 
theory of truth is not to be equated with tne actual processes involved in any 
direct sense. ^  Yet at least if we begin witn something like his truth 
conditions theory , and the structure it describes within language, we have some 
means of entry into the processes of understanding other speaker's utterances; 
if we begin with Dummett's requirement that we regard the issue of the Theory
of Sense as primary , and that what we must demand is complete and certain 
explications of how a speaker understands or grasps the use of his language, 
it is not only difficult to see what headway could be made in such matters, but 
it surely goes against the fundamental need to find common structure in this 
area of understanding, whether or not.the kind of .structure given by Davidson's 
truth condtions theory is tne whole of tne story. Dumrnett's thesis has things 
too much orientated in the direction of the Theory of Sense; it is better to 
begin from the point where we do have a clearer picture, that is , from the 
truth conditions structure of language, even if Davidson's theory will have to 
be augmented. Again, Dumrnett's call for complete certainty in such matters is 
a red herring; and when it is linked to the issues of guaranteeing the proof 
of statements and of verificationist requirements that understanding be fully 
manifestable in the use of language the errors are merely compounded. ^  At 
the very least, therefore, Dumrnett's criticisms do not show that Davidson's 
truth conditions theory cannot suffice for a Theory of Sense and Understanding, 
and there are strong indications that, in some form or other, such a truth 
conditions theory is an essential element in such explanations.
To quickly summarize the issues discussed with respect to Frege and Dummett, 
then, the main points are these. In order to explain why a speaker said some­
thing, reference to the psychological reality of the speaker was seen to be 
indispensable: an interpreter has to know what theat speaker believes his own 
words meAn, and how he understands the use of his own words. (6 »l). The 
Fregean Theory of Sense is rejected as unacceptable by Davidson,its reference 
to propositions in explicating such psychological features as 'A believes that p 
not only incurring difficulties in identifying and individuating such 'founda­
tional* , extra-linguistic entities, but also making any intersubjective theory 
of sense along the lines of Tarski's truth condtions theory impossible. The 
claim is that the trutn condtions theory does not need reference to such inten- 
sional objects. Reference to other entities such as sentences is also rejected 
by Davidson as being unamenable to the kind of structure a truth theory needs.
Frege offers little explanation of what it is to understand language, and 
Dumrnett's concentration on the Theory of Sense and Understanding , together
with his desire to see guarantees oi mastery in such areas makes no room for 
a truth conditions theory in this area - yet the kind of structure delineated 
by such a theory could well be an essential element in such understanding.
The hope is then, to reconstruct such intensional features of psychological 
reality as beliefs and also desires from within the extensional truth conditions 
metalanguage, and tnafc the truth conditions tneory will at least suffice for 
understanding, issues which are taken up in CHAPTER SEVEN.
However, tne issue of the use of the truth conditions theory in reconstruct­
ing the intensional aspects of psychological reality , and of thus avoiding any 
•dualism* in this sphere is only part of the story. The other part is concerned 
with the intentional aspect of how a speaker is construed as using his language, 
for the use of language is also an intentional activity. This is the issue 
dealt with in the following section •
o * o  'rne use 01 Lan-.ua e ana uricean intentions
So far, in considering tne intensional features of psychological reality such 
as beliefs or desires, Davidson has rejected the need for any reference to 
extra-linguistic entities like Fregean propositions; nor does the kind of 
theory advocated by Dummett, which cannot countenance any truth conditions 
structure in the area of understanding, but which places all its emphasis on 
understanding and competence at the expense of truth structure prove acceptable. 
Davidson's truth conditions theory offers the hope of avoiding any correspond­
ence to , and thus any dualism with, such 'foundational', extra-linguistic 
propositions, and also of providing structured access to understanding. But in 
discussing Dummett , the close connection between his theory and Wittgenstein's
notion of meaning as use was noted. Wittgenstein's reaction to his own earlier
69
views in the Tractatus , that language has a single function of reference by 
which meaning is to be explained,is echoed by Dummett', s criticism of Davidson' 
theory as neglecting the variety of uses to which language is put . The empha­
sis is transferred to seeing sentences as having meaning because people use 
them ; language is inseparable from human activity. Hence , for Wittgenstein,
in his later philosophy, the idea of the language as 'the whole, consisting
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of language and the actions into which it is woven' To master a language
game , since such games are linked in a fundamental way to the things people do
is accordingly to master a scheme of beliefs and intentions : to enter into a
humanly shared world view. The concern in the later Wittgenstein of language as
use, and of language as a form of intentional activity is thus closely related
to the views of other philosphers sucn as Austin 3earle,(and in particular,
Grice,) for wiiom what is primary is not the explication of the truth conditions
structure of language, but rather the wider question of how the use of language
relates to the world by virture of being.a form of rule-governed intentional 
behaviour Grice's theory of meaning, for instance, in its most general form
is the attempt to explain human communication as a species of rational human 
activity. On Grice's view what distinguishes such communication is the conco­
mitant psychological states , that is , the beliefs and intentions with which 
communicative acts are conventionally performed. Such notions are envisaged as
providing, in the case of Grice, some kind ox' foundational basis in extra- 
linguistic beliefs ana intentions , for explicating the use of language by 
speakers. Not surprisingly, just as with the notion of extra—linguistic Eregean 
propositions, Davidson's truth conditions theory radically opposes any reference 
to such foundational, extra-linguistic notions: as with intensions, such 
intentional aspects of language use are indeed seen by Davidson as playing a 
crucial role in interpreting language as a form of intentional human activity, 
but not in the foundational sense required by Grice.
Grice begins by trying to find a ground of distinction between the meaning 
of 'meaning' in such contexts as 'Those spots mean measles ' - what he calls 
meaning in its natural sense - and non-natural meaning, such as with 'Those 
three rings on the bell ( of the bus) mean that the bus is full. ' ^  After • 
two attempts, Grice arrives at a definition along these lines: that for A to 
mean something by uttering x , A must intend to induce,by uttering x ,a
belief in the audience and intend his utterance to be recognized as so intended.
7*5
(The recognition is intended by A to play it3 part in indicating a belief).
In a later paperj Grice specifically brings in tne issue of conventions , and 
a distinction is drawn oetw^en wnat a speaker said , and what he has implicated : 
he indicates that he 'would not want to deny that ...speakers' intentions are 
to be recognized, in tne normal ca^e, by virtue of a knowledge of the convention­
al use of the sentence' ^  , and says that his account of non-conventional
implicatufes depends on this idea. This latter feature of Grice's work is 
important since it is designed to show that all communication .involves general 
agreement between speakers and hearers which Grice terms'the Co-operative 
Principle' ^  under wnich certain maxims specify the conventions which 
participants in a conversation normally obey. Discourse is part of a co-operativ 
activity in which each participant's speech is designed to help achieve the 
purpose of the activity. Thus, one's contribution to a conversation must be 
appropriate in terms of its aim, and tnis is fleshed—out by Grice in the form 
of four maxims:
(l) Quantity: which says that the contribution one makes to a conversation
ought to be as informative as required in the situation : neither too informa­
tive, nor too un-inforrnative.
(ll) Q.uality: indicating that one ought to try to make a true contribution
(ill) Relation: wnich says that one ought to make a relevant contribution
(IV) Manner: showing that one ou^ht to avoid creating confusion as a result of
obscurity, ambiguity, and the like, and to try to be clear and 
concise*
The importance of adopting such principles is that it provides an assumption 
about the participants in a conversation- roughtly that they are following 
mutually known and accepted rules ; and, very importantly, this enables them to 
infer various things about the proper ways to construe a speaker's utterance 
in connection with what it conveys beyond what the speaker has said. Accordingly 
such conversational implicatures are implications of a very different nature 
from semantic entailments or logical implications(see PART 1 ) : clearly, they 
cannot be a part of the semantic meaning of sentences, since they depend on a 
prior understanding of this (conventional) meaning of a sentence.Another 
important feature is that it is the flaunting of these conventions which is the 
basis for the flexibility of the message conveyed, six-ce any interpretation 
can be cancelled without contradiction.
Finally, in Grice's latest papers there are one or two interesting insights
I
into his ideas on semantics. For instance, Grice (rightly, of course, ) regards
7 6
intensionality as embedded in the very foundations of a theory of language- which 
accounts for his starting - off point in extra-linguistic psychological reality. 
Also, he sees a close analogy between intending and believing in the sense i,that
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the focal element in an intention is to be regarded as a certain sort of belief.
Frotn this sketch of the main ideas in Grice’s published papers, we thus see
the following, each aspect of which is important to the later criticisms invoked
by Davidson. In delineating his theory of meaning for individual utterances by
particular speakers as outlined above, tne basic idea in Grice'g theory is that 
semantic properties of utterances are a function of the communicative
intentions of their utterers, or of conventions that associate sentence-types 
with such intentions. The key concepts are tnus intention and belief: a speak­
er’s meaning consists in a complex intention, the core of wnich is an intention 
to affect a hearer’s beliefs,;intentions, or actions, in a specific way. The 
other key idea is then to explicate tne conventional semantic properties of 
sentences as deriving from conventional regularities that associate sentence- 
types with communicative intentions . Hence,Grice offers principles connecting
the psychological propositional attitudes with semantics by means of conven -
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tions. The central point, from the perspective of the criticism to follow, 
is that Grice's explication depends for its viability on a notion of a 
foundational framework of propositional attitudes which does not depend upon 
the semantic properties to be explicated. For, even though the central elements 
indicated above from Grice’6 papers are indeed crucial to Davidson's philosophy 
of language as much as to Grice's > Davidson's truth conditions theory reverses 
the role which they are to play: any notion of extra-linguistic,foundational 
basis of intentions and beliefs is rejected as an unsatisfactory basis from 
which to explain a speaker’s intentional linguistic activity; rather, for 
Davidson, they are constructed from within the extensional truth conditions 
metalanguage. ( See CHAPTER SEVEN. )
The Gricean programme seems to offer, then, the prospect of analysing the
concept 'means1 without appeal to any semantic or linguistic notions whatsoever
and on the basis of derect reference to the beliefs and intentions issuing;
in individual utterances. Perhaps Bennett has stated this most clearly:
*H.P.Grice showed how to give a clear sense to "By uttering. x,u meant that P"
79without implying anything about language...' Thus, according to Bennett,
we can have an account of meaning which presupposes nothing about language ,
and which 'treats as basic the individual instance of meaning, by one speaker, 
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at one time ...' This is the focus of Davidson's criticism: 'Grice', he
says, 'if I understand his project, wants to explain linguistic meaning
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ultimately by appeal to non-linguistic intentions.'' yet even from his 
earliest published papers , it seems clear that Davidson regards the appeal to 
any extra-linguistic attribution of values or propositional attitudes as wholly
untenable. in later worK, ne notes tnat n  someone utters a sentence nice
Q-2
'The sun is over the yard-arm' , one solution to interpretation might be 
suggested by tne fact that 'he intended to convey to his hearers the impression 
that he believed the sun was over the yard-arm...' For Davidson,however, what 
should be taken as basic is not what the particular person meant , but rather 
what the sentence itself as uttered meant, communication being via the literal, 
truth condtions structure of the sentence, ( See PART l) and this approach 
requires abstracting from any extra-linguistic intentions. In various other 
papers, too, Davidson emphasises that there cannot, in his opinion, be any 
extra-linguistic knowledge of beliefs or intentions , that our best and only 
suitable route to such attitudes is via linguistic behaviour itself, and that
consequently the foundational basis for interpretation in non-linguistic
8 A
beliefs and intentions required by Grice is mistaken. But the most devasting
critique occurrs when , in again considering the possibility of a theory of
interpretation starting from non-linguistic intentions, purposes and the like,
and which he specifically relates to the tradition of Wittgenstein and Grice,
he says'There is a principled, and not merely a practical, obstacle to verifying
the existence of detailed, general and abstract beliefs and intentions, while
85being unable to tell what a speaker's words mean. ' For, continues Davidson, 
'we have no good idea how to set about authenticating the existence of such 
attitudes when communication is not possible. ' and he concludes :
My claim is only t..at making detailed sense of a person's intentions and 
beliefs canL-ot be independent of making sense of his utterances. If this 
is so, then an inventory of a speaker's sophisticated beliefs and inten­
tions cannot be evidence for the truth of a theory for interpreting his 
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speech behaviour.
Davidson's position, then, is absolutely clear: there can be no reference to any
foundational basis of psychological reality in terms of extra-linguistic
intentions and beliefs as required by the Gricean elaboration of the traditional
theory of meaning. Is Davidson correct to hold such a point of view, aiid is 
there no prospect of rescuing Grice's ideas from such a fate? The argument to
follow will show that for Davidson any hope of retaining the Gricean view, even
with the additional help wnich has been suggested, is futile; this does not
mean, however, that Davidson is ignoring such elements of psychological reality
as intentions or purposes. Indeed, such 'Gricean' features have a critical role
to play- but not in any foundational sense. (CHAPTER SEVEN)
Many criticisms have been levelled at Grice's theory , some of which can be
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used back up Davidson's own claims. For example, Ziff invents an academic,
George, who, given a test to establish his sanity for induction into the army
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replies with the nonsense phrase, 'Ugh ugh buugh blugh ugh blug blug'. By 
this utterance, George means to produce an effect on his audience- perhaps to 
offend them- and he intends this effect to arise from the recognition that he 
intended to offend them. Hence, George means something by his utterance in 
Gricean terms, but of course his utterance means , in itself, nothing whatsoever. 
Without language, in terms of a prior notion of sentence meaning, nothing that 
is semantically intelligible is conveyed.
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Again, Searle postulates an American soldier captured by Italian troops.
In trying to give them the impression he is a German, he addresses them with 
the words 'Kernst der das land, we die Zitraner blutter?' which, on the Gricean 
analysis mean 'I am a German soldier' , but which really mean 'Do you know the 
land where the lemmon-trees bloom?' On Searle's own revized version of Grice, 
the effects of U's utterance on A must be produced through the mechanism of 
A's knowledge of the rules governing the use of sentences of type x which U 
utters. '
It is not clear that the above examples of nonsense, which however have an
intentional point , are necessarily a worry to Grice's theory ; they may have
some relevance, but, since they both involve deceit, it could be argued that
Grice's theory is readily modified to account for them. Nevertheless, they
point to an area of unease over the matter of correlation between sentence
meaning and extra-linguistic intentions. A third criticism by Neil Wilson hints
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in this direction . He maintains that Grice's thesis requires an untena­
ble relation hold between the response which U intends to elicit and what is 
meant by x:
If I mean my guests to leave there are any number of different things that
I can say (and mean by what I sayj in order to shoo tnem oat. On the 
other hand, if I say "It’s getting pretty late", meaning that it's getting 
pretty late, there might be any one of a number of different things I 
can expect of my audience. ^
The relation between intentions and utterance seems to fall apart. T.his raises
the question of how regularities.between the two are to be sustained on the
Gricean account. °ertainly there seems usually to be a regular connection between
a sentence, an utterer's intentions in uttering that sentence, and the audience's
response to such an utterance. But, the argument goes, surely that regularity
is not a chance one; it is determined, rather, by the rules which determine
the meaning of the sentence uttered, and these will be part of the total set
of rules determining the literal meaning of every sentence of the language.
Again, it i3 equally unclear that the utterance of any sentence will be
standardly accompanied by any one set of intentions on the part of speakers;
about the only plausible candidate for such intentions to regularly accompany
the utterance of,say,sentence p , is that of actually saying that p. But once
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again, this linguistic notion defeats the point of the Gricean programme.
The dilemma, then, which all the above points indicate is this* 'The Gricean 
analysis of 'means' ostensibly achieves its aims by avoiding reference to any 
rules of language, or to any prior linguistic or semantic concepts, by taking 
extra-linguistic beliefs ana intentions as basic. Yet our examples above at 
least suggest that an appeal to language as the prior determinant of meaning 
independent of the intentions and beliefs of particular speakers is indeed 
necessary to understand tne very notions which Grice takes to be basic. The 
point is well-made by Ziff: 'Grice's analysis rings untrue. It was bound to;
95his alloy lacks the basic ingredient of meaning: a set of projective devices.1
This is, then, Davidson's point that we can have no idea of how to get at the 
attribution of propositional attitudes apart from through language and the
semantic structure provided by his truth condtions theory. let should we, along
with Davidson, 'despair' at Grice's attempt to delineate them in extra-semantic
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terms ?
The various criticisms have not shown , so far , that Grice's theory cannot
be modified to meet the arguments . In relation to the last example, for instan­
ce, if it could be snown that the general linguistic conventions which relate 
each sentence in a language to the other sentences of the language are in some 
way essentially Gricean communicative relations holding between particular speak­
ers and hearers in specific situations of communication, then perhaps we could 
secure Gricean theory. Such a demonstration of tne Gricean roots of linguistic 
conventions would need to go through without appeal to a y unalysed semantic 
notions, but since we nave not yet seen any conclusive reason for denying this 
possibility, we must investigate further.
Jonathan Bennett has recently argued, for instance, that Grice's theory , 
when coupled with David Lewis's theory of convention, offers a way of under­
standing the relationship between an utterer's intentions and their conventional
95sentence meaning realizations. There are two aspects of Bennett's thesis
which are relevant to what we are considering here , both of which would not be
open to -Davidson to accept, though he does not specifically discuss Bennett's
ideas themselves. For Bennett, 'the essence of a statement is U's reliance on the
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Gricean mechanism to get A to believe something. ' Since he specifically
rejects language as a basis for ascribing beliefs and intentions,- ' I am working
on a detailed theory about how non-rlinguistic behaviour can support working
97concepts of belief and intention' - he obviously has to find behavioural 
criteria for ascribing such intentions and beliefs to people without linguistic 
considerations. To do this, Bennett has two solutions : (l) iconicity, by which 
he claims that the pictoral character of certain signals offers us direct 
insight into the nature of the belief which an utterer may intend to produce by 
his utterance, and (11) regular associations, which he claims offers us a way of 
'escaping from icons' since if we find that certain gestures constantly seem to 
be correlated with certain environmental conditions, and if the social circum­
stances are such that we can reasonably impute to the person who produced the 
signal a desire to produce in others beliefs about those conditions, then we 
have grounds for treating the gesture as having a certain propositional content. 
To take each of these matters in order. Surely , in the first case, there is
an enormous gap Dexween xaxmg non-xmguisxic Denaviourai eviaence as maica x m g
that there is a Grioean intention on the part of one person to produce a state of
belief about a specific matter- as is the case in the simple behavioural
example Bennett gives - and the transference of this to an explanation of
normal utterances in natural language. Bennett's example is ’one day we observe
a tribesman U, stand in full view of another, A, and emit a snake-like hissing
sound while also making with his hand a smooth undulating horizontal motion
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which resembles the movement of a snake. ' Bennett argues that U's performance 
indices 'the thought of a snake', and that we can therefore postulate that 'if U 
is trying to make A believe something, it is something about a snake ', which, 
together with further behavioural evidence, can give us grounds for concluding 
that U intends A to believe that there is a snake. But why should we 
jump from this to accepting Bennett's contention that this constitutes the 
making of a statement, and that, since he assumes that 'the essence of a state­
ment is U's reliance on the Gricean mechanism to get A to believe something',
we can thereby help to explain the utterance of sentences of natural language?
99As Davidson mentions in another context, ' it is perhaps possible that the 
very simplest of intentions can be detected quasi-behaviouristically(though not 
even this is certain) ; but for intententions of any complexity, this is simply 
implausible: the behavioural guide is simply too inexact. Any explanation of.how 
raor complex intentions are recognized will inevitably rely upon the recognition 
of the meaning of sentences in the first place, such sentences being the only 
plausible route to the speaker's intentions. Why should we accept Bennett's 
thesis that the essence of a statement is given by reliance on the Gricean 
mechanism to get someone to believe something? Surely it is possible to make a 
statement only by uttering some appropriate sentence in some natural language?
The whole weight of Bennett's theory of language must therefore ultimately 
come to rely on an explication of sentence structure in all but the most trivial 
csases.
Secondly, Bennett argues tnat language is a set of Lewisian conventions 
founded upon the Gricean mechanism ; but tnis,too, is at least open to dispute. 
Lewis demonstrates that it is a distinctive feature of conventional activities 
that they reflect a background structure of participant's intentions of
precisely the kind outlined by tne Gricean concept of utterer.'s:-.meaning.
Hence, Bennett says: 'So we can smoothly combine Grice plus Lewis: conventional 
meaning involves the use of Lewis's conventions to coordinate the Gricean 
intentions of speakers with the belief acquisitions of the hearers.’101 Lewis 
regards conventions as solutions to what he terms 'coordination problems' wnich 
arise when two or more agents have interests which do not exactly conflict, 
but which are such that for each agent the best way of pursuing them depends on 
what the other agents do. It is known to the agents that such problems have 
been solved before by adopting ascertain procedure, C ; given they all know this 
there is a good chance, according to Lewis, there is a solution to the co­
ordination problem by initiating procedure C. When such behaviour becomes uniform
and regular, the community has acquired a convention, which , for Lewis, is a
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'behavioural regularity sustained by self-interest. ' Gan we then, along
with Bennett, that natural language is based on a system of Lewisian conventions 
which coordinate the Gricean intentions of speakers with the belief acquisitions 
of hearers?
On this issue, Davidson does have something to say in one of his latest 
103published papers, and tne criticism offered reiterate the points already
made. Davidson admitts that convention does figure conspicuously in many of 
our activities, but then he goes on to question the exact role of conventions in
speech. Are conventions mere conveniences , just social flourishes, or are they
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really central to the existence of communication by language? ' In other
words, how fundamental are ti.ey to explaining language ? Plainly , the most
important feature about Lewis's conventions as described above is that something
must be seen to repeat itself over time; regularity is the crucial factor.
Hov/ever, though -^avidson accepts that linguistic communication is to some degree
regular, he has doubts about making it a condition of linguistic activity;
'...it is an error to suppose we have seen deeply into the heart of linguistic
communication when we have noticed how society bends linguistic habits to a
public norm. ' 10^ Davidson then goes on to make the point that , for him,
regularities are not to be regarded as basic or as necessary to explaining
language: though linguistic communication may make use of rule—governed 
repetition, it does not required it. Thus, conventions, per se though they may
describe usual though co; tin ent features of linguistic communication, are not 
basic to explaining the use of language. 10^
How are we to assess Davidjon'n contention, and what is its significance 
for Bennett's project and of augmenting the Gricean account of language?
What Davidson seems to be saying is this. It is not that social habits, rule- 
governed repetitions, and conventions are not important, or have absolutely no 
no role to play in explaining linguistic behaviour, but only that they cannot 
and should not be taken to be basic to explaining language in the way that Lewis, 
Bennett and others assume. As with other tradionally orientated concepts in this 
area, the requirement is that the issue of the meaning of sentences be connect­
ed with the beliefs and intentions of their users : conventions are supposed to 
do their work in making these connections between the linguistic meaning of 
sentences and human propositional attitudes described in non-linguistic terms; 
such conventions are the foundational basis for explaining language. But for
Davidson, 1 The only candidate for recurrence we have is the interpretation of 
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sound patterns ': the conventional regularities which are present in the
use of language , ana which are reflected in the fact that people tend to speak 
much as their neighbours do, can only be approached via such people's possession 
of a common sharable language, the possession of which is itself a condition for 
having these conventions. In Davidson's view, Lewis and others have got things 
backwards in taking conventions and the like as basic. Although he does not say 
so, perhaps Davidson would argue that the kind of conventions and regularities 
under discussion presupposes the possession of the kind of distinctive rationali­
ty by the humans who formulate them which can only be seen in terms of a 
language with the kind of truth conditions structure he delineates. Nevertheless
Davidson does make it clear that 'language is a condition for having conventr- ' .
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rons.'
If Davidson is correct, therfore, it would seem to negate the second point
of Bennett's thesis mentioned above: that language is s set of Lewi-sian
conventions founded upon the Gricean mechanism, and tnere seems no hope of
taking such conventions as basic in oruer to coordinate tne ^ricean intentions
of speakers. As witn .bennett's first point, it seems that good arguments can be 
adduced for taking the semantic structure of language as our foundational base.
wnac tne discussion in trus section 6^ *0 ; seems to indicate, then, is that 
reference to any Gricean extra-linguistic beliefs and intentions, in the 
'foundational' sense required, is untenable. Nor does tne appeal made by 
Bennett to Lewis's theory of convention offer any way out , both premisses which 
he invokes in this respect being open to question. We can have no access to 
such features of psychological reality as intentions - or of the conventions 
required by Bennett - other than through language itself.
In a similar spirit, it is easy to summarize the overall findings of section 
6*2 in general.If Davidson is correct, and tne arguments point in this direction, 
there can be no reference to extra-linguistic Fregean abstract entities such 
as propositions as the objects of propositional attitudes like 'A believes that p 
or 'A desires that p 1 and the like. Davidson hopes to achieve a 'pre-Fregean 
innocence ' by avoiding any dualism between language and such intensional objects 
by their construction within an extensional metalanguage.
But can Davidson's truth conditions theory suffice as a theory of understand­
ing? Dummett claims not, yet it is difficult to see how Bummett's own theory 
of understanding, with its emphasis on certainty in the area competence can 
succeed , since tne kind of structure it abjures, and which can be provided by 
Davidson'g truth condtions theory, does seem necessary to any reasonable 
comprehension of how we understand the use of language.
Finally, though Grice's distinction between sentence meaning and utterer's 
meaning is crucial, as is his discernment of the kind of intentional structure 1
I
which has to be invoked in defining meaning, such intentions and beliefs cannot 
play their role in any foundational, extra-linguistic sense that Grice supposes. 
As Davidson indicates, there is a principled obstacle to delineating and 
authenticating such propositional attitudes without language and the kind of 
truth structure he envisages; neither does the salvage attempt with conventions 
help matters in this respect, they themselves depending on something like a 
truth conditions interpretation of language.
This leaves us, if we accept Davidson’s views, in the position that any 
description of the intensional and intentional aspects essential to understand­
ing how a speaker uses his language must be explicated via language. But does 
this not make these features obscure, mysterious, perhaps even otiose?
0 * 3  T r u t h  c o n d i t i o n s  s t r u c t u r e  a s  ' . E n t e r i n g  w e a g e '  t o  r s y c n o i o g i c a i  i t e a j L i t y
Section 6*2 makes it clear that,for Davidson, describing the intensional and 
intentional features necessary to any interpretation of how a speaker uses or 
understands his language does not require. any reference to any extra-linguistic, 
foundational basis in such features of psychological reality. The only access 
to the contents of the Theory of Sense, of thoughts, beliefs, desires , intent­
ions and the like is via the truth conditions theory of language; hence 
Davidson's eschewal of any dualism between language and uninterpreted psycholog­
ical reality. Many philosophers, however, have voiced opposition to Davidson's 
stance in tnis area, maintaining that it results in an anaemic construal , and
even a neglect , of crucial evidence for the interpretation of language, leading
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to a concern only with the formal considerations of language. Contrary to 
the view that -Davidson’s position results in giving a total conceptual primacy 
to language, it is argued here tnat though Davidson does hold that any reference 
to any such extra-linguistic psychological features is unintelligible, the 
intensional and intentional aspects are not considered entirely reducible to 
language: indeed, they have a reciprocal role to play on Davidson's thesis .
What is a requirement of Davidson's position is that for us as interpreters, the 
only access we have to a structured view of the elements of psychological 
reality - for, instance of beliefs as.the elements of thought, or of intentions- 
is via the 'entering wedge' of something like tne strcure provided by means 
of the truth conditions tneory of language. Only in this sense can language , 
on Davieson's view De considered dominantlt is from tnis perspective that 
the structure given by Davidson's truth condtions theory of language becomes 
the new intersubjectively shared foundational basis for the construction of 
beliefs, desires and intentions
This does not become clear witnout a detailed examination of Davidson's 
ideas. For surely, it could be claimed, the arguments against reference to 
Fregean abstract intensional objects, or against Gricean extra—linguistic 
intentions maues it obvious that for Davidson language is entirely to be 
regarded as conceptually primary? Davidson makes certain statements which
w u-lj •.. uiixj d, oicduure oncii/ vail -Lnuerprei. speecn
can have tne concept of a thought. 1 110 or 1 We have tne idea of belief only 
from the role of belief in the interpretation of language...' 111 Such state­
ments seem to suggest that for Davidson language is conceptually primary, and 
perhaps even that we should give up the notion of any extra-linguistic psycho­
logical reality altogether.But then we nave other clues which indicate that 
Davidson does not want to give up the idea of an independent realm of psycho­
logical reality. He makes it plain, for instance, that his own theory of language
11?
differs markedly from Quine's , with its wish to eliminate the intensional, 
and we have such rebuttals as the one give to Foster: 1'My way of trying to give
an account of language and meaning makes essential use of such concepts as those
those of belief and intention, and I do not believe it is possible to reduce
113these notions to anything more scientific or behaviouristic. * In this manner 
Davidson seems to say that the 'reality' of the psychological realm is to be 
taken seriously in a non-linguistic sense. How then are we to reconcile the two 
seemingly differing contentions indicated above. One way is by comparing David­
son's position with tnat of a philospher for whom language undoubtably does 
have conceptual primacy: Sellars.
The conceptual primacy' which Sellars accords language at the expense of
psychological reality can be clearly seen in the controversy wnich ocurred on
114this issue between himself and Chisholm ^ The bone of tneir contention is over 
whether tne concept of thought is more basic tnan the concept of language. Both 
accept, as1 Davidson does (see PaRT 1 ) that a string of words as sounds is only 
meaningful 'when syntactically and semantically and so,logically*well-formed. 
Further , that sucn structural . characteristics of language delineate : the relat­
ionship of language to the world, and that there are certain semantical propert­
ies which are analogous to the intensional and intentional features typical of 
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mental episodes. Essentially Sellars attempts to explain the analogy between
ll6
speech and thought (an analogy wnich Davidson says plainly exists ) on the 
model where the verbal episode is taken as primitive and the notion of a mental 
episode is characterized in a derivative way as an analogical extension of the 
verbal episode.
But why snould one give conceptual primacy to tne notion of the verbal
primitive, and characterized speecn as an extension of tnought? After all, is
thought, as some have maintained, 'internalized speech', or is speech just -
externalized thought? For Sellars, as noted , language is more basic than
thought ; yet for Chisholm, the semantical talk by which semantical properties
are ascribed bo verbal episodes is covertly psychological in the sense that it
involves an implicit reference to mental episodes. For, to say that a person's
utterance was meaningful , Chisholm maintains, involves us in saying t..at the
person knew what tne words we used mean, and tnat ne used tnem with the intention
of conveying such and such. Hence, for Chisholm, it is only because of the
intensional and intentional properties of mental episodes that the verbal
117episodes can be said to have tne semantical properties that they have.
Thus, it is possible to 3ee Cellar's thesis as the exact opposite of
Chisholm’s • ForSellar's it is only because of the semantical properties of
verbal episodes tnat mental episodes can be said to have the intensional and
intentional properties they have- tne mental episodes are postulated as entirely
dependent upon the model of overt verbal episodes, the intentionality of thought
being explained by reference to categories of semantical discourse about langu-
age.-whereas for Chisholm the opposite is true. Sellars gives an undoubted
conceptual primacy to language: speech is conceptually prior to thought, the
notion of the thought being modelled or being an analogical extension of, the
concept of speech. Chisholm, however, claims tnat tnought is hot just causally,
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but also ponceptually, prior to language.
Plainly, then, what is dominant for Chigholm in the foundational sense is the
realm of the mental, psychological reality; wnat is dominant for Sellars is the
realm of language. Davidson's position is extremely interesting. At first sight,
in view of what has been said in section 6*2 , it would be expected that he
would be antithetical towards fahisholm's position, and in complete accord with
that of Sellar's - especially if those philosophers who maintain that Davidson's
position results in giving language a total conceptual pri-acy were correct.
Certainly Davidson is no friend of what Chisholm advocates (see 5*2); yet ,
surprisingly perhaps neither is he prepared to countenance Sellar’s views on 
the complete dominance accorded to language. Even though, along with Sellar s
Davidson accepts that there is a kind of analogy or correspondence between 
language and thought - some form of isomorphism or formal similarity.
In one recen.t paper, Davidson asks what the connection is between thought, 
belief, and intention, and, whereas Sellars takes the notion of thought as cen­
tral, Davidson, whilst admitting tnat most thoughts are not beliefs, takes it
120
that belief is 'central to all kinds of thought' and is thus the primary
concept to be explained in this context: the 'system of such beliefs identifies
121
a thought by locating it in a logical and epistemic space. ' But what are
we to make of Sellar's contention that sucn intensional and intentional concepts
are subsidary to language? Bennett, for example, claims that his theory starts
from the notion of thought and moves towards an explication of language; he
further maintains that he thinks it possible for creatures to have beliefs
without being language users, and that he has little sympathy for the idea that
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intentions must require language. And there are many philosophers, apart
from Chisholm, who would argue for tne conceptual primacy of the intensional
at the expense of language. Before considering- what Davidson says, let us very
briefly look at some of the evidence for this .
There seem to be three main areas wnich are cited by various philosophers
for holding that thoughts, beliefs and intentions do not require language, and
that , since they are not reducible to linguistic concepts, language cannot
be given conceptual primacy. 'These are the examples involving young children,
animals, and deaf and dumb adults. If , in such cases, people and animals can
have concepts such as beliefs whilst lacking any linguistic skills, one is
justified, it is argued, in holding that conceptual primacy should be attributed
to the mental realm rather than language. It could not be concluded, for instance
that in such cases thought is impossible witnout the corresponding linguistic
capacity to express such thoughts. So , for example, the fact, which no one
doubts, that infants receive and react to stimulation of various kinds from
their environment, and that they,according to recent research,appear to have a
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much richer mental life than hitherto imagined, poses the question of
exactly how much mental life they are engaged in before linguistic capacity
manifests itself: do they perhaps partially, or even in some sense completely, 
understand what is going on before they can properly articulate this in words?
How, it. may be asked, can tne behaviour of sues infants be explained unless they
can be described as thinking, and thinking in fairly complex ways, without
language? If being able to identify and re-identify objects does not depend
on the use of words( as perhaps some recent research indicates) then presumably
it must be admitted that infants already have a complex apprehension of the
world: a child who can pick out dogs from other animals presumably has some kind
of concept of 'dog' , even if it cannot use the word 'dog1 yet.
Similarly with the case of animals. Surely, it is argued, their behaviour
can only be satisfactorily explained by the fact that they have non-linguistic
beliefs which govern their actions. Surely they would not be behaving as they
do if they did not have some form of belief . For example , does not the cat
waiting at the mousehole believe that a mouse may soon appear ? And surely every
dog-lover knows that his dog is thinking and believing that he is about to be
taken for a walk? And again, the concept of intentions have been attributed
to animals wnich do not possess a language: 'Intention appears to be something
that we can express, but which brutes... can have though lacking any distinct'
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expression o intention. '
Finally, we have the evidence that deaf and dumb people can have perfectly
adequate thoughts, beliefs and intentions without having a language . William
James is a philosopher who is often cited by some as having shown that thoughts
beliefs and intentions of considerable sophistication are possible by such
handicapped people whilst they lack the use of a language - though Wittgenstein
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regards this example unfavourably.
Wittgenstein's understandable scepticism for the private and mental phenome­
na which lack any outward criteria of verification extended, of course, to 
the areas mentioned above. Thus, for instance, the example of the attribution of 
beliefs and intentions to dogs is rejected as an unwarranted anthropomorphism ; 
.and the notion of thought cannot in a sense be understood as independent of 
language. Such a 'strong* behaviourism is reflected, in Quine, who maintains
that the attribution of beliefs and intentions to animals has no firm criterial 
foundations , and depends upon our imaginatively putting ourselves in the posit-*
ion of the animals and tnen using' our actual language to express the beliefs
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we imagine we would have if thus placed . No non-linguistic concept of belief
is aamissioie. in a very similar spirit we return to Sellars, with nis marked
refusal to give anything but coneptual primacy to language : thinking is really
silent speech . Ke warns against envisaging language as expressing inner thought
Rather: 'an uttering of p which is a primary expression of belief that-p is
not merely an expression of a thinking that-p, but is itself a thinking, i.e.,
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a thinking-out-loud that-p . ' ' Thus, for Sellars, thought equals linguistic
activity in some very strong (thought unexplained) way.
It is not possible nor necessary to go into all the ramifications of the var­
ious arguments to appreciate , in view of what has been said, that even though 
the motives of those who wished to write-off all non-linguistic concepts of 
thoughts, beliefs and intentions because they are unamenable to outward criteria 
of verification were well-intentioned , the reduction of such areas of the 
mental entirely to linguistic concepts was too strong. Even if, as we shall see, 
construing beliefs, for example, as having a certain kind of structure necessari­
ly involves us in linguistic concepts, this does not justify us in equating the 
whole of the mental area with language in the sense that any creature who does 
not possess a language cannot be said to have tnoughts, beliefs, or intentions.
A superficial reading of Davidson can make it appear as though he is in agree­
ment with those philosophers like Sellars who give complete conceptual primacy to
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language, and tnis is a trap some criticisms have succumbed to Yet there
is a fundamental aiff .ence in Davidson's work which sets his philosophy of
language apart from those wno would reduce the wnole of psychological reality
to linguistic concepts, a difference which reflects a more sensitive appreciation
of the intensional and intentional.
Thus, there is the hint that the rejection by tnose such as Wittgenstein and
Quine of the attribution of beliefs and intentions to dogs as an unwarranted
anthropormorhphism, or of Sellar's view of thought as silent speech is perhaps
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the result of a primitive behaviourism wnich is not really justified. And
certainly, Davidson rejects Sellar's notion that language should be given 
conceptual primacy:
neither language nor thinking can be fully explained in terms of the other,
152and neither has conceptual priority.
It seems,then, tnat Davidson wants to say that we cannot eliminate one at 
the expense of the otuer, or give conceptual priority to language rather than 
to psychological reality as required by those like Sellars. Indeed, for Davidson, 
the two appear to be reciprocally inter-related :
The two are, indeed, linked, in the sense that each requires the other 
in order to be understood; but the linkage is not so complete that either 
suffices, even when reasonably, reinforced, to explicate the other.
The fact that we do not need, on Davidson's truth conditions account , to give 
up the notion of an independent psychological reality - even though (see 6*2) we 
have given up the idea of any dualism between the truth conditions theory of 
language and extra-linguistic intensional and intentional entities is reinforced 
by what another philosopher says, that though it!... may even be a logical nec­
essity that certain thoughts can be manifested in linguistic, behaviour only. ' 
this is completely compatible with the 'distinct existence in every case of
134mental states and the linguistic behaviour in which they may be manifested.1.
It seems , therefore, that Davidson is sensitive to the fact , illustrated by 
the three examples given, tnat there may well be certain features of psychologi­
cal reality wnich cannot be reduced entirely to language as some philosphers 
hold, and that they are independent of linguistic concepts.
But what about the other point- that Davidson has already accepted Sellar's 
point that there is some kind of isomorphism between language and beliefs (as 
the elements of thoughts) and intentions? And wnat about Davidson's comments, . 
wnich again make some critics subsume his ideas in this respect to those of 
Sellars , to the effect that the concepts of thoughts, beliefs, and intentions, 
can only come from a creature which has the concept of a language? We must not 
loose sight of the 'reciprocal' role indicated above. The crucial factor in 
balancing tne notions of independent features of psychological reality and 
the fact that they are somehow related to linguistic concepts lies in the 
distinction between the concept , say, of a belief, and the concept of a
structured, true, belief. It is not tnat we should— or even that we can — write 
eff the concept of extra-linguistic thoughts, beliefs, or intentions, or that
we should suppose that tney cannot exist unless the capacity for language is 
present. But what we must accept is that the concept of structured,true beliefs 
and intentions cannot intelligibly be said to exist without the presence of 
a language suitably interpreted in terms of the kind of structure given by 
something like Davidson's truth conditions theory. It is in this sense, and this 
sense only that Davidson means us to understand tne reciprocal role of language 
and psychological reality, and that we cannot attribute the notion of a thought, 
belief or intention without language. It is not that such intensional and inten­
tional features are dependent upon language for their existence, or that they 
can be wholly reduced to the conceptual primacy of language; only that the 
concept of them as possessing intelligible, true structure is entirely 
parasitic upon sometning like the kind of truth conditions structure of language 
which Davidson envisages. Can infants, animals, and the deaf and dumb be said, 
on Davidson's analysis to possess thoughts, beliefs (or desires and the like), 
and intentions even though they lack a language? Possibly, even probably, ijan 
they, on the same analysis, be said to possess the concept of structure^,true 
thoughts, beliefs and intentions in the absence of a language? Here Davidson 
would surely (and undoubtably correctly ) answer 'no'. For attributing merely 
the concept of thoughts, beliefs and intentions to a creature is by no means 
the same thing as attributing the concept of structured,true thoughts , beliefs 
and intentions to that creature. And the only intelligible way we have of 
entering into any precise, structured and true description of the intensional 
and intentional features of psychological reality is via the truth conditions 
theory of language.
Thus, we can prooably conclude that pre-linguistic thought is a possibility, 
but only t..ought which can be articulaed linguistically can have any degree of 
precision: wordless thoughts perhaps exist but tney would on this account be 
shifting, unwilling to be anchored down. Similarly with beliefs (or desires and 
the like) : it is certainly conceivable that beliefs can be attributed in the 
absence of language, but it'is not possible to attribute structured, true
beliefs without language, since surely we can nave no idea of how the elements 
in a belief can be structured wnich is not derived from our understanding of 
how the elements in our language are structured - and tnis, as we have seen,
is for Davidson via tne truth conditions theory of languages our only insight 
into the elements and structures of beliefs can only be through our understanding 
of tne elements and structures of the true sentences of our language. Finally, 
even the concept of Gricean intentions as extra-linguistic is not impossible; 
but our grasp of them in any intelligible way surely depends , as Davidson says, 
on their interpretation via the truth structure of language.
The essential points which emerge from the discussion in section 6»3 are 
these. What has gone from Davidson's work is the idea that we can have any 
access to any 'foundational' basis in psychological reality in order to ascertain 
how a speaker believes and understands the use of his intentional linguistic 
behaviour: his use of Tarski's truth conditions theory does not require any 
reference to extra-linguistic Fregean abstract intensional objects or Gricean 
intentions'^ y e no.t f however, abandon the notion that such intensional 
features as beliefs or desires , or intenitions, cannot exist in the extra- 
linguistic sense, or that the are conceptually eliminable in view of the concept­
ual primacy of language, since it is possible to attribute such concepts to 
languageless creatures. All that is insisted upon is that any description of the 
true, structured elements in these features of psychological reality is 
immanent within language: the direct description of such structered elements 
is by virtue of the truth conditions structure of sentences. It is in this 
sense that the structure of language is in a kind of isomorphic 'correspondence' 
with the structure of psychological reality," and an 'entering -wedge' into that 
reality. It is also what Davidson meant by a return to a 1 pre-Fregean'-and , 
in a sense, a 'pre-Gricean' - innocence.
r r u v a  o o n a i t i o n s  x n e o r . y  o x  l a n g u a g e  a s  i n t e r s u D . i e c t i v e  b a s i s
The last section showed that, following on from Davidson's denial of the need
for any foundational basis in psychological reality, to which we can have access
in interpreting a speakers words, although in nis view language cannot be given
total conceptual primacy, sometning like the truth conditions theory of language
is still the only 'entering wedge' that we have into a structured view of the
elements of propositional attitudes sucn as beliefs, desires or intentions#
Whether or not Davidson's conception of the structure involved is adequate to
the task is a matter to be considered in CHAPTER SEVEN ; what is relevant here
is that the rejection of any extra-linguistic foundational base means that the
truth conditions theory itself must provide the new foundational basis for an
intersubjective theory of shared beliefs and attitudes. It is only from within
the truth conditions theory of language itself tnat the identification and
discrimination of the common, sharable, basis of beliefs and other attitudes
needed behind successful communication can take place. .The . ^identification
and individuation of the common features of psychological reality from within
tne truth conditions theory of language occurrs is a matter for the next chapter
but it is necessary here to stress that on Davidson's thesis this is the only
means for describing the common elements of such over-lapping schemas of beliefs
desires and intentions. Also, just as we saw that in PART 11, the concept of
private reference is untintelligible- since the coneupt of reference itself is
a semantic, one , accessible only via the interpretation of language- so Davidson
holds that , for example, belief 'as a private attitude is not intelligible
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except as an adjustment to the public norm provided by language. ' It is
only because a creature is a member of a speech community tnat it can have the 
concept of beliefs(and other attitudes) , and, as seen, tne concept of such true 
structured , beliefs and the like can only be"via publicly accessible, and 
intersubjectively shared language structures. Hence, the business of the truth
conditions theory is preserving,in intertranslation, the invariant , objective-, 
shared elements of beliefs and other attitudes.
The central im ortance of ascertaining what elements of, for example,beliefs, 
are shared between the language of the interpreter and the language of the 
speaker he is trying to interpret , was made clear in section 6-1 . for, the 
uninterpreted intentional linguistic behaviour with which the radical interpreter 
is confronted jointly manifests both what the speaker to be interpreted means 
about the world, together what that speaker believes about the world: the 
attribution of meaning and belief are interdependent concepts, the sentences 
held true being a result of wnat is meant and what is believed by a speaker .
And, in order to solve such a 'simultaneous equation' , one has to fix the 
beliefs of the speaker in order to'solve for meaning.' The idea , according
to Davidson, being that w.e.invoke the notion of further empirical constraints 
requiring reference to the speakers beliefs (an other attitudes) in order to 
get at the meaning. That is, for Davidson , meaning is discovered by holding 
the speaker's beliefs constant, and the principle employed here is known as
“I 7Q
The Principle of Charity* , wnich states that speakers generally agree upon their 
beliefs . As Davidson puts it, in attempting to understand a speaker, we 
have to assume that the speaker's pattern of beliefs largely agree with our own 
and indeed that 'I can interpret your words correctly only by interpreting so as
l^Q
to put us largely in agreement' J (with respect to our beliefs. ) Davidson's 
constitutive point is that we cannot take an alien speaker to be uttering 
meaningful sentences unless we take him as having (as far as possible) beliefs 
that are in agreement with ours .Such a 'Principle of Charity* - that we share 
overlapping belief schemas (the invariant elements of which , as seen, are 
preserved by his truth condtions structure) - was first muted by Davidson in 
his earliest paper ^ 4 ^  an(j appears subsequently in many forms throughout his 
later work as more subtle restatements of the same principle. Undoubtably,the 
early ideas were influence by Quine and Neil Wilson^l t latterly there 
have been moves towards more complex formulations. •E'or instance, the earlier
papers counsel , quite generally, to prefer.theories of interpretation that
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minimize dissagreement and maximize agreement ; Davidson says things like:
'We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret
143 . .
in a way that optimizes agreement' .But most recently, there is tne admission
■*44
that '...minimizing disagreement, or maximizing agreement, is a confused ideal
There is now a new suggestion from Davidson. But it is one which returns us to
the point made at the beginning of this chapter (6 *1) that the role of the truth
conditions theory must be to enable the interpreter to understand how another 
speaker understands tne use of his own (intentional) linguistic activity; fThe
I/15
aim of interpretation is not agreement, but understanding. 1 The interesting
feature is that Davidson goes on :
My point has always been that understanding can be secured only by interpre- 
■i ing in a way that makes for the right sort of agreement. The "right sort", 
however, is no easier to specify than to say what constitutes a. good reason
for holding a particular belief. 1 ^
Perhaps this is because in order to fix a correct theory of interpretation ,
what we ideally need to do is to reconstruct the whole of the complex of
attitudes which a speaker is bringing to bear in the use of his language, and it 
is not yet clear whether the truth conditions theory as Davidson conceives it 
is adequate to this task. (See CHAPTER SEVEN. ) Y/hat Davidson is edging
towards may be what was indicated by Grandy:
Whether our simulation of the other person is successful will depend
heavily on the similarity of nis belief-and-desire network to our own. It
would be desirable to base our simulation on all of the other person's
beliefs and desires but this is not possible. Thus it is of fundamental
importance to make the interrelations between these attitudes as similar
147as possible to our own.
Grandy calls the his 'Principle of Humanity' , and seems to hint at a 'richer ' 
version than Davidson's original conception of his own 'Principle of Charity', 
but which he now appears to be feeling towards, in order to secure the best 
translation, the ideal is to simulate all of the other speaker's beliefs , 
desires and intentions if anything like wholeness of understanding is to be 
achieved. As Grandy indicates, we have to bear in mind that the other speaker is 
a person , and when choosing between translations of verbal behaviour, we should
ao so on tne oasis ox ourselves as trie model;, ana presumably, the model we
have of ourselves is of psychologically complex human beings.
Of course, interpreting' other-speakers on the basis of ourselves seems to be
the intention behind Davidson's original conception of nis 'Principle of Charity'
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- and of his associated 'Principle of Rationality1 - but it is not clear that
tuese original conceptions were subtle enough or comprehensive enough to
accomplish all that is required - the the proposal for maximizing agreement ,
though not incorrect, was just too blunt in face of the complexities involved.
Thus, Davidson's constitutive point that if we cannot find a way to interpret
the utterances and other behaviour of a creature as revealing a set of beliefs
largely consistent and true by our own standards , we have no reason to count
that creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything , has been
criticised by some philosophers. There are many places where Davidson propounds
his thesis-that the 'Principle of Charity' is 'not an option, but a condition.
149of having a workable theory' and that 'Charity is forced on us; whether we
150
like it or not, if we want to understand others...' For example , such a
Principle is elaborated as 'The basic claim is that much community of belief is
151needed to provide a basis for communication or understanding..•' wnich
echoes an earlier statement that 'we would have to assume a pattern of beliefs
and motives wnich agreed with our own to a degree sufficient to build a base
152
for understanding and interpreting dissagreements. ' Furthermore, such
'widespread agreement is the only possible background against which disputes
153and mistakes can be interpreted. ' , so that though 'we can make sense of
154
differences all right, but only against a background of shared belief* for
in Davidson's view , without such a vast common background of overlapping ,
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shared beliefs, 'tnere is no place for disputants to have their quarrel. '
Davidson thus maintains that 'what makes interpretation possible is the
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fact that we can dismiss a prior the chance of massive error. ' ' even
though, of course, we cannot assume that speakers never have false beliefs.
However, Davidson's blanket assumptions have been questioned by , for
example, Devitt1^  It is accepted that the interpreter's task is an explanation
of the (alien's ) verbal behaviour, and that we seek the 'best' explanation of 
this behaviour which is , indeed , likely to attribute to the alien speaker
many ueixtJis w h i c h  are nice our own. lex , lor jjevixt, .Davidson's .Principle of 
Charity is too strong, since the 'best' explanation of the alien's verbal 
behaviour is also likely to attribute many beliefs that are very different 
from ours. Devitt maintains that 'It is surely common for many of us to expect 
disagreement over vast areas of belief' in such areas as religion, or
politics. And, if this is so it would certainly seem to jeopardize Davidson's 
Principle.Devitt gives an example of a 'religious' alien,., whose behaviour , 
interpreted charitably by his own lights would not make sense , but which, 
interpreted uncharitably, apparently would. Perhaps, then, though Davidson's 
claim that there needs to be a widespread area of shared belief in order to
provide a basis for interpretation though plainly not wrong, is not as subtle
159or comprehensive as it needs to be. Other philosophers make similar points.
Such criticisms are also levelled against Davidson' associated 'Principle 
of Rationality';
making sense of the utterances and behaviour of others, even their most
aberrant behaviour, requires us to find a great deal of reason and truth
in them. To see too much unreason on the part of others is simply to under-
160
mine our ability to understand what it is they are so unreasonable about
In other words, we cannot take the alien speaker as having beliefs unless we 
also take him as being rational: not only must he have similar beliefs to us, but 
sucn beliefs must also be correct in a rational way. More generally, Davidson 
notes'the satisfaction of conditions of consistencey and rational coherence may 
be viewed as constitutive of tne range of applications of such concepts as those 
of belief, desire, intention and action,' and that t is 'constitutive
force in the realm of behaviour derives from the need to view others, nearly
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enouth, as like ourselves. ' since 'would have to impute a large degree
of consistency on pain of not making sense of what was said or done. '
Again, however, the criticism seems to be that -Davidson's is too strong to 
account for the subtleties and variations involved in the concept of human 
rationality. Devitt says teat though rationality is constitutive in so far as 
that to give a belief-desire explanation of a person's behaviour is surely to
make that behaviour rational in tne light of his beliefs and desires, but that 
people can be rational or irrational in various ways(and , presumably, in
various degrees), many beliefs about , for example, politics or sexual morality,
being irrational. So that althougn one hopes that tne views will be explicable, 
to explain them is not to mane them rational in the strong sense demanded by
Davidson. Devitt sees no reason to accept Davidson's version of the
Principle of Rationality which apparently demands that a person must have a 
unified set of beliefs with no inconsistencies in the total set, whereas most 
people maintain emotional and psychological equilibrium by going against such 
a Principle. Once more, therefore, though Davidson is obviously not wrong in his 
demand for rational explication- since plainly if an alien speaker were wholly 
unlike us in rationality and grip on the truth, it may be impossible to explain 
such a creature's behaviour- perhaps there can be subtleties and degrees of 
rationality (and irrationality) involved which Davidson's strong Principle 
would be hard pushed to explicate.
Such difficulties confronting Davidson's thesis of the Principle of Charity 
and the Principle of Rationality will become clearer in the next chapter, since 
they raise questions whicn concern the efficacy of the constraints Davidson 
imposes on the postulation of beliefs and desires in his reason-explanations 
of linguistic behaviour, and tne extent to which such explanations can be 
considered lawlike given such beliefs and desires.The point of the discussion in 
this section has been only to hint at the fact that,in the essential considera-
I
tion of a speaker's beliefs and desires in getting the 'right sort' of agreement’ 
for interpretation, though it is undoubtably correct that we must presuppose 
something like the background of common, sharable belief and desire;networks 
behind the use of language which Davidson's Principle of Charity demands, 
together with some degree of rationality suggested by his Principle of Ration­
ality, but it is not yet clear whether Davidson's constraints in this direction 
are adequate. The extent to which Davidson's truth conditions theory- as the 
foundational basis- is successful in seeking to capture the structurally- 
invariant features of such belief-desire-intention networks and in reconstruct - 
ing the psychological reality of speakers , is the concern of CHAPTER SEVEN.
To briefly go over the considerations of this chapter which will lead us 
into CHAFTER SEVEN, the ground covered is as follows. In interpreting linguistic 
behaviour, essential reference must be made to the psychological reality of 
a speaker in order to understand how such a speaker understands the use of his 
or her own words to refer to the world. Additional empirical constraints are 
needed in order to ensure that a truth conditions theory will provide an 
accurate manual of translation; maximizing agreement between the claims generat­
ed by the truth conditions theory and the claims of the alien speaker necessita­
ting reference to the intensional and intentional features of the psychological 
reality of the spekersr concerned. But how is reference to the essential 
propositional attitudes such as the ones expressed by ’A believes that p' or 
’A desires that p 1 , or intentions to be secured? For Davidson's truth condit­
ions theory abjures tne need for any reference to the kind of foundational, 
extra-linguistic, Fregean intensional abstract entities sucn as propositions (or 
of sentences), and furthermore rejects the need ,or the possibiility of any 
reference to extra-lingui3tic Gricean intentions. It is Davidson's contention 
that his truth conditions theory can suffice for a Theory of Sense and Understand 
ing by delineating the required kind of structure without tee need for such 
entities as Fregean propositions, and that, wnile tne kind of intentional 
structure propounded by Grice is indeed essential to understanding linguistic 
action, it cannot provide trie kind of foundational base demanded by Grice,despite 
the efforts of those such as Bennett or Lewis. Davidson thus eschews any dualism 
between his truth conditions theory of language and psychological reality; yet, 
even'soy the notion or concept of extra-linguistic beliefs and intentions 
does not give way entirely to the total conceptual primacy of language: what is 
demanded is that the concept of any structured, true beliefs(as tne elements of 
thought) or intentions is entirely parasitic upon the ’entering-wedge' of the 
kind of structure provided by sometning like the truth conditions theory of 
language. In this sense, the truth conditions theory of language becomes the new, 
foundational basis for capturing the invariant structural features common to tne 
belief-desire and intentional schemas wnich overlap between speakers. Yet it is
not clear tnat the constraints suggested by ^avidson'q Principle of Charity and 
of Rationality entirely adequate to gaining tne 'right sort of agreement.
CHAPTER SEVEN 
ONTOLOGY AND PSYGKOLOGICAL REALITY
7-1 The Truth Conditions Theory. Direct Description and Inventive Construction
So far it has been seen tnat it is only possible to interpret a speaker’s
utterances by assuming that the observed linguistic behaviour describes or
refers to any given situation in the world as tnat speaker believes it to be ,
and that other attitudes such as desires may be involved; furthermore, that tne
use of language by such a speaker to refer to tne world is a form of intentional
activity. Uttering words to refer to the world is thus an action by a speaker
which requires not only the theoretical reconstruction of what is referred to
on the part of tne interpreter, but also the attribution by the interpreter to
that speaker of a network of beliefs, desires and intentions.Ultimately what we
are seeking is a comprehensive theory of reference, intensional attitudes such
as beliefs and desires, and intentional action , all of which play a crucial
1
role in describing linguistic behaviour. -But,just as with tne issue of 
reference , since any extra-linguistic foundational base is rejected by Davidson, 
the direct description and inventive construction of the intensional and inten­
tional features now under consideration also takes place from within the truth 
conditions structure of language as the intersubjectively shared basis for 
reconstructing their invariant characteristics. Thus, for instance, sui generis 
abstract entities such as Fregean propositions, being impossible to identify or 
individuate, are rejected as providing the basis for construing what it is that 
two people who believe the same thing both believe,which receive an analysis 
from within the extensional truth conditions metalanguage - as would desires and 
the like, together with intentions. Such aspects of tne psychological reality of 
speakers - which we need to credit speakers with in order to satisfactorily 
account for the evidence of linguistic behaviour- thus become variables to
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postulations to satisfy the truth conditions structure of language. However, 
Davidson’s analysis involving extensional reference to such postulated entities 
and the construal of such 'reasons’ as the causes of intentional linguistic 
behaviour, has been rejected by some philosophers. They would deem reference to 
such causes as being every bit as mythical as the reference to the intensional 
objects which Davidson eschews. Nevertheless, it is argued here that reference 
to some such independent, antecedent 'reasons’ cannot be eliminated, even though 
Davidson’s delineation of the 'springs’ of linguistic action-though it suffices 
in many respects- is an ideal which.requires augmentation by richer concepts 
if we are to understand more fully a speaker's reasons for his or her 
intentional actions. What remains the case, however, is that for us, our 
reconstruction of such features of psychological reality behind linguistic 
actions is a part of our overall truth conditions theory explaining such 
behaviour.
In the last chapter it was seen that in order to describe the elements of 
the network of beliefs and other propositional attitudes underlying the intention 
al use of language in structure, true, terms, we must do so via something like 
Davidson's truth conditions theory and the structured,true, elements of 
language which such a theory describes (6*3). The general structural outline 
given by such a truth conditions theory of language is taken by Davidson to
directly describe or refer to the structural elements of such features of a 
speaker's'psychological reality, and is thus tied to the simultaneous postulation 
of the assumed objects such as beliefs needed to satisfy such a structure.
Hence, Davidson can maintain:’Each interpretation and attribution of attitude
is a move within a holistic theory, a theory necessarily governed by concern for
2
consistency and general coherence with the truth...' and 'we cannot intelli­
gibly attribute any propositional attitude to an agent §v.cept within the 
framework of a viable theory of his beliefs, desires, intentions,and decisions.1^  
Thus the possibility suggests itself of a theory which deals directly with the 
relations between linguistic actions, treating beliefs, desires, and intentions 
as theoretical constructs; such a theory of complex linguistic action having
emotions of an agent: trie relevant pattern of those features of a speaker's 
psychological reality such as beliefs, desires and intentions whicn, as indicat­
ed in CHAPTER SIX,(6*4) issue in linguistic actions. ^ Moreover, the holism 
of this mental realm means that we can make sense of one particular belief, for
example, only as it coheres witn 'other beliefs, with preferences, with inten-
5
tions, hopes , fears, expectations , and tne rest. ' in one vast network.
Enough has been said, then, to maKe clear that for Davidson, the attribution
of beliefs, desires and intentions necessary to any satisfactory explication of
linguistic action becomes tne study of the logical relations of language, their
analysis involving the determination of an ontology, and it is only because
such entities as beliefs or desires or intentions can play a useful part in the
overall construction of a unified theory about the psychological reality of
speakers as it is operative in issuing in linguistic action that they are to
be admitted as viable: independent objects of belief and the like as required by
Frege are of no interest to Davidson, since if they are needed, then they can 
£
be invented. Davidson summarizes this aspect of his philosophy of language 
by indicating that, if he is right, no embarrassing entities need be added to 
the world's furniture, his account needing only linguistic action itself, 
together with an ontology of propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires
and intentions. The reconstruction of psychological reality, of the beliefs, 
desires and intentions of speakers, is thus immanent within language, even 
though fop Davidson such descriptions directly describe such features as really 
existing and issueing infthe linguistic actions of speakers. The attribution 
of such postulated attitudes necessary to understanding a speaker's language, 
and which can involve the full range and subtlety of such psychological traits, 
can only be undertaken via tne structure of language, for as hinted at in 
CHAPTER SIX , the finer distinctions among beliefs, desires, intentions and the
like require . a cognitive structure as complex as that of language for their 
8
delineation. That such a complex system of psychological reality is opera­
tive in issuing in linguistic behaviour in terms of a causal nexus is made clear 
by such statements as '...in describing an action as performed with a certain^ 
intention, we have described it as an action witn a certain causal history.1
A closer examination or Davidson's tnesis snows how ne is committed to the 
idea of reference to propositional attitudes as real entities which must exist 
as the causes of intentional linguistic action. For Davidson, the distinguish­
ing mark of the mental is intentionality in the sense described by Brentano- 
that is, of being directed towards something in the world, 11 and intentionality 
is the distinguishing mark of actions themselves: 'A person is the agent of an
event if and only if there is a description of what he did tnat makes true a
12
sentence that says he did it intentionally . 1 And , as will be seen, a
full explication of intentional action requires reference to entities such as
13 <-beliefs, desires, and intentions, Davidson having changed his mind over
intentions being entities referred to in the course of various papers. Each of
these aspects will be discussed shortly , but the general picture is given when
Davidson says: 'we can explain why someone acted as he did by mentioning a
desire, value, purpose , goal, or aim the person had, and a belief connecting
14the desire with the action to be explained. ' Elsewhere , too, he says:
When a person acts with an intention, the following seems to be a true, if
rough and incomplete, description of what goes on: he sets a positive value
on some state of affairs (an end, or the performance by himself of an action.
satisfying certain conditions); he believes (or knows or perceives ) that
an action , of a kind ..open to him to perform, will promote or produce or
realize the valued state of affairs; and so he acts(that. is,he acts becauseo
15
■ his value or desire and his belief).
Expanding this basic idea by means of his ideas expressed in other papers,
Davidsonmaintains that ’Someone who acts with a certain intention acts for a
reason1 and that furthemore, 'he has something in mind that he wants to promote
or accomplish' — that is, some purpose. And, what is it to act for a
’reason1? Someone acting for a reason must have (primarily) a belief, together
with a complex network of other attitudes, wnich undoubtably will include a
desire; such complex states are what Davidson terms ’Primary Reasons’ :
a Primary Reason consisting of'a Pro—Attitde towards actions of a certan kind
18
and a belief 'that his action is of that kind. '
Hence,
Cl. R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under the
description d only if R consists of a pro attitude of the agent towards
actions with a certain property, and a belief of the agent that A, under
19the description c[ , has that property.
is a necessary condition for Frimary Reasons. Thus to interpret and explain
why someone acts intentionally, reference must be made to a belief, desire , and
possibly other attitdes behind such an agent’s intentional action, since, as
Davidson hints elswhere, it is logically impossible to perform an intentional
20action without such appropriate pro- attitudes.
But this it not enough. Reference to the beliefs and desires,which is
necessary to tell us an agent's reasons for acting intentionally, explain such
an agent's reasons for acting only if those propositional attitudes are
21
appropriately related to.the action of the agent. This is because ’we might
allow ...that a man can have a desire and believe an action will satisfy it,
22
and yet fail to act...' Therefore, 'it is only if the desire and belief
23
cause him to act that we can speak of an intentional action. * An
interpreter's understanding of (linguistic) action thus depends , on Davidson’s
view, on* being able to see tnat an appropriate belief and desire can explain, 
and be the reasons for, an intentional action only if they can be regarded as 
having caused it in a special way. ^  Hence, Davidson needs to augment
condition Cl above witn :
25
C2. A primary reason for an action is its cause.
Davidson gives an interesting illustration of tnis thesis in another paper where
he speaks of Hume's intentional act of admitting that he could not see how to 
reconcile two theses. Hume must have believed that he did not see how this
was possible, and he must have desired to reveal this fact; such a belief and
desire were thus somehow efficacious in tne making ol the intentional admission. 
Davidson then indicates how he wishes the force of this to be taken. Hume made 
the intentional act of admission because he had the desire and belief, and:
ii we interpret true "Decause" as implying ^among other things; a causal
relation- and I believe we must- then in describing an action as performed
with a certain intention, we have described it as an action with a certain 
27
causal history.
Thus, we have reached the point where we can say that, on Davidson's analysis, 
if an intentional action is done for a reason, then there must be rationalizing 
beliefs and desires ( in the sense that their propositional expression puts the 
intentional action in a favourable light, providing an account of the reasons 
the agent had in acting, and which allow the interpreter to reconstruct the 
intentional action) i
A can do x intentionally (under the description^^) means that if A
28
has desires and beliefs that rationalize x (under cl ), then A does x*
However, the presence of such beliefs and desires when the intentional action 
is done does not suffice to ensure that what is done is done with the appropr­
iate intention; we must add that the agent acted because of his reasons:this 
'because' implying for Davidson, the notion of cause:
If the agent does x intentionally, then his doing x is caused by his
29
attitudes that rationalize x.
i
This notion of acting intentionally because of a belief and a desire as being 
causal is crucial to Davidson's idea of how we,are to interpret intentional 
action; indeed, it is central to his thesis that the ordinary notion of cause 
applicable to scientific accounts of the world (see CHAPTER FIVE) is also central 
to the understanding of human intentional action, and thus, of course, to 
linguistic action. But, as will be seen in the next section (7*2), such a 
causal structure behind intentional action requiring reference to beliefs and 
desires as causes, together with Davidson's extensional construal of such 
beliefs and desires, is open to heavy criticism by some philosophers. Suffice it 
to say here that the right kind of causal chain is extremely difficult if not
impossible to specify : an agent might have the kind of beliefs and desires 
that would rationalize an action, they might cause him to perform it, and yet 
still the action would not be intentional since they may be further complica­
tions involving anomalous, wayward , or lunatic caual chains. The criticism of 
reference to beliefs and desires as involving such a causal structure will ,* 
however , be left here for the present. 50 ..it is part and parcel of David­
son's ideas on the relationship of the mental realm to materialism, singular
causal statements (see CHAPTER FIVE) and the degree to which strict scientific
31laws are applicable to the psychological causes of human intentional actions.
The important points of this part of the investigation is that , for Davidson,
to describe a (linguistic) action as intentional is to describe such an action
in the light of a special reference to real, particular beliefs, desires, and
perhaps other relevant attitudes of a particular person(and in a particular 
32
context. ) J Furthermore, it is to describe such intentional action as having
33been caused, in a special way, by those beliefs, desires and other attitdes.
But we have not quite finished witn investigating how Davidson wishes to 
construe intentional actions, for , as mentioned earlier , Davidson's opinions 
in this area altered somewhat with respect to intentions themselves as entities 
referred to in the course of explaining intentional actions. For , in his early 
papers, Davidson held that ’To know a primary reason why someone acted as he
34ded is to know an intention witn which the action was done', and that the 
intention with which the action was done does not refer to an entity or state 
of any kind. ^  According to Davidson, expressions such as ’The intention with 
which Jones went to church1 has the outward form of a description, but in fact 
is really syncategorematic, and cannot be taken to refer to an entity, disposi­
tion, or event ; its function is rather 'to generate new descriptions of actions
36
in terms of their reasons. 1 If Davidson had been right about this, then 
there are no such states or events such as intentions to which reference is made. 
As already seen, Davidson seemed to hold that statements like 'A did x inten­
tionally' were equivalent to corresponding statements affirming that the 
intentional action was caused by a certain kind of primary reason. Davidson, at
tnis time was clearly claiming that a statement like 'Jones went to church 
intentionally1 is true just in case tne intentional action wa3 caused by
a complex 01 oeiiei and a pro attitude 6Li.cn as desire, such pro attitudes bein? 
real mental states or dispositions to which reference is made , and which are 
something other than a state, or event of intending. Thus, there is , at this 
stage of Davidson's work, just no reference to intentions per se. ^
Yet surely Davidson's early views on this, and his syncategorematic approach 
to intentions was not very plausible. And certainly, Davidson could not use as 
an argument against the notion of reference to entities such as intentions the 
point of view that intensional locutions never really refer to events or states 
since, as seen , Davidson does accept reference to such entities as beliefs 
and desires. (See also 7*2) If, therefore, Davidson assumes that locutions such 
as 'John believes that his dog is immortal' , or 'Daphne desires lots of 
wealth* genuinely refer to events or states or dispositions, it seems difficult 
not to assume also that a statement like ’Jones intention in going to church* 
refers to a state or entity. Prima facie , there seems no more reason to deny 
that intentions are genuine mental states to which we refer that to deny that 
beliefs and desires ar real mental states or events or dispositions to which 
we refer. This is not yet to say that we are right to suppose that we must refer 
to to such entities in explicating intensional locutions: this is a matter for 
consideration in tne next section; it is only to say at present, that on David­
son's terms it is incongruous to deny reference to intentions whilst accepting 
that refe'rence to entities such as beliefs or desires are required. And there is 
evidence that would support sucn a thesis: for instance, in normal linguistic
usage it does seem that a person can be said to have an intention which he has
3 0
never acted upon , singular terms apparently denoting these intentions, and
which Davidson's early work fails to analyze adequately. Furthermore, as 
Austin notes, ^  the concept of intending is closely related to choosing and 
deciding, and both of tuese seem to apply to mental activities characteristically 
involved in processes of deliberation— an important issue which wiil be discuss­
ed in relation to Davidson's work in tne following pages(see particularly 7* 3) .
In processes of deciding wnat to do, for example, one is faced witn alternatives 
between which to choose; but tne decision to choose to do X, rather than Y, is, 
among other things , to form an intention fo doing X. And, if one does formulate 
such intentions in such cases, it would seem to be the case that one thus
lnxenas t o  a o  some b n m g  ,  j u b  u  e i s  o n e  o u i n e s  u u  u e x x e v t s  b u i u b  w t i t m  u u e  i i c t a
formed a belief. Consequently, if believeing, for example, is a genuine state of 
mind, as Davidson accepts, it would seem that intending to do something should
also be considered to be a genuine state of mind.
It would appear that Davidson has now recanteu on his early position and
accepts that this is so : in a fairly recent paper he recognizes that the
intention with which an intentional action is performed does refer to an entity
or state of some kind. ^  In developing the concept of pure intending ,
■Davidson comes to admit that his original concept of what it is to act with an
intention was inadequate . For his original postion led him to hope , with
respect to intentional action, that 'If someone digs a pit with the intention
of trapping a tiger, it is perhaps plausible that no entity at all, act, event,
or disposition, corresponds to the noun phrase, "The intention of trapping a
tiger"- . ..'^ Yet, with respect to pure intending, 'it is not likely that if
a man has the intention of trapping a tiger, his intention is not a state,
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disposition, or attitude of some sort. ' And, as Davidson concludes, it 
would be be quite incredible to suppose 'that this state or attitude(and the 
connected event or act of forming an intention ) 1 in respect of pure 
intending - and which was discussed above- 'should play no role in acting with 
an intention. ' ^  It would be unacceptable to suppose that the something 
referred to in pure intending were not also always present in cases of grasping 
intentional action. With pure intending, tnere is 'no room for doubt that
i
intending is a state or event separate from the intended action or the reasons 
that prompted the action. ' and 'Once the existence of pure intending is 
recognized, there is no reasaon not to allow that intention of exactly the same
44 • ^ x’
kind is also present when the intended action eventuates. ' Davidson tnus
makes it clear that , on his new analysis, the concept of the intention with
which an intentional action is performed does require reference to intentions
as genuine events or entities. Moreover, in discussing- Grice's contention that
intentions imply beliefs, Davidson maintains that , though there may be loose
connections, the thesis is not justified, since reasons for intending to do
something are generally very different from reasons for believing one will do 
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it. It therefore seems clear that Davidson now holds that a concept of
A ^
desires is required. ° It is further interesting that , in attempting .to
arrive at a suitable account of intending and of intentional action, Davidson
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finds it necessary to bring in the additional notion of judgement; this aspect, 
however, raises questions wnicn are connected with Davidson’s causal account of 
intentional action, and wnether his constraints are adequate to explicating 
such behaviour, and this matter is brought up later. (See
Summarizing the position so far,then, we can say tnat aon Davidson's analysis 
of intentional (linguistic) action, the following seems to be the case. Uttering 
words to refer to the world is an action the interpretation of which must 
include the attribution to the speaker of beliefs^in their action-guiding
A Q
capacity ) » desires, and intentions, the attribution of which occurrs in the 
form of a vast network from within his holistic truth conditions theory of 
language.’ It is thus a matter of the analysis of the logical relations of langu­
age together with the determination of an ontology- the direct description 
and at the same time the inventive construal of the entities concerned, (with, 
of course, no Fregean intensional objects or the like being admitted. ) The 
attribution of psychological reality is thus immanent within language, but also 
refers to the needed entities as real states, dispositions or events. Thus, such 
real entities as beliefs and desires must exist on Davidson’s analysis in order 
to satisfactorily explicate intentional linguistic action. Furthermore, such 
Primary Reasons behind intentional linguistic action must nave a causal structure 
tney must be deemed to have cayyed the linguistic action in a special way , 
(difficulties for this causal, lawlike delineation of intentional linguistic 
behaviour being one of the criticisms Davidson’s tnesis must circumvent). Also, 
on Davidson’s amended account , he now accepts that reference to intentions as 
real entities must also be made- not only to explain tne concept of pure intend­
ing ,but also intentional action. Thus, in sum, Davidson's thesis requires that 
the explication of intentional (linguistic ) action must involve reference to 
real entities such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, and that tais involves
the notion of a causal structure.
However, tne characterization of such reasoning behind intentional action
in terms of describing the logical relations between beliefs, desires and 
intentions, with reference to sucn entities possessing a causal structure , has 
been challenged on two accounts by philosophers. Davidson's extensional recon­
struction of the attribution of beliefs(and thus of otner attitudes ) replacing 
for example, Fregean propositions in determining wnat it is for two people to 
believe who botn believe tne same thing, and also tne notion of reference to 
reasons as causes , nave both been rejected by different philosophers. The 
examination of both t^ese aspects is the matter for discussion in the following 
scetion.
7*21 Davidson's Extensional Reconstructions a Myth ?
As seen in the last section, for Davidson, reference to real entities such as 
beliefs, desires and intentions is required, together with a causal structure. 
But is Davidson's proposal for the extensional reconstruction within the meta­
language of such entities he assumes must exist ana to which reference must be 
made satisfactory? Furtnermore, is Davidsoxx'3 notion of reference to reasons 
as causes in t e explication of intentional (linguistic) action necessary? 
Certain philosophers deny tnat Davidson's analysis of both aspects is adequate. 
In the first case, Davidson's reconstruction within the extensional metalanguage 
of the pro- attitudes attributed to a speaker, and wnich, for example , with 
beliefs,is designed to eliminate the need for any reference to Fregean proposit­
ions as the basis for construing what it is tnat two people wao believe the same 
thing both believe, is rejected by some philosophers as requiring the very type 
of semantic primitive in tue metalanguage which it ostensibly obviates. And, in 
the second case, the (extensional ) reference to reasons as causes is unaccept­
able for many philosophers who hold tnat the postulation of causes as an 
attempt to explain human agency must fail. Whether Davidson's truth condtions 
tneory can meet tnese crxticisms is what must now be considered, if it cannot, 
what are the alternatives suggested by other philosophers — and are their sugge­
stions viable? Perhaps tne problem is oest seen in terms oi exactly w..at con­
straints should be put on this aspect of Davidson's enterprise ;if so, what are 
"tqe consequences for Davidson's extensional account and scientific realism?
propositional attitudes necessary to understanding intentional linguistic action
requires the quantification over something- reference to certain entities the
/a
precise nature of which will be made clear presently. y Some philosophers,
however, regard reference to the kind of entities Davidson assumes to be necess ~
ary in explicating the features of intensional discourse as , at the least,
problematic, failing perhaps to avoid the kind of non-extensional metalanguage
wnich his proposals are designed to obviate.
The manner in which Davidson proposes that we should attribute attitudes
such as beliefs or desires is given by his explanation of indirect discourse in
general * a‘ paratactic analysis which ostensibly avoids the difficulties
incurred by accounts requiring reference to Fregean abstract intensional objects,
and which unlike proposals sucn as those needing reference to sentences, Davidson
believes will allow what follows the 'that* clause to be treated as a sentence
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with significant1 structure which his truth conditions theory can exploit.
(See CHAPTER SIX, section 6*2). We saw that Fregean propositions as abstract 
entities were introduced, in part, to stand for the ’thing1 w.iich two people 
who both believe the same thing both believe; Davidson’s 'reversal of Frege’ 
in the matter of attitude attribution hopefully eliminating any extra-linguistic 
reference to propositions as standing for what two people might be said to , 
for example, believe, in favour of extensionally reconstructed beliefs on the 
basis of the truth conditions structure of languaage alone. This aspect of 
Davidson'^, philosophy of language is , of course, crucial to his overall plans, 
to providing an extensional account of tne whole of natural- language : 'Of 
course my project does require that all sentences of natural languages can be 
handled by a T-tneory, and so if the intensional idioms resist such treatment, 
my plan has foundered. ' Yet, as Davidson in tnis same paper admitts— and as 
was suggested in CHAPTER FIVE (5*3) - it is not clear tnat a theory of truth 
satisfying Convention T cannot allow an intensional semantics; indeed, it seems « 
to be the case that the very severe constraints which Davidson places on 
Convention T are not necessary. Thus,the argument here is tnat , even if certain
philosophers are correct in tneir criticisms of this aspect oi Davidson’s theory, 
it need not mean that tne trucn conditions account itself must be abandoned.
al locutions such aj 'A said tnat p' - and by implication the analysis of the
attribution of oeliefs and other propositional attitudes are mainly given in
one paper, but also appera in vaiou3 other places. J As Davidson notes, in such
cases of Oratio obliqua , tne relation between trutn and logical consequence
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seems to break down. The truth-value of , for example, ‘Galileo said that
the earth moves', does not depend in any direct way on the truth -value of 'the
earth moves'; furtnermore, there is a failure of substitutivity, since, from a
sentence such as 'John said that tne moon is round' and where 'The moon equals
the sole planet of the earth', one cannot infer 'John said that the sole planet
of the earth is round. ' The first step, Davidson urges, in explicating such
*1
intensional discourse, should be to parse a sentence sucn as 'Galileo said that 
the earth moves' as:
Galileo said that.
The earth moves.
Davidson's paratactic analysis for tne logical form of attributing pro-attitudes 
tnus takes the form of two utterances paratactically joined:
sentences in indirect discourse...consist of an expression referring to 
a speaker, the two-place predicate,,said" , and a demonstrative referring 
to an utterance, period. What follows gives the content of the subject’s 
saying, but has no logical or semantic connexion with tne original
54attribution of a saying.
Obviously, the full logical form proposal must assign structure to each of the 
sentences involved in this paratactic analysis. For the first sentence, attribu­
ting a saying to a speaker, it will be determined by Davidson'g proposal for 
dealing with action sentences- since uttering a sentence is an action. In the 
case of the second sentence, what Davidson terras t.:e 'content' sentence, it 
is determined by Davidson's truth conditions theory for ti.at kind ol sentence. 
There are certainly unresolved difficulties over Davidson's logicl form proposal
nowever, the issue to oe concentrated upon here from Davidson's overall proposal
that we should treat 'said' as a two-place predicate, taking as arguments
expressions referring to speakers, a demonstrative 'that' referring to an
utterance, and witn no logical or simantical connection between the two sentences
concerned, is the additional requirement of samesaying- for it is here that the
feature of semantic primitives manifests itself.^
The matter of samesaying- has to be brought in because of tne following. In
'Galileo said that the earth moves' Galileo is obviously attributed with saying
something which the formal representation Davidson gives is meant to recapture;
but it is. unlikely Galileo uttered that very sentence- for one tning Galileo
probably did not speak English . We must add, then, the requirement that Galileo
and I are samesayers : 'when I say that Galileo said that the earth moves, I
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represent Galileo and myself as samesayers. 1 That is, there -was an 
utterance of Galileo's that has the same import as my utterance does here 
and now. Thus :
The earth moves.
(Exl)(Galileo's utterance x and my last utterance maxe us samesayers).
And, since utterances are actions, and hence events, we can quantify over them.
Davidson's explication of indidrect discourse involving 'A said that p'
thus relates an agent or speaker to utterances. Similarly, by analogy, all
propositional attitude constructions such as 'A believes tnat p' , 'A desires
1
that p 1 and tn like will receive a similar treatment, since Davidson thinks that
57these constructions all involve concealed demonstratives. 'A believes that'p'
is again fully captured by the relation oi tne a^ent to an utterance.
Davidson's account is problematic: there is still the question of explica­
ting the notion of 'samesaying' . For, on the paratactic approach to an utterance 
such as 'Galileo said that the earth moves', the first utterance('Galileo said
that') is true if and only if an utterance of Galileo's was the same in content
(that is , it translates) tne utterance to which the'that' refers('the earth 
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moves';.-' But it is clear that Davidson's proposal , requiring as it does that
Galileo's utterance has ti.e same import, or the same content , as my utterance
59that this is indeed so. he appears quite happy to account for the fact that 
there is something1 said (or believed, etcetera ) wnich makes Galileo and I 
samesayers in terms of synonymy, But surely, if this is so, then Davidson’s 
account requires a semantic primitive of samesaying in the metalanguage, and in 
this case, tne metalanguage will not be purely extensional - and this, as seen 
at the beginning of tnis section, is the very aim of Davidson’s programme. 
Davidson insists that his truth conditions theory be given in terms of an 
absolute definition of truth which uses no semantic primitives. '(See PART l).
What price , then, Davidson’s non-Fregean semantics, in view of this methodo­
logically disquieting feature? Davidson’s answer to this criticism is that the 
appeal to samesaying and synonymy is admissible because localized:
We are indeed asked to make sense of a judgement of synonymy between 
utterances, but not as the foundation of a theory of language, merely 
as an unanalysed part of the content of the faimiliar idiom of indirect 
discourse. ^
Yet is Davidson’s claim really justified? Davidson appears unconcerned about
his move, and does not regard it as bringing back all the old headaches about
synonymy? he regards his general account as appealing only to the Tarskian truth
conditions theory, even though the specific account of ’says that’ does require
samesaying as a semantic primitive •
Furthermore- and this is related to the issue of understanding discussed in
CHAPTER SIX (6«22J- Davidson argues elsewhere that that tne notion of the
sameness of content between utterances required above need not threaten his
overall truth conditions theory since the concept of synonymy itself is concealed
6l
within the idea of a Tarski-scyle truth conditions theory.of translation.
Davidson, in replying to Foster's point that apparently 1 no T-theory can give
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a satisfactory semantics for sentences tnat attribute attitudes...' , and
that intensional notions sucn as 'states’ would need to be invoked , seems to
want to make it clear, among other tiling's, that he believes that his truth 
conditions theory of radical interpretation, if it succeeds, already gives the
Notwithstanding wnat Davidson maintains, it cannot be denied tnat many other
philosophers have regarded Davidson’s moves in this area as wholly inadequate-
and even as a form of cheating.^imon Blackburn, for example, rejects Davidson’s
theory of propositional attitudes as unsatisfactory. Blackburn maintains 'of any
utterance I now make it will be possible that X' (that is, Galileo) 'should have
said that the earth moved and not samesaid that- since the utterance might have
failed to mean what X said. ' j he concludes, ’the only natural solution is to
take the demonstrative to refer to the thought or proposition X in fact
expressed’, and tnat this means that 'propositions are brought in by the back 
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door. ' J Similarly, McFetridge. holds that Davidson* proposal involves
6 a
'Propositions in tne minimal sense. They are utterances. '
The most that can be said at this present stage of research, then, is that 
there is still considerable controversy/ about whether Davidson's semantic 
primitives in the extensional metalanguage can be considered 'local' as Davidson 
says, and whether his required samesaying and synonymy proposals threaten his 
overall extensional account of sentences which attribute attitudes such as 
beliefs or desires. Certainly it 3eems that insofar as Davidson fails to provide 
us with any axioms or conditions for the employment of the samesaying relation he 
demands, his theory remains, to tnat extent, undeveloped.
But there is a further issue, one that touches on what was mentioned in 
CHAPTER FIVE ( 5*3) and which will again arise in the next part of this present 
chapter: the very constraints wnich Davidson places on his truth conditions 
theory. As mentioned in C..AFTER FIVE, it does not appear that the the constrain­
ts Davidson originally assumed to be a requirement of Convention T are in fact 
necessary ; indeed, it is not even a requirement of tne kind of particularist 
theory Davidson espouses that it must have an extensionalist semantics. If it 
transpires, therefore, that Davidson’s austere ’ideal* constraints cannot 
satisfactorily accommodate indirect discourse locutions and sentences attribu— 
ing propositional attitudes, there are wider possibilities for suitable theories 
dealing witn t^ese aspects whicn do not appeal to intensional oDjects such as 
propositions, and wnich remain within tne constraints on a truth conditions
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theory demanded by Convention T.
7*22 The Logical Connection Argument and Unavoidable Reference
In the last section, Davidson’s extensional programme for sentences attributing 
propositional attitudes such as belief or desire was considered, and it was seen 
that Davidson's proposals here must still be regarded as extremely problematic. 
However, to return now to the other issue directly concerning intentional 
linguistic action mentioned in 7«1 ,it was stated there that,on Davidson's 
thesis, the explanation of such linguistic action as it is used to refer to the 
world requires not only reference to postulated entities r beliefs, desires, 
and intentions; it also required tnat the primary reasons said to rationalize 
an action be deemed to cause (in the ordinary scientific sense) that action in 
a very special way. But this notion of reference to reasons as causes is 
utterly rejected by some philosophers of neo-Wittgenstinean persuasion */ho hold 
that the explanation of human intentional actions entirely eludes the ho.tion.of 
scientific cause.;, afforded to physical things: the logical connection argument 
ensues and with it reference to beliefs and desires as the causes of intentional 
linguistic action is ostensibly eliminated. Nevertheless, other philosophers 
still maintain that it is in fact impossible to eliminate reference to reasons 
as causes, even though Davidson's criteria for acting on such reasons are 
unacceptable. 'Thus the questions asked here deal with whether it is possible to 
avoid reference to reasons as causes, and whether, if Davidson'9 criteria for 
intentional action are not satisfactory, what alternatives are suggested. Answers 
to these problems will take us into the final assessment of Davidson's truth
conditions theory and scientific realism as it pertains to psychological real -
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lty.
Earlier in this chapter (7*1) it was shwon how Davidson explicates intention­
al (linguistic) action in terms of primary reasons consisting of pro-attitudes 
such as beliefs and desires; according to this account, the reasons which ration­
alize the action are the reasons which have caused that action. Thus, in discuss- 
int Hume, Davidson says that someone who is proud, or states that ne is proud
always has his reasons which are the cause of such an action , and which will 
rationalize it: giving tne beliefs and other pro-attitudes on which tne pride
is based explains tne pride by providing a causal explanation; and giving a full
description(in logical terms ) is all tnat is needed to reconstruct the agent*s 
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reasons* For Davidson, tuen, reference to real entities such as beliefs,
and desires as the causes (in tne ordinary scientific sense) of action- and also 
to intentions - must be made. For an agent to act in a certain way, the agent 
must have such reasons for acting in that way, and must also act in that way 
because of such reasons; if Davidson is correct, then knowled0e of an agent*s 
reasons for acting involves knowledge of mental causation, or, as Davidson puts 
it, the * because * must have causal force.
But, must this' 'because* be a causal because- and, if not, what- is it exact - 
ly? For many philosophers hold that reference to reasons such as beliefs , 
desires , and the like as the causes of intentional (linguistic ) action is 
wholly misplaced, that it is not a requiremnt of the logical description of 
actions that such things are said to exist as their causes. Are such philoso­
phers correct, and if so, what other proposals do they have for explaining the 
relationship between (linguistic ) action and the beliefs, desires and intentions 
of agents or speakers?
The *tradition* wnich would reject Davidson's causal thesis is, of course,
that of the *neo-Wittgensteineans1 and which sees the purposeful, goal-orientated
actions of human beings as of a completely different order to that of the
material events which science explicates (on some views) in terms of cause and
effect. (See CHAPTER FIVE). Such views which envisage a sharp and unbridgeable
gap between human action and the events of the physical world, if it were true,
would naturally put paid to any hopes of a materialist account of human action,
and of explaining the relationship between the psychological reality of
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speakers and their (linguistic ) actions in completely causal terms. The 
neo—Wittgensteineans thus see man and human action as in some way eluding the 
kind of causal network in which physical things may be emeshed, the scientific, 
Humean causal explanations not being applicable to human reality in the way 
that the world of material things is said to be susceptable to scientific 
explication. Human behaviour is deemed to fall under a set of concepts which 
are not causal, and which are wholly inconsistent with causal explanations. To 
show this- that explanation of human behaviour in terms of , say, beliefs and
desires is not causal, it is maintained that such pro-attitudes,as causes, are 
non-contingently connected with their manifestatiox. in (linguistic ) behaviour, 
and that the reasons for action are not amenable to explanation by reference to 
causes;
Desires, tryings, intentions, and tne like, serve no better than volitions
as the causes of actions- and for precisely the same reason- namely, that
it is impossible^ as it is in the case of any known instance of a real
causal connection, even to begin to say what these events are without
69describing them in terms of their alleged effects.
Thus, Richard Taylor puts forward the standard neo-Wittgensteinean view and the 
animadversion on the notion of reference to reasons as causes. On Taylor's view, 
intentional actions have no mental events as their causes and to which any 
reference must be made, if sucx* causes are postulated in an attempt to explain 
agency, they must fail in this attempt. Taylor's thesis questions both of the 
assumptions made by Davidson which were mentioned earlier- that the notion of 
'because' is a causal one, and that beliefs and desires and the like as causes 
must exist in order that reference can be made to them in explicating actions. 
Though ordinary locutions used for explaining human action may look like express­
ions of causality (Davidson's 'because') , Taylor holds tnat this is wrong. In 
an example which is directly relevant to tne issue of causality, and so will be 
quoted in'some detail, Taylor notes,firstly, tnat supposing’ that tnere is a man
who goes to the pantry, and tnat this is correctly explained by saying, for
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instance, tnat he did tnis because he desired some salami. The word
'because' in such statements indeed seems to suggest that an agent's desires,
say, were the cause of his action; but Taylor maintains that explanations of this
sort which grammaticily seem to assign causes to intentional actions, really
assign reasons which are 'wholly different in kind from causes', and tnat to
'assimulate them to causes is simply to distort them and to create an entirely
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misleading conception of human agency.' Taylor then gives two sets oi
statements to illustrate tne contrast between the ordinary notion of causal 
connection and tnat of intentional action:
I. Jones fell from the stool because ne slipped,
Jones fell from the stool because he was pushed,
Jones fell from the stool because it collapsed,
II. Jones went to tne pantry because ne wanteu salami,
Jones went to the pantry because ne wished for some salami,
Jones went to the pantry because he desired salarni, ....
Both of tne sets contain statements w..ich are grammatically similar, expressing
a relationship between events conveyed by the word because. And, since the
relation in tne first set is obviously that of causation, it seems reasonable
to suppose the relationship in the second set is also one of cause and effect.
However, the statements in tne second set are, maintains Taylor, in an ordinary
context, equivalent: 'Under ordinary circumstances one could not insist that one
72
was true but anotner false. 1 But tne statements in the first set do not all
say essentially tne same thing: correctly explaining a man's fall as the result
of slipping is far from equivalent to explaining it by his being pushed. 'The
truth of any of the statements in the first set would ordinarily (though not
73necessarily) exclude the others...' Thus, for Taylor, the second set does
not, unlike the first set, constitute a variety of causal explanations for an 
event; rather, it is a variety of ways of giving one and the same explanation, 
without directly,or even tacitly, mentioning any causes at all: 'It gives no
causal explanation whatsoever. ' ^  Furthermore, the statements of this second
(v.
set are entirely equivalent to:
III. Jones went to tne pantry in order to get some salami,
Jones went to :;tne pantry for tne purpose of getting salami, ...
and such statements do not even bear any resemblance to causal explanations,no 
causes being alluded to whatsoever.Why then, Taylor asks, should anyone want to 
hold that tney really mean that some state of desire (or tne like) caused Jones 
to behave as he did? Taylor concludes tnat the only reason seems to be the
attempt to force tne explanations of such expressions into an overall causal 
theory. Certainly, of course, this is Davidson's aim as stated at the outset.
On the other hand, the statements of the first set, which are explanations in 
terms of causes, do not lend themselves to teleological locutions. Finally,
Taylor compares tne teleological statements of set three with setfour:
IV. Jones went to the pantry for some salami,
Jones went to the pantry for some cheese, ...
Such statements, like those in the first set, but not like those of set two, 
are not alternative ways of saying essentially the same thing, the truth of any 
of them being consistent with the falsity of th~ others , and would ordinarily, 
(though not necessarily) exclude the others as explanations of the agent's 
actions. Yet the differences expressed by the various statements is not a differ­
ence of causes , since no causes are in any way referred to: the differences are 
differences of ends, differences in the possible states of affairs following
upon the action which would or would not constitute tne attainment of the
75purpose in question. '
In summary, then, in set one we have several causes and evidently no end at 
all, while in tne second set there are several ends, and evidently no causes; 
and, the statements of set two, being equivalent to those of set three, explain
t
the agent's action by citing his reason for'acting in terms of his ends or goals
or purposes# and say what the agent was aiming or intending to accomplish,with
7 6
no reference to causes at all. ‘■Phis, as Taylor notes, does not entail that 
there were no causes of the actions, but only tnat the linguistic explanations 
itself gives no hint of it; they suggest nothing- even if there were anything - 
made the agent act as he did. Thus, the truth of such statements is consistent 
with denying them causal explanations . The statements themselves in no way 
suggest that any reference to reasons such as desires must be made in order to 
give a causal expianationof tne agent’s actions , and an explanation in terms of 
intention or aim of tne agent, tne purpose or goal he was trying to realize, is
all that is needed. Whereas,as we saw, for Davidson, reference to reasons like 
beliefs or desires as causes must be made in order to explain an agent’s actions 
( 'Central to tne relation between a reason and an action it explains is tne 
idea tnat the agent performed the action because he had the reason' ^  
for Taylor, the teleological account provides tne real explanation of actions, 
an account whicn is different in kind from , and does not presuppose,any causal 
account Explanations of such actions , on 1‘aylor'g account , simply does not 
require any reference to reasons as causes, as it does for Davidson; for him, 
explanation is given entirely in terms of the linguistic statements themselves.
Some time has been given to Richard Taylor's neo-Wittgensteinean point of
view since it seems to encapsulate very clearly the ideas shared by many other
philosophers' who, in tne last decade or so have emphasized a sharp dichotomy
between explanations in terms of scientific causes and explanations of human
behaviour in terms of purposes and intentions; the issue is plainly crucial for
philosphers like Davidson , for whom the notion of scientific cause is central
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to explaining human behaviour as well as that of physical objects. On 
teleological accounts such as tne one outlined above, the reasons assigned to 
explaining the actions of human beings is not just different in degree, but 
wholly different in kind from the causal explanations of the natural world, and 
to asimuiate the former to explanations in terns of causes is simply to distort 
and to create an entirely misleading conception of human agency.The correct 
explanation demanded of hu^an behaviour on such views is a representation of 
that behaviour as the means to some end: we are asking for some indication of 
the purposes, goals or intended result.
Like Richard Taylor , other philosophers have claimed similar arguments in 
hoping to justify the sharp distinction between explanations in terms of reasons 
and motives and causal explanations. For example , Kenny has claimed tnat the 
relation of an attitude or emotion to its object is a non-contingent and thus
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necessary one, and that tnereiore it cannot be causal; in particular,
Kenny's claim is that an emotion is non-contingently connected to its 
manifestation in (linguistic) behaviour, and thus the relation cannot be causal. 
Moreover, his animus is directed against tne possibility of any causal
account in this area. Kenny's thesis is initially directed against traditional
theores of the emotions, ti.ose of Descartes, Locke and Hume, and he tiien goes on
to distinguish emotions from other feelings such as bodily sensations by virtue
of the fact, apropo Brentano, tnat tne former are essentially directed towards
objects, making a radical distinction between the intentional objects of mental
states and the objects of physical actions. Hence, Kenny wants to claim that
there is a total distinction between tne object of an emotion and its cause: he
thinks that the objects of emotions and causes of emotions form two mutually 
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exclusive classes. Yet tne point of relevance for us here is that Kenny's 
requirement tnat there be a sharp dichotomy between a causal account and that of 
reasons can be ,and will be, questioned. As with Taylor, the invective against 
any attempt to completely reduce explanations of human, intentional,behavior 
to causal explanations is indeed laudable ; but this is not sufficieht reason 
in itself to show tnat tne notion of cause has no part to play, or tnat the 
dichotomy between reasons and causes is as radical as these philosophers would 
like to maintain.
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This line of approach is the one we find in Daviason(and also in Pears )• 
In particular, Davidson's arguments are directed against Melden's criticisms of 
the causal account, which relate closely to those of Taylor and Kenny mentioned 
above. Taylor, it will be recalled, maintained that there is no way of connecting 
human action with beliefs and desires except by representing such actions as a 
means to the attainment of the object of those beliefs a^d desires; any causal
I
solution is otiose and tne connection is, he would haveit, only logical and
on
semantical. This is the central feature of Melden'g argument against the
causal view, tne heart of which is his development of the logical connection 
argument. Melden's logical connection argument claims that reasons are 
logically connected with the actions they explain,and, since causes and their 
effects must be logically independent , reasons cannot be causes. As with 
Taylor and Kenny, to suppose tnat the motive for human action is a cause is
wrong :
As the alleged cause of the action, it cannot serve further to characterize
tne action. As motive it must- ror it tells us wnat in fact tne person 
was doing. It informs us, qua motive, that the action of raising the arm 
was in fact the action of giving information to others to the effect that 
the driver was preparing to make a turn. Now this...is in effect to make 
it clear that the action of raising the arm was indeed the action of 
signalling. In short, citing the motive was giving a fuller characteriz­
ation of the action; it was indeed providing a better understanding of 
what the driver was doing. ^
Melden's claim, then, is that a cause and its effect must be distinct and 
logically independent, but motives need not be; and, in the case of actions for 
which there is a motive , there is no prior mental event: there is nothing other 
than the action itself. Hence, tne motive must be a part of the action , rather 
than anything antecedent to the action. And, as with Taylor, Melden suggests 
that to give tne motive i£ to say what the agent's intention is in so acting; 
it is not about an intention which had been previously formed, but is about the 
action itself. Thus, the intention cannot be separated from the action- to 
describe the one is to describe the other. Precisely the same kind of argument is 
used by Melden in relation to propositional attitudes such as desires: desires, 
wants, and the like are also, for Melden, logically connected with the related 
actions. They cannot be characterized without reference to their objects- to 
desire or want something entails doing the action for which one has such 
reasons. In summary, for Melden, neither intentions, nor pro-attitudes such 
as desires can be separated from Motions, and to describe the action is actually 
to describe the intentions and pro-attitudes concerned. Thus the intentions and 
pro—attitudes are logically coiinected with the action. This is in direct agree­
ment with what we learned from Richard Taylor and Kenny, and in contradistinct­
ion to Davidson's claim that we must refer to reasons such as beliefs and 
desires behind the (linguistic) actions of an intentional nature since they
in fact caused such actions.
Melden's argument that intentions and pro-attitudes like desires are not 
states or events which are in any antecedent to or independent of the (linguistic) 
actions they explain but are rather completely internal to tne actions themsevles
Jias a rurtner important consequence, neiaen maintains tnat m  explaining an 
action an interpreter is making clear what is being done, tnat one ’reveals an 
order or pattern in tne proceedings which had not been apparent’. ^  It is a 
’what’ explanation, concerned with showing what order is present, what something 
is, rather than being a ’why’ explanation concerned with showing why an action 
came about as the result of antecedent factors dealing with its origin - the 
paradigm of which is the causal explanation of physical happenings. Thus, whether 
with an action, an event , or the explanation of a poem, a ’what’ explanation 
would be in terms of the pattern as redescribed, and not in terms of what caused 
it. This aspect,too, is obviously crucial to this part of the thesis, since 
Melden’s notion suggests that in teleological explanations we are concerned with 
’revealing the pattern', or redescribing it, and ought not to be concerned with 
referring to antecedent or separate causes such as beliefs, desires and intentions 
For again, Davidson's position, as our discussion has already shown, is that 
the explanation of intentional human(linguistic ) action in fact involves both 
the 'what' explanation and the 'why' explantion , since with respect to the former 
his truth conditions theory is certainly concerned with revealing the pattern in 
linguistic actions (See PART l) whilst also holding that, with respect to the 
latter, we must refer to real entities such as beliefs, desires and intentions
QS
as the extra-linguistic causes of linguistic action, and of behaviour in general. 
(See CHAPTER SEVEN section one. ) The crucial questions to be answered next, 
then, are whether explanations of actions are, as Melden says, only dealing with 
the notion, of 'revealing the pattern' , together with the related issue raised 
by Melden and like-uinded philosophers such as Richard Taylor and Kenny as to 
whether reference to reasons as causes is indeed otiose.
We have already seen that it is tne very notion of Davidson’s causal 'because' 
wnich was called into question by the teleological accounts of human action 
propounded by philosophers of a neo—Wittgenseinean persuasion. Certainly, tnere 
are, as will be seen, grave difficulties in maintaining a wholly causal account 
of intentional actions; but need the ensuing difficulties preclude the notion of 
cause entirely? Plainly, Davidson t:links not:
Noting that nonteleological causal explanations do not display the
element of justification provided by reasons, some pnnosopners nave 
concluded that the concept of cause that applies elsewhere cannot apply 
to the relation between reasons and actions, and that the pattern of 
justification provides, in the case of reasons, the required explanation.
But suppose we grant that reasons alone justify actions in the course of 
explaining them ; it does not follow tnat the explanation is not also- and 
necessarily - causal. ^
Davidson goes on to note, vide the discussion above, the distinction between
Melden's explanation in terms of revealing pattern ('what1 explanations) and
explanation in terms of causes('why' explanations), and accepts that Melden's
'pattern of justification' argument indeed provides insight into how we are to
explicate human action; what Davidson will not accept , however, is Melden's •
claim that causal explanations are ' "wholly irrelevant to the understanding we
88
seek" of human action. ' Explanations wholly in terms of the pattern of
justification means for Davidson that something essential is being left out, and
that the 'notion of justification becomes as dark as the notion of reason until
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we can account for the force of that "because".' But this , of course, is the 
very essence of the problem: whether the 'because' can be given the kind of 
causal force which at this stage of his work he assumed it could . Just how prob­
lematic the notion of cause as applied to human intentional actions can be must 
now be shown.
If reasons are causes, then a belief and desire which constitute a reason 
must cause the action they explain. One of the major difficulties in tne way of 
any causal connection between reasons such as beliefs and desires and (linguistic) 
actions is the seeming impossibility of connecting up the actions or behaviour 
with that attitudes in any straightforward way which will do justice both to 
the complete freedom which it is commonly felt that tne intentional action of 
human beings possesses with the sense of determinacy wnich a causal explanation
seems to indicate.Thus Austin's contention that being free to perform an action
cannot be a causal power at all, and hence that a causal theory of human action 
90must be false. As will be seen, the possibilities of giving necessary and 
sufficient conditions for intentionally acting on a reason, or of delineating
strict scientific laws connecting sucn reasons with actions seems remote indeed; 
but it is unclear tnat this entails that freedom to perform an intentional action 
cannot be a causal power at all. Nevertheless, as Davidson comes to admit, trying 
to distinguish when intentional actions must be caused by certain beliefs and 
desires is an almost impossible task. The attempt to provide necessary and 
sufficient conditions for intentional action must confront the problem that rad­
ically different propensities to behave may issue from similar beliefs and 
desires. We can, for instance, have two actions, one of which is intentional and 
the other of which is unintentional, both of which result from similar beliefs
and desires. This is clearly seen by what Davidson says. First he states that
'The only hope for the causal analysis is to find states or events which are
91causal conditions of intentional actions, ' and that 'The most eligible such
states or events are the beliefs and desires of an agent tnat rationalize an
action, in the sense that their propositional expressions put the action in a
favourable light, provide an account of the reasons tne agent had in acting, and
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allow us to reconstruct the intention with which he acted. * But then
Davidson goes on to aamitt that 'Beliefs and desires that would rationalize an 
action if they caused it in tne right way- through a course of practical reason­
ing, as we might try saying- may cause it in other ways. If so, the action was 
not performed with the intention that we could have read off from the attitudes 
that caused it. ' ^  Davidson uses the following example to make the point clear:
A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding
another man on a rope, and he might know tnat by loosening his hold on
the rope he could rid himself of tne weight and danger. This belief and
want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it
might be tne case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do it 
94intentionally.
Now if Davidson wishes to maintain his causal thesis of holding that beliefs 
and desires are tne causes of intentional action, he must find a way oi distin­
guishing between intentional and unintentional actions-all of which result from 
similar beliefs and desires. Davidson, however, freely admitts that he has not
yet louna sucn a way : '/mat 1 uespair ox spelling out is tiie way in which 
attitudes must cause actions if they are to rationalize the action.
And the problems of providing necessary and sufficient conditions for acting 
on a reason are only beginning-. An analysis of freedom to act that makes it a 
causal power must stand or fall, according to Davidson, together with a law 
giving the conditions under wnich agents perform intentional actions. ^  Yet the 
attempts which have been made to date to give such a lawlike account of human 
action all seem to have failed. One notable attempt to give a scientific and 
lawful delineation of human action is Hempel’s schema for explaining why a person
97X did a certain action:
I. X  was in a situation of type C
II.X was a rational agent
III.;in .a situation of type C, any rational agent will do f.
IV. Therefore X did f.
The key notion for Hempel is that of a rational agentiThis he says must be 
conceived of as 'a descriptive-psychological concept governed by objective criter­
ia of application' ; furthermore, it is 'a broadly dispositional trait: to say of 
someone that he is a rational agent is to attribute to him, by implication a
complex bundle of dispositions, each of them a tendency to behave in characterist-
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ic ways in certain kinds of situations...1
What is important about the above points is that statements (ll) and (ill)
of Hempel’S schma seem to presuppose that there is one and only one notion of
a ’rational agent’, ahd that this is the same for any agent and all kinds of
human action. In another publication, Hempel makes this even clearer, indicating
tnat references to motivating reasons ’provide explanatory grounds for the
resulting actions only on the assumption that people motivated by such and such
reasons will generally act, or will tend to act , in certain characteristic 
99ways.’
Hempel’s hope of introducing laws of such generality and which will say 
something about what all people will do under certain conditions now seems 
hopelessly optimistic. And, unless it can be shown in an objectively determinable 
way wnen people will and when they will not act on their reasons it is difficult
to see a place for laws tnat could be used in reason explanations. Hart and Honors 
for example, in what seems to be accepted by philosophers as one of the most 
important discussions of the relationship between causes and human action in the 
realm of jurisprudence, claim tnat though tne ordinary scientific causal explana­
tions involve laws, but rationalizations do not: ,rJ?he statement that one person 
did something because, for example, another threatened him, carries no implication 
or covert assertion that if the circumstances were repeated the same action would 
follow. ' The status of laws in the explanation of human behaviour is indeed
important, since if human action differs radically in this respect from ordinary 
causal explanations, it would seem to be more ammunition for backing the views 
espoused by those philosophers like Taylor, Kenny and Melden discussed earlier. 
Richard Taylor, for example, specifically says that he , echoing Hart and Honors, 
does not believe there can ever be general scientific laws for human behaviour^^ 
On this issue Davidson would agree, for he says’generalizations connecting
reasons and actions are not- and cannot be snarpened into- the kind of law on the
102basis of which accurate predictions can reliably be made. ' Even though
Davidson holds that the notion of causal connections is invoked in both scientific
accounts of the world and in teleological explanations, he does accept that it is
not possible to hold that there can be any strict scientific laws covering the
teleological explanation of actions. Though we can say that it is logically
impossible* to perform an intentional action without some appropriate belief and
desire , the best it seems we can expect , says Davidson, is for very low-grade
statistical explanations of when such beliefs and desires will lead to intentional 
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action.^ Davidson is not denying tnat there can be laws far less strict or
deterministic were intentional action is concerned; only tnat the uind of
generality demanded by Hempdl. Elsewhere , Davidson makes it clear that, although
(as mentioned earlier; a causal analysis of intentional action stands or falls
with the notion of a law, in his opinion, 'they fall together if what we want are
explicit, non-question begging- analyses, or laws witnout generous caveats and
ceteris paribus clauses. 1 Davidson's rejection of the possibility of
turning very low-grade statistical tendency statements implied by the attribution
of beliefs and desires into anytiling like serious laws is of course at one with 
his views on tne impossibility of their being any strict psychological-physical
laws in general, and no explicit definitions of tne mental in terms of physical 
behaviour.
In tnis area, Davidson goes against tne kind of strong identity thesis and 
materialism advocated by t..ose like Hempel and Smart. Such a strong physicalism 
asserting the existence of a general identity between each psychological condition 
and a physical counterpart is less acceptable to Davidson tnan the more sophisti­
cated and 'weaker' version of the 'identity- tneory' of materialism, advocated 
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by Nagel. J The latter kind of physicalism does not require that a physical 
condition be found identical with every psychological condition. Davidson's rejec 
tion of any very strong identity thesis between mental and physical events which 
argues a presumptive optimism that all mental events are identical with physical 
events- in the sense that all intensional concepts can be analysed in terms of 
physical concepts, and allowing psychology to be exhaustively reduced to physics -
10g
is apparent in many papers. where he argues for the irreducibility of the
mental at the expense of physicalism. For example, in considerin the relationship
between the mental and the physical, Davidson offers wnat he sees as tne four
alternatives: nomological monism, affirming correlating laws between mental and
physical events; nomological dualism, incorporating various forms of parllelism,
interactionism and tne like; anomalous dualism, combining ontological dualism
with a general failure of laws correlating the mental and the physical (as in
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Cartesianism) , and Davidson's own position of anomalous monism . And
'anomolous monism entails that 'no purely phsycial predicate, no matter how
108
complex, h'as, as a matter of law, the same extension as a mental predicate. '
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Thus, mental events 'resist capture in tne nomological net of physical theory'
The holism of the mental realm is wnat entails the autonomy and anomalous
character of the mental; mental and physical predicates are just not make for one
another, and hence there can be no strict pyscho-physical laws. Yet on Davidson's
thesis of anomalous monism, even though the realm of the mental resists capture in
any nomological net, this can still be reconciled with the causal role of mental
events in the physical world, since it is still possible to hold a version of the
identity theory in which at least some mental events are identified with physical
events. In this sense there can be a degree of 'reciprocal!ty' between the mentaj 
and the physical since, even though, as a class, mental events cannot be
explained in terms of physical science, we can still obtain a kind of 'entering-
wedge' into the realm of the mental by means of particular identities . In this
respect, it is consistent to hold that though there can be no strict scientific
and physical laws of the psychological, the mental can still in some sense be
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said to depend on tne physical. 'This is because ’psychological events are
describable, taken one by one, in physical terms, that is, they are physical 
events. ’ This , then, is Davidson’s anomalous monism , and a sketch of his
kind of materialism in which the two aspects of mental events in relation to 
physical events- causal dependence together with nomological independence- are 
combined.
This slight divergence to Davidson's ideas on materialism and the identity
thesis is in fact directly relevant to Davidson's views on the status of laws in
the causal analysis of intentional action. For, with respect to the first issue,
the nomological irreducibility of the mental is linked to the fact that 'tne
attribution of mental phenomena must be responsible to the background of reasons,
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beliefs , and intentions of the individual. ' Similarly, the same kind of
responsibility to the complex pattern of beliefs and desires of the individual
prevents us from being able to give any serious laws connecting reasons and
intentional actions, and tnus prevents us from giving any necessary and suffic-
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ient conditions for acting on a reason. In order to be able to give
necessary and sufficient conditions or serious laws for the explication of human 
intentional action, we would need, according to Davidson, a 'quantitative calcu­
lus that brings all relevant beliefs ana desires into the picture. ' And this,
f
Davidson thinks , is not a possibility.' Tne laws that are implicit in reason
explanations seem to me to concern only individuals- they are the generalizations
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embedded in attributions of attitudes, beliefs, and traits. '
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Unlike for Goldman or for Armstrong1, Davidson now bar3 defining intentional 
action in terms that fully identify the causal conditions ; his initial optimism 
in this direction thus seems to have been premature. It will be recalled that 
Davidson initially enunciated two conditions C-^  and Gg for explicating 
intentional action. (See 7*1) These two conditions were deemed to be necessary, 
but Davidson also believed that condition C2 (that a primary reason for an 
action be its cause) could be strengthened to make the condition sufficient a-3
well. Yet-Davidson’s later position is changed:
Can we somehow give conditions that are not only necessary, but also 
sufficient, for an action to be intentional, using only such concepts as 
those of belief, desire and cause? I tnink not.
The reason why this cannot be achieved, as hinted at above, being that in order
to distinguish' ±he right sort of causal process , we need to take into account
how a decision by the individual is reached’in the light of conflicting evidence
U S
and conflicting desires. 1 But to do this would mean going beyond the
constraints Davidson envisaged. The notion that Davidson’s constraints are
inadequate in this respect, and that his account must be augmented is echoed by
119other philosophers. What is lacking,on one account , in Davidson’s analysis,
is the very point just mentioned: that we must have an explanation of how a 
prima facie reason becomes a cause . The claim that a primary reason just is a 
cause tells us little,explaining nothing about how an agent arrives at his reason 
and how it relates to his action. And wnat turns an agents reasons into causes,it 
is suggested, entails an acco-nt of how an agent deliberates, and how he evaluates 
such reasons. This matter about how Davidson’a constraints may need to be 
augmented is is dealt with later; for the present , enough has been shown to see 
that Davidson now recognizes we cannot define intentional action(or’free action) 
with concepts that fully identify the causal conditions of intentional action. 
Davidson thus admitts that we must count our search for a causal analysis of 
’A is free to do x' a failure, even though he still sees it as a causal power of 
tne agent.
If, then,on Davidson’s own admission, we cannot give necessary and sufficient 
conditions for intentional action by reference to reasons as causes, this would 
appear to go some way towards tne views expressed by Philosophers such as Taylor, 
Kenny and Melden that reference to reasons as causes cannot explain human , 
intentional action, and that perhaps, as Melden suggested, intentions and pro­
attitudes such as beliefs and desires are completely internal to the actions 
themselves and that explanation of such actions is in terms of ’revealing the
pattern’. Yet Davidson also still maintains that intentional action is a causal
power of the agent. Is it therefore necessary that we must refer to reasons as
causes of intentional action, and that Melden's logical connection argument
in terms of 'what' explanations which reveal pattern in (linguistic) actions, but
where the intentions and reasons are wholly internal to the action , cannot be
sustained? For , though Davidson's constraints could not be expanded to provide
sufficient conditions for explaining intentional action, this failure does not in
his view prevent them from being necessary : '...there is not a good argument to
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show that causal relations rule out necessary connections. ' The arguments
utilized by Melden, and wnich rest on an ability to reveal coherent pattern in
the action of the agent s^till do not, in Davidson's view, touch the question of
'why1 an intentional action occurred; we cannot infer from Melden's arguments that
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reasons like beliefs cannot be causes. Is Melden wrong? Can we show that
we must refer to reasons and tnat explanations concerned with only revealing the 
pattern,and which see reasons as wholly internal to the intentional action , are 
incorrect - or at least inadequate to the extent that , as Davidson would have it, 
explanation by redescription does not exclude the possibility of causal explan­
ation?
Melden's grounds for alleging that intentions, desires, and other reasons 
cannot be. separated from intentional actions - that tney are logically connected 
with trie action (and thus cannot be any kind of Jumean cause) is that they
cannot be characterized without reference to tneir objects , and that, for
)
example, to desire something entails trying to do the very action for which one
122has such a reason. Unlike Dayidson's causal 'why' explanations, Melden's
'what' explantions consist of redescribing the object of the explantion: they do
not link two distinct or independent actions, but rather mention only the action
being explained from which an alternative description is found. For example,
John's action in standing up is explained in terms of his intention of trying
to see the game better. To state his intention is to redescribe accurately
his very action. And John's having such an intention is not a separate event
from his intentional action ; hence to offer an explanation in this way is not
to give a cause for tne action.
But is it enougn to claim tnat such explanations involve only the kina
oi reaescnptioi.s w m c n  neiaeri's argument suggests.-' uertamiy, 01 course, tne
answer for Davidson is ‘n o 1: 1 Reasons, being beliefs and attitudes, are certainly
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not identical witn actions. 1 And, although he was prematurely optimistic
that his causal analysis would provide sufficient conditions for explicating 
intentional action, surely on this latter issue he is correct. If Melden's claim 
that 'what' explanations are only explanations by redescriptions is to be sus­
tained, he must show that such explanations by reasons in terms of redescriptions
do not involve any reference to a cause, and that hence tney do not involve a
124
'why' explanation. But surely reference to a cause is involved in many
instances. Melden is undoubtably correct to maintain that , for example, desires
are not some kind of Humean impression(as do Taylor and Kenny): but it does not
follow that they cannot be, as Melden supposes , independent of the actioB they
explain , or that reference to them is not required- it does not follow , that is,
that they are only internal to the action.
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To see this consider Melden's example of a man driving and raising his arm 
in order to signal: his intention, to signal, explains his action, that of rais­
ing his arm, by redescribing it as signalling. Melden's argument is alleged to • 
show the interdependence of reasons and actions; clearly his point is that there 
can be no prior pro-attitude to act as a cause since there are no prior inde­
pendent mental events or states of mind to be identified: the intention is not 
a prior event, and to say tnat tne agent did the action because of an intention 
is to say something only about the action , since there is only the agent's 
doing of the action. The intention, that is, cannot be independent of the action. 
And thus, to give tne agent's intention is just one more description , and not
a description which refers to independent events, but rather a description of
, 1 2 6
an internal characteristic of the action itself. Yet as Davidson notes,
Melden's explanation of this example is unsatisfactory , and explanations in
terms of patterns does not answer the question of huw reasons explain actions.
Davidson's criticism that Melden's explanation cannot be fully adequate is also
emphasized by another philosopher • For Milligan, as for Davidson, the having of
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a reason and the acting upon it need to be seen as independent. With respect.
to Melden's example, Milligan says 'To ascribe an intention of signalling to 
him is to say more than t;iat he has signalled. ' Milligan goes on to note that
every action has many characteristics, some of which are unknown to the agent and 
are thus not part of his intention , some of which are known but are incidental 
to the action and tnus not strictly part of his intention, ana still others which 
are know to the agent and provide tne reason for his action and constitute his 
intention. In the last example, the difference is , as Milligan says, that the 
agent's attitude towards the feature must be involved. And, 'Since the agent can 
have a favouraole attitude towards a feature without it providing the reason or 
intention for the acting, it looks as if trie attitude has to be such that it is
l O Q
the having of the attitude which leads to the, action being done. ' In other
words , the agent has an attitude■towards, the feature mentioned in the intention,
and the action is carried out because of such an attitude. This is in effect to
endorse Davidson's, contention, for Milligan concludes 1 Thus the action and the
intention appear to be separable; without there being some additional link between
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the two the intention does not explain the action. 1 And , as Milligan notes
for Davidson, this link is given by the intention being the cause.
Furthermore, Milligan goes on to suggest that the evidence of immediate
actions indicates that intentions and reasons such as beliefs and desires,though
internal to the actions as Melden says, are nevertheless also external and
independent of the actions. Kence, 'Though a reason may give a what-explanation
130
of an action, it also gives a why-explanation. ' ' Actions are not only done
with intentions; they are done because of the intentions. This,again, is to 
argue against Melden's notion tnat intentions and pro-attitudes such as beliefs 
and desires are not antecedent or independent of the actions they explain, but are 
wholly internal to such actions. And thus there is a furtner endorsement of 
Davidson's position expressed earlier, that the explanation of intentional human
action involves botn a 'wnat' explanation concerned with 'revealing the pattern' 
of such actions , and a 'why' explanation concerned with how the actions origina­
ted as a result or antecedent factors. As Davidson stressed, Melden's‘what' 
explanations which reveal coherent pattern in actions , and which see reasons as 
wholly internal to the actions, does not preclude the necessity or the possibility 
of 'why' explanations in wnich we must refer also to external reasons as 
causes. 1^1 Thus, though intentions , aesires and beliefs are indeed internal to 
intentional action,, it does not also follow , as Milligan says, that they cannot
be independent and external to the action as well.'*'"'*"
On these issues, then, it seems that Davidson has substantial support, not 
just from Milligan, but from many other philosophers not m e n t i o n e d . I t  
therefore appears that there is at least a good body of evidence to suggest that 
Melden’s claim that reasons are logically connected with the actions they explain 
and that there is no reference to such antecedent or independent reasons as 
causes, should be rejected: reasons do provide ’why’ explanations, and are nece­
ssary to the actions they explain.
To very briefly summarize the concerns of this section, we began with David­
son's notion that the explanation of intentional required not only reference to 
entities such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, but that the primary reasons 
which rationalize an action must cause that action ( in the ordinary scientific 
sense ). This was completely rejected by neo-Wittgensteineans like Taylor,
Kenny, and Melden, who hold that the explanation of intentional human action 
completely eludes any such explanation, and that reference to reasons as the 
causes of intentional action is otiose, with reasons being wholly internal to 
the actions they explain. Though it had to be admitted that Davidson's early 
optimism for providing necessary and sufficient conditions for intentional act­
ion only in terms of reasons as causes, it does seem that there are good grounds 
for holding that we must refer to such antecedent and independent reasons as 
causes- in addition to any explanation which is only concerned with revealing 
the pattern of actions. Nevertheless, the fact that Davidson's criteria could 
not provide necessary and sufficient conditions leads to the conclusion on the 
part of some philosophers that there is something lacking in Davidson's account, 
that what is needed is an augmented explanation indicating, how an agent arrives 
at his reasons for action, and that this involves an account of how the agent 
evaluates and deliberates upon his reasons. The repercussions which this would 
have for Davidson's proposed constraints and for his account of intentional 
action in terms of scientific realism is discussed in the following sections.
( widening Davidson's constraints
Many philosophers are willing to accept that Davidson's constraints as so far 
discussed though necessary, are not able to provide both necessary and sufficient 
conditions for tne explication of human, intentional action, as Davidson himself 
now recognizes. There is in fact a close relation between intentional action and 
the matter of choice or decision in acting, as Davidson sees; however, the springs 
of intentional action are , in tne case of human beings(and unlike the analogue 
of'intentional' behaviour in machines) grounded in an extremely complex psycho­
logical network of attitudes and emotions of the individual, which .makes the 
application of tne Decision Theory model somewhat problematic. Alternative 
solutions have been proffered which purport to give necessary and sufficient 
conditions for intentional action which deny the efficacy of the use of the 'ideal' 
approach of Decision Theory and deductive logic in this area, and which envisage 
the involvement of essential processes of deliberation and the evaluation of the 
individual's reasons as being .needed in explaining intentional action. The 
problem here is tnat such processes seem , in one case at least, to require 
reference to private , subjective features , wnicn would go beyond what Davidsons 
explanation of intentional action in terms of scientific realism would find accept 
able. A totally unified theory meaning' togetner with essential reference to the 
agent's beliefs, desires and a tneory of decision tnus seem to be the best 
solution at present to explicating s.uc.h ..intentional action and remaining within 
tne constraints of a truth conditions theory, tnough accepting that other
approaches augmenting Davidson's proposals will be needeu.
That Davidson's constraints on explicating intentional action in terms of 
reasons as causes are necessary but not sufficient is expressed by many philoso­
phers in various ways. Thus, Aune, for example, says 'What I have been princip­
ally concerned to show here is tnat a primary reason (as Davidson seems to :
conceive it) is not sufficient for doing sometiling intentionally ; such a
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reason however, may be necessary for intentional behaviour. ' Hence, Aune
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sees Davidson'3 account of intentional action as 'seriously oversimplified'
and that'a particular desire typically leaas to rational action on±y by means
of a line of reasoning or deliberaion whose outcome is partly determined by a
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variety of beliefs and otner pro-attitudes. 1 J Similarly, Milligan states 
tnat
What is needed for Davidson’s view to be acceptable is an account of how
a prima facie reason becomes a cause, wnat it is that turns it into a cause,
or what criteria we need to decide whether a prima facie reason is a cause.
Without such an account the claim that the primary reason is a cause tells
us little, and says nothing about wnat an agent’s reason is and how it
157relates to his action.
We will return to Milligan’s views in a moment since it is he who seems to offer 
the most detailed explication in present research of the processes of delibera­
tion and evaluation wnicn are seen as leading to an intentional action. For the 
present let us just register tne fact that intentional action is closely related 
to issues of choice, decision, and deliberation, and that its outcome is also 
partly determined by an extremely complex psychological network of attitudes 
and emotions of the individual agent to wnich the process of decision and 
deliberation and the intentional action may ultimately be traced back. This 
latter fact is clearly recognized by Wilson: 'It is the beliefs, desires and 
emotions wnich are intentional, and our account of this notion must have refer- 
ence to features of their states and dispositions themselves • '
Indeed, it can be plausibly argued, as Wilson does, that a pei-sons intention­
al actions — unlike their analogue in the 'intentional ' activity of machines, —
only forms a coherent whole because such intentional actions are rooted in a
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complex network of attitudes and feelings • It is such a complex network of
attitudes and feelings as a coherent whole (though not an entirely consistent 
one) which ultimately lies behind a person’s actions , rather tnan the fact that 
it is merely goal—directed , as a machine’s behaviour may be deemed to be. This 
is surely rightj and , to the extent that a machine, though in a se^se it may 
be considered to have intentional behaviour (and even thougnts, and beliefs) 
lacks a comparible complexity of organization involving such thoughts,attitudes*
and emotions, it must surely fail to be an adequate analogue by wnich to judge 
the intentional actions of numan beings. Thus it seems reasonable to demand
tnat our basis for judging tne intentional actions of other human beings and the 
related processes of .'decision and deliberation wnich lie behind such actions
should be the shared attitudes and emotions of human beings, and not the goal-
directed model provided oy a macnine or a computer. That we do possess a common 
stocn of attitudes and emotional responses helps us to explain how we can under­
stand the intentional (and, of course, unintentional) actions of our fellow human 
beings , since another person’s intentional actions (for example) will make 
sense to me only if they are seen as springing from attitudes and feelings which 
form a part of my own set of characteristic responses:
If I know how it feels to feel as he does, I can understand how he defines
the situation in wnich he is acting, and why he acts as he does. If the
feeling out of which his action springs is foregein to me, to that extent 
his action is unintelligible.
Thus, emotions, as well as other altitudes are central to our understanding of 
how people act in tne world and towards one another, and it is only by taking 
such an overall largely coherent and consistent , but extremely complex , psycho­
logical network into account tnat we can finally understand and successfully 
interpret another person’s intentional actions. Indeed, for V/ilson, it is
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plain that 1’emotions are tne fi.,.al touchstone of sincerity. ’ It is also 00
emphasize, as we draw to tne end of this thesis , trie point made at tne beginning 
of PART 111, tnat in tne interpretation of tne meaning of an agent’s intentional
(linguistic) actions , one must make reference also to all the features comprizing
thupsychological reality of such an agent.
That the explanation of intentional (linguistic) action must take cognizanceof
decision and deliberation, and is ultimately responsible to the complex psychologic 
al network of attitudes and more of the individual is recognized by Davidson. The
problem is wnether his own proposals in this direction go far enough. Hence, it 
is not just that the interpretaion of the meaning of a speaker’s words and the
interpretatio oi' t:ie related beliefs, desires and intentions must go hand-in- 
hand, but any unified t.ieory must also include a theory of decision:
All this strongly suggests tnat the attribution of desires and beliefs 
(and other thoughts ) must go hand in hand with the interpretation of 
speech, tnat neither tne theory of decision nor of interpretation can be 
successfully developed without the other.
In fact, the central importance of Decision Theory to Davidson’§ overall theory 
of language goes back to his original papers published in the early 1950’s. ^ 4  
More recently, as tne above quotation indicates , the matter has taken on increas­
ing importance:
The theory for wnich we should ultimately strive is one that takes as evid­
ential base preferences between sentences- preferences that one sentence 
rather than another be true.- The theory would tuen explain individual
preferences of this sort by attributing beliefs and values to the agent,
145and meanings to his words.
The introduction of Decison Theory is necessary since ’where one constellation
of beliefs and desires will rationalize an action, it is always possible to find
1 a
a quite different constellation tnat will do as well. ' Of course, such
a theory itself relies on language , so that 'If we think of all choices as 
revealing a preference tnat one sentence rather than another be true, the result­
ing total theory should provide an interpretation of sentences,and at the same
time assign beliefs and desires, both of tne latter conceived as relating the 
agent to sentences or utterances. 1 Finally, in his latest published work,
the matter is refined still further: the issue now is 'to tell when a person 
has a certain degree of belief in some proposition, or what the relative
strengths of his preferences are. '148 (emphasis added) and Davidson con­
cludes 'So if we could discover degree of belief in sentences from preferences
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that sentences be true we would have a successful unified tneory. '
The hope was , therefore, that Decision Theory would offer a more
sophisticated way of dealing with the reason explanations of intentional action,
since it is concerned with how an a0ent chooses a m o n g several competing’ action,
and with the problem of the effect of variations in the strength of desire, or
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degree of belief. But taking Becison Theory as a model for explicating
the reasons and preferences behind choices of courses of action has problems.
Firstly, as Davidson notes, 'Some ordinary desires, however, do not translate
directly into preferences, so tnat not all reason explanations have a clear
151
decision theory counterpart explanation ' , this being especially so in
relation to conflicting desires, a problem which Decision Theory appears to skip,
barring possible evidence for conflict in behaviour.
The suggestion , already , is that Decision Theory is not able to cope with
the complexity in the processes which eventuate in human , intentional action.
This is the brunt of the criticism levelled at Decision Theory by Milligan: 'This
model of decision-making seems to force on us a view of desires which does not
apply to all that originates action' and indeed seems to 'force on us a mistaken
152
view of desires. 1 Decision Theory as a model for the reasoning process
leading to intentional action is hopelessly inadequate by Milligan's standards.
It is too limited, being applicable only where the consequences of different 
possible actions can be accurately predicted, and where preferences of an agent 
for these consequences can be ordered ; and, according to Milligan, 'In some cases 
we do not have tne required predictability or cannot measure the likelihood of 
alternative outcomes' while'In other cases to give an agent's preferences for 
alternative outcomes is an unsatisfactory way of showing how his wants relate to 
each other. ' ^  ^ t ,  most important of all for Milligan's thesis, Decision 
Theory has nothing to say about the formation of preferences:
...most important of all, tne decision theory model can give no account of 
the formation of preferences and tne way they are ordered, and their form-
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ation is often an essential part of tne agent's deliberation.
Milligan's case is thus predicated on tne fact, for him, that Decision Theory
is of little help in explicating the complex processes of deliberation and 
evaluation leading to intentional action on the part of an agent. Of fundamental
importance to an account oi reasons is that it is tnrough the agent's evaluation 
of the relevant factors involved that he determines wnat is to be a reason, a ' 
good reason, and tnen finally a decisive reason, and that this process throws 
some doubt ^as we have seen ) on a complete causalist account, and upon deductive 
metnods. hence, an agent's beliefs, desires and other attitudes are not them­
selves sufficient to result in action, nor can JDecsion Theory aid us in fully 
understanding tne process; it is only through trie agent's own process of evalu­
ation of his attitudes that tne link to intentional action occurrs, and it is 
this which an interpreter must comprehend. Though of course, as we have also seen, 
it is the case that without reference to sucn entities as belefs and desires we 
cannot explain why an agent would have done an action , having.,, such reasons on 
the part of the agent is not sufficient for the action to have followed; whether 
or not it did follow depends on that agent's evaluation of his reasons : 'In ex­
plaining an action by saying that a factor is the reason for it, we are not 
merely mentioning the presence of that factor, or its connection with the action;
we are also saying something about the way it is connected throught the agent’s
155evaluation of it. ' For Milligan, 'Reasons are not mere abstractions which
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have logical relations ' and an account of whether reasons are causes is
best approached by considering how the agent comes to have such reasons;
The explantion of why tne action takes place must be in terms of now the 
agent comes to make up his mind, and that will depend on the way he thinks 
about and assesses his situation and the courses of action he believes are 
open to him. The agent's reason must similarly depend on what he thinks 
and the factor mentioned in his reason is something which he has taken into 
account of in his deliberation ; indeed it is chat factore Wnich, as he
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deliberates, swings him decisively behind the line of action he takes.
Thus it is such processes of deliberation and evaluation on tne part of an 
individual agent which Milligan sees as the necessary addition to a theory 
suon as Davidson's , since it is an account of how a reason becomes a cause, 
and what it is that turns it into a cause, that Milligan saw as lacking in 
Davidson's thesis. Yet the passage like the one quoted above, with its
euu.ud.axa on tne individual's processes 01 thought and evaluation also point the 
way to why Milligan13 views would presumably be unacceptable to Davidson with 
his truth conditions account, together with Milligan's rejection of reasons as 
logical relations and his dismissal oi deductive logic as being adequate to deal­
ing with an individual's deliberations and evaluations; such evaluations are 
seen as essentially value judgements beyond the scope of deductive logic . Not 
all the reasoning whies occurrs in deliberation is deductive or causal for 
Milligan, and mistakes will be made if it is assumed that the real form of 
thinking must be deductive, it thus being 'legitimate to widen the notion of 
logical reasoning to cover all reasoning. ' as Milligan puts it in his
discussion on Von Wright's Deontic Logic and Kenny's Logic of Satisfactoriness.
The flaw in such demands - from the point of view of Davidson's truth condit­
ions theory anyway - is that ultimately they <■ depend on eviuence which is
159beyond the province of a truth conditions account. J For, on Milligan's thesis
to explain an action fully we not only need to understand the individual'agent's
reasons and how he arrived at them , but also the way all the other factors affec-
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ted his awareness of and response to the situation in which he acted. The
required rationalisation is the one which is closest to the individual agent's 
actual processes of thinking. The ^mean'deductivist, in Milligan's view tries to 
reduce the elements of deliberation to the rules of logic, whereas for him it is 
such elements in the individual agent's deliberation process wnich are far wider 
than can be allowed for by logic. What Milligan appears to be doing is placing 
the individual agent's processes of evaluation and thought as beyond those of 
formal methods , wnich should tnerefore(pe,in most cases, rejected as inadequate. 
Instead of putting tne intentional actions themselves, and the formal interpreta­
tion of their structures first- as on Davidson's truth conditions theory- the 
emphasis nas swung completely in tne opposite direction, and it is the individuals 
subjective process leading--to deliberation and thence to action itself which nave 
become paramount* Thus Milligan contends tnat the agent 'decides in his own way 
and can act in a unique way or for reasons wnich ne alone has1, and that 'Since
agents determine their own reasons, we are not entitled to infer one person's
1^ )1reasons from tnose of another. ' Furthermore 'each person evaluates for
"j £ p
himself' ana '...manes no reference to anything outside himself. 1 ■L >^eL .
Elsewhere Milligan coi.ies close to aumittmg wnat, from tne point or view or 
Davidson’s truth conations theory , is tne fatal flaw in his delineation of the 
processes of deliberation and evaluation necessary to any understanding* of 
intentional action : ’According to my account, reasons relate to the intention 
of the agent and, in the case ol deliberative actions, to private processes of 
reasoning; none of these are directly accessible to an observer. ' (emphasis 
added. ) But, as Milligan accepts: ’It may , therefore, be more difficult to 
combat the charge of subjectivity ' ^ on his account.
The problem wnich such opinions focus on is one which has been met often in 
tne course of this tuesis: whether we can allow tne evidence of extra—linguistic
factors into our explanation and interpretation of linguistic action, together 
with the relative importance wnicn should be attatched to the truth conditions 
structure of language at tne expense of sucn extra—linguistic considerations.
And the central point wnich has been continually made is that though , on David­
son’s thesis there is a kind of reciprocity between language and extra-linguistic 
reality, and that an argument can be put forward for holding that total concept­
ual primacy should not be given to language, we nevertheless have little choice 
but to accept that any structured view of both objective and psychological reali­
ty must come from tne side of something like tne truth conditions theory of 
language. The same applies with relation to the arguments above for the needed 
concepts of deliberation and evaluation in understanding intentional (linguistic) 
action . It is not disputed by Davidson that the processes involved on the part 
of the individual take us beyond the capacities of his truth conditions theory 
and of Decision Theory; all that is claimed is presumably any access to
tne needed processes of decision, deliberation or evaluation must also be from 
within a unified formal theory. Milligan’s aims are admirable, but it is hard to 
see how his ideas can escape such constraints. Certainly Davidson’s proposals in 
this area will no doubt have to be augmented, but on the latest stage of research, 
it would seem tnat a unified theory of the truth conditions structure of language 
which attributes a complex network of meaning, belief, desire and intention,
together with Decision Theory accounting for the processes leading to intentional
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action, is the best approach.
7*4 Truth Conditions Theory as a Unified Theory of Psychological Reality
The conclusions reached in the last section indicated that Davidson's use of his 
Decision Theory left a lot to be desired in accounting for the processes which 
eventuate in human, intentional (linguistic) action, and will no doubt require 
further refinement, the alternative suggested by Milligan, on the other hand, 
seems to necessitate an understanding of features of deliberation and evaluation 
on the part of the individual agent which would take us beyond the area of opera­
tion of something like Davidson's truth conditions structure of language and the 
Decision Theory. And, since our ultimate aim (7*1) is for a unified theory of 
meaning together with a theory of the beliefs, desires, and intentions which 
issue in(linguistic) actions, ( .including an account of how the agent or speaker 
chooses or decides . on the course of action) , Davidson's truth conditions 
theory of interpretation and theory of action seems, at the present stage of re­
search, the best approach.
To see how this conclusion was reached, let us briefly summarize the main 
concerns of this chapter. We began by seeing that the only way to interpret a 
speaker's utterances was by assuming his words referred to the.yworld as that 
speaker believed it to be, that other attitudes such as desires were involved, 
and that the use of language to refer to the world was a form of intentional 
activity.*Our description of the linguistic action of referring to the world 
must therefore make crucial reference to the beliefs, desires, and intentions 
of the speaker. Yet, just as witn reference, since any extra-linguistic founda­
tional basis , such intensional features as beliefs must receive an analysis from 
within the extensional trutn conditions metalanguage j it is thus a matter of 
tne analysis of the logical relations of language together with the determina­
tion of an ontology. The attribution of such features of psychological reality 
is thus immanent within language , even though reference is made to real entities 
such as beliefs and desires on Davidson's analysis , such reasons having been 
deemed to have caused linguistic actions in a special way. However, both 
Davidson's extensional reconstruction of beliefs and other attitudes, and also 
the notion of reference to reasons as causes have both been rejected Dy various 
philosophers. Whether Davidson's trutn conditions tneory can satisfactorily
explicate sentences attributing propositional attitudes is so far unclear. The 
second issue of reference to reasons as causes is more complicated: though it 
had to be admitted tnat Davidson's early optimism for providing necessary and 
sufficient conations for intentional action only in terms of reasons as causes was 
unjustified, it does seem tnat we must refer to such antecedent reasons as causes 
in addition to any explanation(sucu as Melden's ) which is concerned with such 
reasons only as internal to the actions. Nevertheless, shortcomings were revealed 
in that an account of how the agent arrives at his reasons for action needed 
also to be considered. The fact that the springs of intentional action are 
grounded in extremely complex attitudes and emotions of the individual makes 
the application of Davidson's Decision Theory model somewhat problematic; yet 
alternatives such as the suggestion by Milligan for explicating the processes of 
deliberation and evaluation behind intentional action seem to require notions 
which would go beyond what would be acceptable if we wish to retain the truth 
conditions structure of language as our foundational basis. Thus, Davidson's 
unified theory of meaning and action, though it will no doubt need augmentation 
in this area, seems the best approacn at present.
PART FOUR 
LANGUAGE
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS
8*1 Resume
The original problem with which this thesis began was 'what is the nature or 
structure of language and what is the relationship of language so construed to 
the objective reality of the world and to the psychological reality of the 
speakers who use it. ' ^
Ascertaining the solution to the problem of what it is about the nature of 
the linguistic behaviour of others which allows an interpreter to construe it 
as meaningfully referring to an extra-linguistic objective reality , as it is so 
used by speakers, has in fact brought us full-circle: from taking such linguistic 
behaviour as the only really scientifically objective and concrete evidence 
available to an interpreter who is trying to discover what is being said about 
the world by a speaker, to finding out that language itself is the common shared 
resource from within which the theoretical reconstruction of the objective 
reality which is being referred to , together with those features of the 
psychological reality of the speaker which are deemed to constrain the use of 
such a linguistic action, must take place. For, what has become clear in the 
course of this thesis is tnat,for Davidson, there is only our intersubjectively
shared language and an extra-linguistic world (which includes of course the 
speakers of a language) wnioh must- and can only be- finely discriminated from 
within such a language.
What is equally clear is that such a notion renounces utterly the idea of 
all dualisms between scheme and content: whether within language itself, or ,
more pertinent to the theme of this study, between language and objective reality 
or psychological reality. Thus we have a complete rejection of any traditional 
theories of realism (or their contemporary counterparts ) which give credence
to any form of empiricism or of the idea of language-whether in terms of words, 
sentences, or of a whole language— as labelling, corresponding to, or organizing 
an extra—linguistic, reality. Similarly wuen it comes to the necessary considera 
tion of those features of tne psychological reality of speakers(such as beliefs, 
desires, intentions plus decisions) which guide and constrain the linguistic 
action of meaningfully referring to objective reality: unlike as with traditional 
theories of meaning, no extra-linguistic access to such features is allowable.
In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that Davidson's use of Tarski's theory of 
truth effectively reverses such traditional conceptions of the connection 
between the elements of language and the elements of objective and psychological 
reality; the elements of the latter being brought into relation , on Davidson's 
view, with those of language. This is in accordance with Davidson'3 adherence 
to the tenets of scientific realism: just as the early Wittgenstein and Russell 
in their philosophy of language are clearly in line with the science of their 
day, so Davidson's approach reflects the 'bootstrap' theory of contemporary 
physics.^
Nevertheless, this need not place a total conceptual primacy on language at 
the expense of extra-linguistic features of reality , as some critics of Davidson 
maintain: it is not necessary, for instance, to hold that the elements of object­
ive reality, or the elements of thoughts, beliefs and the like are to be 
identified with linguistic elements. It is argued here tnat though there is, on 
Davidson's tnesis , a degree of 'reciprocity' between language and objective 
or psychological reality, this need not be taken to imply that linguistic con - 
cepts exhaust those of reality. What is_ central to Davidson's thesis is that the 
only access we have as radical interpreters to understanding the true and 
structured elements of objective reality, as with those intensional features 
such as beliefs within psychological reality, is by means of the 'entering-wedge'
provided by something like the truth conditions structure he advocates; the 
qualification implied by 'something' being important, as the research showed.
It is in this sense,too, tnat the truth conditions theory of language becomes 
the new intersubjectively shared ioundational basis from within which tne 
invariant structural features of reference('meaning') , belief, desire,
and intention (plus decision) are preserved in the inter-translation of conceptu­
al schemes between an interpreter and an (alien) speaker- since, in translating 
between languages we no longer have, for Davidson, any access to any foundational 
basis in objective or psychological reality in the sense required by traditional 
notions of realism or traditional theories of meaning - such inter-translata- 
bility (the 'essence of l a n g u a g e h o o d ) merely correlating two comprehensive 
theories concerning all that there is. This being so, of course, only on the 
assumption that 'in front of' the intersubjectively shared truth conditions 
structure of language there is a real, extra-linguistic objective reality (one 
common world at the most , as Davidson would have it^ ) about which there are 
already over-lapping schemas of reference involving substantial general agree­
ment concerning the naoure of these inferred externals ostensibly referred to; 
and that 'behind' the intersubjectively snared trutn condtions structure 
of language are equally real dispositions to believe, to intend and the like, 
(language being for Davidson, amongst other things, one large disposition to 
believe^) about wnich there are over-lapping schemas of commonly shared beliefs 
and other attitudes. The existence of such over-lapping schemas of common, 
shared features of reference, belief and other attitudes being an essential 
prerequisite if successful communication is to be achieved about external ob­
jective reality and human psycnological reality, the invariant structural 
characteristics of which, on Davidson's analysis , are captured by the 
translation schema of the truth condtions theory of language. Of course, in 
order to hchieve the ideal or best translation- to make maximum sense of the 
meaning of the linguistic utterances of other speakers, an interpreter must, 
ideally, also simulate to the maximum extent all of the other speaker's beliefs, 
desires , intentions,(plus decisions) if anything like wholeness of understand­
ing is to be achieved § Davidson's early formulation of 3uch requirements in 
terms of his Principles of Charity and Rationality are open to some criticism, 
his later and more subtle statements being perhaps more appreciative of the 
kind of understanding we should be aiming for. But the essential point 
remains : tnat, on Davidson's analysis, with no recourse to any foundational
basis in an extra-linguistic objective or psychological reality possible, the 
interpretative reconstruction of how a speaker refers to the world ( a n d
to what he is referring), as with the necessary consideration of tne complex
of attitudes taken to guide and constrain such a linguistic action, can only
take place from within (something like tne truth conditions theory of) the
intersubjectively shared structure of language itself. Language is thus the
real intersubjectively valid foundational basis by means of which minimum
agreement between speakers is secured with respect to matters of reference to
any extra-linguistic objective reality , and the beliefs, attitudes and aims
underlying such a reference. No foundational basis other than the very fine
distinctions provided by language in the attribution to a speaker of these
features of reference, belief, desire, and intention (and decision) is possible
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or necessary for Davidson.
It is in this way, then, that if one accepts the overall correctness of
Davidson's arguments- as it is suggested in various sections of this thesis we
must, despite the sometimes justified criticisms made by philosophers of certain
aspects- the only conclusion which can be drawn is that reality, for us , in any
discriminated sense, must be linguistic reality. For., only from within the
truth conditions structure of language can direct, extensional reference be
made to the simultaneously postulated entities which are assumed, to exist in
objective reality, together with- since it is all part of a single project,
8
'no part .of wnich can be assumed to be complete before tne rest is1 • -extension­
al reference to the theoretical constructs of beliefs, desires, intentions as 
well as decisions. Particularly in his very latest papers, Davidson makes it
t
clear that the interpretation of (linguistic) action requires that we treat
such elements as meaning(reference), belief, desire , intention, along with decis
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ion as fully-coordinate elements in a unified tneory. Thus, from within 
the ’new1 foundational basis of our truth conditions theory of tne structure 
of language, sucn a perspective must require that there is no interpreting how 
a speaker’s words meaningfully refer to objective reality (the extensional 
reconstruction of such reference being also to ask what objects are being 
assumed) without also seeing too. such, a linguistic act of reference as being 
intrinsically linked to a complex background network of beliefs (as action- 
guiding) , desires.( which aim at realisation in action), intentions plus
decisions ( as involving the ultimate aims or purposes of the action, plus the 
closely connected matter of the choice or preference for one course of action 
over another) -the attribution and extensional reconstruction of which (together 
with the assumed entities) must also be from within the foundational basis of 
language.^
Let us expand this just a little in a final explication of the conclusions 
which must be drawn from Davidson’s truth conditions theory and his adherence to 
the tenets of scientific realism. From the starting point that the only 
scientifically objective and concrete evidence available to us in attempting to 
comprehend the behaviour of other people must be intentional linguistic 
behaviour, a theory of interpretation for a certain fragment of that language 
was required - for tne indicative sentences taken to manifest, simultaneously, 
what the complex human organism,which a human speaker is ,must be meaningfully 
referring to in the objective world, togetrier with such a speaker’s beliefs and 
other attitudes towards that world. Davidson's claim is tnat Tarski’s truth 
conditions theory is a theory of the kind required, a theory whicn gives the 
’meaning*- or rather, the structure - of all the true sentences of the language, 
which, with the notion of recursion on satisfaction , relates such sentential 
functions to (infinite) sequences in objective reality, thereby defining 
’truth’. But the importance of this part of the research from the present 
point of view is that it gave a good argument for showing how, and why, the 
whole of natural language could be regarded as one autonomous structural 
network oi* logical possiblilities- accepting that for some philosophers there 
are doubts, as seen in PARTI, aoout whether Davidson's ideas abo-'.t logical 
form are entirely adequate ( tne more radical contention that natural language 
has no logical form wiiatsoever, or even, as for tne Dsconstructionalists, that 
language is a mere play of differences and displacements which can never be 
pinned down, being ultimately unacceptable) - and how that fragment of
,  • x  • n  • 4. 11language of concern to us relates to oojective reality.
That is, as shown in FART 11, it could be seen how such a truth conditions
structure of the relevant sentences (as given by at least something like the
kind of tneory advocated by Davidson; though in no sense 'corresponding ' to 
objective reality in the way envisaged by traditional realism, could
nevertheless, from within language itself, be construed as having extensional 
reference to objective reality whilst simultaneously 'inventing' the postulated 
abstract entities required for such reference (such assumed entities being, for 
Davidson, events with an internal structure of causes). Thus, reference to 
objective reality and the assuming of abstract entities could only be seen 
through language (even though language must not be thought to create nature, 
since the latter can always refute our conceptions of it). Language , as the 
structural framework it is , thus structures any human contact with objective 
reality, providing a matrix of order and control : language creates the
categories through which we experience the world, and which we , as human 
beings, impose on the world. The structure of objective reality itself is , for 
us, identified and individuated from within language, and what counts as an 
entity is a function of our linguistic structure of representation as delineated 
in PART 1 of the thesis. As far as this aspect of the interpretation of the 
utterances of speakers is concerned, then, the burden of PART 11 of the thesis, 
an interpreter in redescribing a speaker's utterance as meaningfully referring 
to the world is in effect realizing (in terms of his own linguistic conceptual 
scheme) the structure of objective reality and the entities assumed within 
such a speaker's language. Such a referential element within language is 
best seen as the structural pattern and abstract entities whi'cn human beings 
project and impose upon objective reality (but wnich are nevertheless underst­
ood by Davidson as being really there) and which reflect the human propensity 
to order inferred externals as a means of controlling the structural pattern 
assumed to exist in objective reality; as such it should be considered the 
fundamental category of language, the 'operative' element , as Davidson would 
have it. ^  Presumably, in tnis respect, it is in our own interests to make 
the mesh of the structural network as 'fine' as possible in order to capture 
in ever—increasingly sensitive terms, as much of objective reality as we can— 
a good reason, perhaps, for accepting Davidson's notion of tne structure of 
language, even if it is not taken to be tne only possible solution. But tne 
essential points have been emphasized: extensional reference to the inferred 
entities in objective reality, and tne fine discrimination of sucn reality,can 
only be from within (something like) Davidson's truth conditions theory of
the structure of language. It is in this sense that objective reality, for 
human beings, is linguistic reality. ^
but again, the use of words with such a structure to meaningfully refer to an 
objective reality which is so inferred is a linguistic action of speakers, 
and is thus intrinsically linked to an extremely complex background15network 
of the psychological reality of the speaker,incorporating a structure of 
beliefs, desires, intentions and decisions which guide and constrain such 
reference. Once more, with no access to such features in the sense required by 
traditional theories of meaning, their attribution necessarily is from within 
language itself, and hence reference to such features of psychological reality 
behind the linguistic utterance concerned receives a reconstruction within 
the extensional metalanguage, together with the postulated entities. PART 111
of this thesis dealt with this aspect of the reconstruction within the exten­
sional metalanguage of such prepositional attitudes as fA believes that p ' * 
(and also the causal structure Davidson takes to underlie such assumed entities) 
Thus beliefs, as indissolubly linked to meaning, appear to be taken by Davidson
as mainly action-guiding: a kind of internal map or network by whicn we
interpret objective reality and which guide a speaker's linguistic actions
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which sometimes result from such beliefs . Similarly, desires are closely 
connected with such beliefs, since dominant desires, if they are in suitable
co-operation with beliefs, can be seen as jointly responsible for a speaker's 
linguistic actions,action having as its objective the satisfaction of the ' .
1
desires. ^  Similarly with intentions and decisions; intentions for example,
in Davididson's view are obviously crucially related to beliefs and desires,
since intending to perform an action is to hold it desirable in the light of
our beliefs; but, in his later work at least, intentions are to be distinguished
18
from beliefs and desires in a way not always done by other philosophers. 
Plainly, too, intentions are closely related to the concept of will behind 
intentional action — behind, that is, the impostion of the structural pattern 
imputed to, and imposed upon, objective reality in the manner described a little
earlier, since such wilful 'striking out' at objective reality must be
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inherently related to our purposes, aims and goals of such action. Likewise,
essentially related to intentions is the notion of decisions and of choosing 
or deciding’ to act- the decision to choose to do X rather than Y being, among 
other things, to form an intention of doing X; what action is ultimately 
performed, then, will depend on one's decisions ( and wnich may further , for 
some philosophers, required the notion of deliberation, the latter being constru­
ed as purposeful thought having as its aim a decision to act. ) 20 Hence it is
that for Davidson, as mentioned earlier, that (along with meaning and reference) 
such elements as belief, desire, and intention plus decision must be treated 
as fully - coordinate features in a unified theory explicating linguistic 
action.
But the fundamental point emerging from this part of the thesis was that, 
just as an interpreter, in redescribing a speaker's utterance as meaningfully 
referring to objective reality had to construe such reference to objective 
reality and the simultaneous postulation of abstract entities in terms of 
(something like)Davidson's truth conditions theory of language,-and that in this 
sense, objective reality , for us, is linguistic reality- so the attribution 
by an interpreter of the necessary backgound of the complex network of 
psychological reality(described above)to a speaker - a network which is 
necessarily imputed to such a speaker since it is deemed to lie behind the aot Of 
linguistic reference under consideration- must also be seen in terms of 
the truth conditions theory of language. The conclusion is obvious: any reference 
to such inferred entities in psychological reality, and the fine discrimination 
of that reality having to be made from within (something like) Davidson's truth 
cbeditions theory of the structure of language, then this psychological reality, 
too, for human beings, is linguistic reality.
If one accepts , in overall terms, that Davidson's arguments for rejecting 
any foundational basis in objective reality and psychological reality are 
correct-and the studies in tne various sections of this thesis suggest we must 
accept this- then what replaces these central features of traditional realism 
and traditional theories of meaning can only be , in the manner indicated above, 
our intersubjectively shared foundatxonal basis of 1nnguage, the truth conditions 
structure of which decides what is to be objective reality for us, together
with the various beliefs and attitudes underlying' tnis. It is in tuis sense that 
such a structure of language reflects the nature of objective reality as well 
as the human attitudes towards the inferred entities in objective reality ; the 
latter aspect is uneliminable since language always implies the presence of 
human speakers' attitudes as well as the presence of the world. The interpreata- 
tion of an utterance of language thus requires tnat it be seen as part of the 
dynamic, complex which is language as a whole- the starting- off point for our 
investigation in PART 1 - and explains Davidson’s contention that the
interpretation of 'meaning' (reference), belief, desire, and intention plus 
decision is all part of a single project, no part of which can be assumed to 
be complete without the rest, since we can understand fully how a speaker's 
utterance meaningully refers to the world only if we understand his complex 
background network of attitudes towards that world. Hence, to the sensitive 
interpreter, and with respect to his own construct system, the language he is 
interpreting, by its very trutn conditions structure , appears to represent the 
structure of objective reality within its sentences, and by this truth condit­
ions structure it relates the assumed objective reality it represents to the 
attitudes of its speakers. Perhaps one can now go further than the suggestion
in Wittgenstein's remark that language is a 'form of life' and see it as
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representative of a'person1.
With respect to the arguments presented in CHAPTERS FIVE and SEVEN., and 
the summary given above, reality must now be considered immanent within 
language,'all ascription of reality, its identification and individuation being 
from within language by virtue of (something like) Davidson's proposed truth 
conditions theory of the structure of language. Objective reality (for Davidson 
in terms of events as temporal, unrepeatable,particulars with an internal 
causal structure, and complimentary to objects- see CHAPTER FIVE) together with 
the psychological reality of people(in terms of such entities as beliefs and 
desires , intentions and related decisions, and also invoking the relevant 
causal structure- see CHAPTER 8EVEP.) is all represented as theoretically 
postulated from within the truth conditions structure of language. Ana, since 
such a theoretically postulated structural network of entities is already 
immanent, reality for us is linguistic reality.
Yet, as also made clear in CJHa PTERo FIVE AID 3EVE1, is not the whole story. 
For even if , in the first instance, reality must be considered immanent 
within the structural network of language - as it must- what is equally plain 
is that such a structured network of interpretants within language must also 
be taken to be referring to an extrinsic objective reality (5*2) and psycho­
logical reality (7*2) which is really taken to exist. That is, language 
wnich seems to be about something , really is about something in objective 
reality, and language, which seems to have been ushered-in by a complex of 
speakers * attitudes really should be taken to have originated in this way. In 
other words, even though reality itself mostly eludes us, language should 
not be taken as merely signifying nothing but language itself, unlike for those 
philosophers who would want to maintain that the structure of language cannot 
be taken as really referring to objective reality , or for those philosophers 
who take it that the structure of linguistic actions does not involve reference 
to independent and antecedent reasons. With respect to the first issue, it seems 
that language must be provided with a semantics in which at least some of its 
quantifiers are referentialiy interpreted (5*2); similarly, linguistic actions 
must be construed as involving independent and antecedent reasons to which 
reference is made in their explanation (7*2). This is so irrespective of 
whether the criticisms centred on Davidson’s construal of the nature of events- 
particularly in relation to their causal structure- or of the austere constrain­
ts Davidson assumed to be required in order to satisfy Convention (t ) are 
valid. Evdn if, for example, it does prove feasible to eliminate a troublesome
ontology, and whether or not Davidson’s causal structure of events is Inadequate,
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the points are still valid.
Thus, even if it is the case tnat reality is immanent within the structural 
network of language, and that therefore the investigation of the disclosures 
of such a web-like structural network of language is of paramount significance, 
the fundamental mechanism, nevertheless, these disclosures of language do not 
just speak about language itself, but reflect and reveal something else and 
something more about a real external reality to wnich they ostensibly refer, and 
do refer.
Even accepting , as it is argued we must, that the fundamental mechanism
for us should lie in the investigation of the disclosures of the structural
network of language, since reality is immanent within language, and that these
disclosures refer to an external reality, it is further argued that this does
not mean we should be too accepting of Davidson's initial presumptions about
the necessary constraints on theories of truth satisfying Convention ^T) which
are to provide a truth conditions account.Although, as noted in various parts
of the thesis, Davidson's austere methodological constraints have certain
distinct advantages, it now seems certain that, if required, there are many
more possibilities for providing richer theories for investigating the structure
of language and still remaining within the constraints demanded by Conven -
tion (t ). This being so, and richer semantic theories being open to us, Davidson's
ideal of the fine discrimination of reality from within language,in the
terms he originally envisaged, cannot be considered the only choice we have.
in our investigation of deeper and deeper structures of language- and thus of
reality itself. Language is tne source, not just of the fine discrimination
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of reality,but also of many other alternative ways of being as well.
Of course, such investigations : of the structures of language are still 
constrained by nature; reality always has the final say. But , as Quine notes,20 
our theory demands of tne world only that it is structured so as to assure us 
that the sequences of stimulation the theory makes us expect are really there; 
if philosophers of other persuasions such as Riccoeur are correct and man 
has withdrawn from the world and,after his break with nature, is intelligibly 
re-creating that world within language, then it is not surprising that we
27
should be aiming for the most unified theory possible which nature will accept. 
But there seems no reason why tnat theory should be limited to the constraints
• x a 28Davidson originally anticipated.
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